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I. INTRODUCTION
Cardozo's opinion in Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.'
hinges on a stark assertion about rights and wrongs: A plaintiff has
no right of action unless she can show "'a wrong' to herself; i.e., a
violation of her own right."2 Cardozo himself made this principle the
core of his analysis, yet scholars typically regard it as impenetrable,
circular, vacuous, or, as Posner put it, "eloquent bluff."3 Small
wonder, then, that readers typically turn to "reasonable
foreseeability" as the essence of the case. Leading scholars treat
Palsgraf as a proximate cause case,4 despite Cardozo's pronouncement
that "W[the law of causation, remote or proximate, is thus foreign to
the case before us.,5 Though Palsgraf is widely regarded as the most
famous case in American tort law, Cardozo's own reasoning in
Palsgraf is typically ignored or derided, but not explained.
The facts of Palsgraf may be peculiar, but its core principle is
pervasive: For all torts, courts reject a plaintiffs claim when the
defendant's conduct, even if a wrong to a third party, was not a wrong
to the plaintiff herself. For example, an injured plaintiff can win in
fraud only if she was defrauded, in defamation only if she was de-
famed, in trespass only if her land rights were violated, and so on.
Courts reach these results even where the defendant acted tortiously,
the plaintiff suffered a real injury, and the plaintiffs injury was rea-
sonably foreseeable. The legal rule upon which these cases rely is
that which our scholarly tradition treats so ambivalently in Palsgraf:
1. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
2. Id. at 100.
3. RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 43-45 (1990) (asserting that
Cardozo's discussion of the relational nature of duty is "eloquent" but subtle "bluff'). See, e.g.,
JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW: CARDOzO, HOLMES, JEFFERSON, AND
WYTHE AS MAKERS OF THE MASKS 134 (1976) (criticizing abstractness and unreality of Cardozo's
opinion); Thomas A. Cowan, The Riddle of the Palsgraf Case, 23 MINN. L. REV. 46, 54 (1938)
("This is merely a definition in a circle, and has all the truth and all the sterility of every
tautologous proposition."); William L. Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1, 16 (1953)
("That is merely a dog chasing its own tail.").
4. See, e.g., W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS § 43, at
284-90 (5th ed. 1984) (presenting Palsgraf as leading proximate cause case). See also DAN B.
DOBBS & PAUL T. HAYDEN, TORTS AND COMPENSATION: PERSONAL ACCOUNTABILTY AND SOciAL
RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURY 210 (3d ed. 1997) (presenting Palsgraf in chapter entitled "Legal or
'Proximate' Cause"); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 512 (6th ed. 1995)
(presenting Palsgraf in chapter entitled "Proximate Cause (Herein of Duty)"); MARC A.
FRANKLIN & ROBERT L. RABIN, TORT LAw AND ALTERNATIVES: CASES AND MATERIALS 366 (6th
ed. 1996) (presenting Palsgraf in the chapter entitled "Proximate Cause"); JOHN W. WADE ET
AL., PROSSER, WADE & SCHWARTZ'S CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 304 (9th ed. 1994)
(presenting Palsgraf in chapter entitled "Proximate or Legal Cause").
5. Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 101.
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A plaintiff cannot win unless the defendant's conduct was a wrong
relative to her, i.e., unless her right was violated. I shall call this
principle the "substantive standing" rule and shall show that it is a
fundamental feature of tort law.
Proponents of the most prominent theoretical approaches to
tort law, law and economics 6 and corrective justice theory,7 have gen-
erally neglected the substantive standing rule, and there are strong
reasons to believe these approaches are unable to explain this area of
tort doctrine. The larger problem is that the substantive standing
rule provides evidence that tort law is built around certain concep-
tions of "wrongs," "rights," and "rights of action," and yet, I shall ar-
gue, seminal versions of law and economics and corrective justice
theory do not appear to have adequate resources to accommodate
these conceptions. With this in mind, I shall sketch a third way of
understanding tort law." While this third view differs markedly from
its competitors, it is far from eccentric. Indeed, I think it is the view
that has always been embedded in tort law itself.9
Tort law is not just a system for the selective imposition of
liability in ways that will maximize wealth or other social welfare
goals, as some law and economics scholars contend. Nor is it simply a
system for rectifying losses or apportioning moral responsibility, as
some corrective justice theorists maintain. Like a great deal of statu-
6. The most thorough and impressive attempt to provide a positive theory of tort law
from an economic perspective is that of William Landes and Richard Posner. See WILLIAM M.
LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAw (1987). See also GUIDO
CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970); STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
ACCIDENT LAw (1987); Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Inalienability: One View of The Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972); Ronald Coase,
The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
7. See, e.g., JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS (1992); ERNEST J. WEINRMIB, THE IDEA
OF PRIVATE LAw (1995); Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151
(1973); George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1972);
Stephen R. Perry, The Moral Foundations of Tort Law, 77 IOWA L. REV. 449 (1992). Some
aspects of corrective justice theory may fruitfully be combined with a conception of tort law
related to that advanced in this article. See Arthur Ripstein & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Corrective
Justice in the Age of Mass Torts, in PHILOSOPHY AND U.S. TORT LAw (G. Postema ed., forthcom-
ing 1998) (philosophical analysis of market-share liability).
8. Arguably, there already is a dominant third view-the "deterrence-plus-compensation"
view that might be called "conventional instrumentalism," and that courts and scholars of tort
doctrine seem to employ implicitly. See, e.g., KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, §§ 1-5 (discussing
deterrence and compensation in tort law). Whether or not this view might be termed a "theory,"
there is clearly a family of important perspectives on the normative underpinnings of tort law
that is instrumentalist, is concerned with compensation and deterrence, and is not necessarily
law and economics. The arguments I offer against instrumentalism in Part IV are intended to
undercut both the law and economics approach and the "det rrence and compensation" view.
See discussion infra Part W.A.4.
9. See infra notes 300-03 and accompanying text.
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tory law, tort law articulates rules telling citizens how they may and
may not treat one another and how they may expect to be treated by
others. In deciding and announcing these rules, appellate courts are
imposing duties on individuals not to treat others in certain ways and
creating rights in individuals not to be treated in certain ways. The
tort law's web of rights and duties embodies a plurality of values as
broad as those found in our statutory law.
Rights of action should be understood against the backdrop of
these rights, wrongs, and duties. Our system normally prohibits
individuals and the state from acting against another individual.
However, when the state recognizes a private right of action, it em-
powers and privileges an individual to act against another through
the coercive machinery of the state-to take his property or to force
him to behave a certain way. The substantive standing rule states
the conditions under which an individual is so empowered to act
against a defendant: only when she has been legally wronged by the
defendant, only when her own legal right has been violated by the
defendant. Understood in this light, the substantive standing rule is
not circular, vacuous, or irrelevant. Nor is it obviously justifiable.
While it is central to the structure of tort law, it is contentious from a
moral and political point of view. Neither efficiency, nor social wel-
fare, nor corrective justice can explain such a requirement, I shall
argue. And so we are led to consider whether there are other princi-
ples providing the normative underpinning of the institution of
private rights of action.
I shall argue that our institution of private rights of action
embodies a "principle of civil recourse." According to this principle, an
individual is entitled to an avenue of civil recourse-or re-
dress-against one who has committed a legal wrong against her.
This principle is a civilized transformation of what is often considered
a quite primitive "instinct" of retributive justice, the instinct that I
am entitled to "settle a score" or to "get even" with one who has
wronged me. In a civilized society, we are not permitted to "get
even"--we are entitled to a private right of action in place of getting
even. But the quasi-retributive nature of recourse explains why there
is a substantive standing requirement. A private right of action
against another person is essentially a response to having been legally
wronged by that person, and therefore exists only where the
defendant has committed a legal wrong against the plaintiff and thus
violated her legal right.
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The account I offer is intended to be a framework for a theory
of tort law that is descriptive, not prescriptive. In Holmes's words,
the first step is to "get the dragon out of his cave on to the plain and
in the daylight"'10-not to say what we should do with him. I shall not
be arguing that the substantive standing rule, the relational
conception of wrongs, or the principle of civil recourse is morally
correct. Instead, I shall argue that tort law does contain a
substantive standing rule, does embody a relational conception of
wrongs, and does reflect our system's commitment to the principle of
civil recourse.
Part II offers a close analysis of Palsgraf, and Part III demon-
strates that the substantive standing rule is essential throughout the
law of torts. We shall see that many of the most controversial and
puzzling issues of tort law involve challenges to the substantive
standing rule. These include, for example: whether the right to
recover for emotional injury to a negligently injured loved one should
hinge on the notorious "zone-of-danger" test;" whether pure economic
loss resulting from negligent conduct should be recoverable; 2 and
whether states should be limited to subrogation actions in their
lawsuits against tobacco companies. 3 At first glance, the law in each
of these areas appears inexplicably restrictive because even where
there is tortiousness, injury, causation, and foreseeability, recovery is
often denied. Upon closer inspection, however, it becomes apparent
that the doctrinal key to the law in each of these areas is the
substantive standing rule, the core of Palsgraf.
Part IV proceeds in two steps. Part IV.A argues that instru-
mentalist theories of tort law, including both law and economics and
conventional "deterrence-plus-compensation" theory, utilize a reduc-
tive conception of "rights" and "wrongs" that renders the substantive
standing rule vacuous. It further argues that, because most substan-
tive standing cases do not involve inordinate administrative costs and
do involve costs more efficiently internalized by defendants, reductive
instrumentalist theories are unlikely to be able to "explain away"
substantive standing doctrine. Part IV.B picks up the challenge of
Part IV.A and constructs a non-instrumentalist framework for analyz-
ing the notions of rights, wrongs, and duties in the law of torts.
10. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897), re-
printed in 110 HARV. L. REV. 991, 1001 (1997) [subsequent citations to 1997 reprinting].
11. See infra text accompanying notes 115-20.
12. See infra Part III.C.2.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 163-67.
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Part V turns to corrective justice theory. Paralleling my
treatment of instrumentalism, I begin in Part V.A by using substan-
tive standing doctrine as evidence against corrective justice theory as
a positive theory of tort law. The fundamental problem, I argue, is
that whether a defendant is held liable should, from a corrective jus-
tice point of view, turn on whether she acted in a manner the law
deems tortious and whether the link between this action and the
plaintiffs injury was sufficiently foreseeable that we morally judge
the injury to be the defendant's "fault." In fact, rights of action in our
tort law do not track tortiousness plus foreseeability-they track
substantive standing. Just as Part IV.B constructs an affirmative
theory of rights and wrongs out of its critique of law and economics,
Part V.B constructs an affirmative theory of rights of action out of the
critique of corrective justice theory.
Part VI introduces the idea of civil recourse. Drawing upon
social contract theory, Part VI argues that rights of action are a form
of civil recourse against others and explains the substantive standing
rule as a limitation on when one person is entitled to recourse against
another. More broadly, Part VI synthesizes the analyses of rights,
wrongs, and recourse to sketch a comprehensive picture of the
stricture of tort law.
The implications of this account are the subject of Part VII.
The critique of law and economics and the critique of corrective justice
theory suggest that those frameworks cannot lay claim to revealing
the "inner logic" of tort law. To a significant extent, this undermines
the aspirations of these theories to guide courts. The model of rights,
wrongs, and recourse has implications for tort doctrine far beyond
substantive standing. By suggesting how this model may affect our
understanding of duty, proximate cause, and punitive damages, Part
VII previews some of the work that remains to be done in furnishing
an alternative framework for thinking about torts.
II. SUBSTANTIVE STANDING AND PALSGRAF V. LONG ISLAND
RAILRoAD Co.
In Palsgraf, a conductor for the defendant railroad negligently
pushed a passenger scrambling to get onto a moving train.14 The neg-
14. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y. 1928). The following
description is roughly Cardozo's version of the facts for the purposes of the appeal. The
secondary literature on Palsgraf includes a good deal of conjecture about the facts. See, e.g.,
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ligent push caused a wrapped package to fall to the ground on the
station platform. As it turned out, the package contained fireworks,
which exploded and caused a scale to fall at the other end of the
platform. The falling scale caused personal injuries to Mrs. Palsgraf,
who then sued the defendant for negligence. Writing for a 4-3 major-
ity of the New York Court of Appeals, Chief Judge Cardozo reversed a
jury verdict for Mrs. Palsgraf, deciding that her negligence action
failed as a matter of law.15
The ultimate legal issue in Palsgraf was whether a plaintiff
whose injury was not reasonably foreseeable may recover in negli-
gence. Cardozo's answer was no; a plaintiff may recover in negligence
only if her injury was one a defendant exercising reasonable foresight
(less than "extravagant prevision") would have foreseen.1 6 Because
Mrs. Palsgrafs injury was not reasonably foreseeable, she lost.
Cardozo's argument breaks down into two parts: (1) If the plaintiffs
injury was not reasonably foreseeable, the defendant's act was not
negligent relative to her; and (2) a plaintiff has a right of action in
negligence only if the defendant's conduct was negligent relative to
her.
Cardozo reasoned that the defendant's act was not negligent
relative to Mrs. Palsgraf because, in order for an act to be negligent
relative to some person, it must be the case that the defendant
breached a duty to that person "the observance of which would have
averted or avoided the injury." 17 The duty to a person in negligence
law is to avoid the "risk reasonably to be perceived" to that person.18
Where the injury (as in this case) was one that was not reasonably
foreseeable-was not "reasonably to be perceived"-it was not a
breach of such a duty and therefore was not negligent relative to the
plaintiff. Or, as Cardozo put it: "Relatively to her, there was no
negligence at all."19
A more direct argument supports the second premise-that a
negligence plaintiff may recover only if the defendant's conduct was
negligent in relation to her. This point follows from a more general
principle that Cardozo restated throughout the opinion: "The plaintiff
sues in her own right for a wrong personal to her, and not as the vi-
NOONAN, supra note 3, at 126-27 (speculating on the status of plaintiffs marriage and possible
speech impediment); POSNER, supra note 3, at 43 (discussing possible inaccuracies regarding the
presentation of facts in Palsgraf.
15. See Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 101 (stating that the complaint should be dismissed).
16. See id. at 100-01.
17. Id. at 99-100 (quoting West Virginia Cent. & P.R. Co. v. State, 54 A. 669, 671 (1903)).
18. Id. at 100.
19. Id. at 99.
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carious beneficiary of a breach of duty to another."2o In short, a plain-
tiffs right of recovery depends on the defendant's conduct having been
a wrong relative to her. "What the plaintiff must show is 'a wrong' to
herself; i.e. a violation of her own right, and not merely a wrong to
someone else, nor conduct 'wrongful' because unsocial, but not 'wrong'
to anyone."21 In negligence law, the pertinent type of "wrong" is negli-
gence. Hence, it follows that where there was no negligence relative
to the plaintiff, she may not recover in negligence.
A confusing characteristic of Cardozo's opinion is his tendency
to alternate between discussions of whether a "wrong" has been com-
mitted relative to plaintiff, on the one hand, and whether plaintiffs
"right" has been violated, on the other. One crucial passage, quoted
above, strongly suggests that Cardozo meant these ways of speaking
to be synonymous: "What the plaintiff must show is a 'wrong' to her-
self; i.e., a violation of her own right." 2 Moreover, the two parts of
Cardozo's argument laid out above may be restated in terms of
"rights" rather than "wrongs": (1) If the plaintiffs injury was not
reasonably foreseeable, the defendant did not violate a right of plain-
tiffs under negligence law; and (2) a plaintiff has no right of action in
negligence unless the defendant violated plaintiffs right under negli-
gence law, which follows from the rule that a plaintiff has a right of
action only against one who has violated her right.23
Whether we formulate the argument in terms of "wrongs" or in
terms of "rights," the two parts of the argument have different foci.
The first part sets forth the kind of conduct that constitutes, under
negligence law, a wrong in relation to someone. Or, correlatively, it
concerns what conduct constitutes a violation of a right under negli-
gence law. The second part says that there must be such a wrong to
20. Id. at 100.
21. Id.
22. Id. (emphasis added).
23. Cardozo supported the first part of this argument on the ground that the right of a
plaintiff in negligence law is to be protected from "unintentional invasion by conduct involving
in the thought of reasonable men an unreasonable hazard that such invasion would ensue." Id.
at 99. Where injury was not reasonably foreseeable, there is no such invasion, and no violation
of the right that negligence law protects. Cardozo correspondingly supported the second part of
his argument by finding a more general principle about rights of action and rights: A plaintiff
has no right of action unless defendant violated her own right. 'The victim does not sue
derivatively, to vindicate an interest invaded in the person of another." Id. at 101. "What the
plaintiff must show ... is a violation of her own right .... Plaintiff sues in her own right." Id.
at 100. These broad statements about the connection between rights and rights of action are
the basis of his more particular conclusion about negligence law: "Negligence is not actionable
unless it involves the invasion of a legally protected interest, the violation of a right." Id. at 99.
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the plaintiff (or such a violation of her right) for her to have a right of
action in negligence.
The second part reaches this conclusion from a more general
rule. What is crucial is that a plaintiff has no right of action unless
she can show "a wrong to herself; i.e., a violation of her own
light ... ."24 This proposition is, in essence, a form of standing rule.
It concedes that the defendant has violated a legal norm and that the
plaintiff is injured, but specifies how the plaintiff must be situated in
order to have a right of action against the defendant. The criterion
offered for standing, according to the analysis in Palsgraf, is that the
plaintiff herself must have been legally wronged (her right must have
been violated) under the substantive legal norm in question-in this
case, negligence. Because the criterion for standing offered by this
rule is in this sense substantive, I shall refer to it as the "substantive
standing rule."25
The substantive standing rule is indispensable in Palsgraf.
Without it, there is no argument that negligence in relation to the
plaintiff is a sine qua non for an action. And without this assertion,
Cardozo has no argument at all. Reasonable foreseeability is relevant
to whether there was negligence relative to plaintiff. But the more
basic question is why that matters. That is where Cardozo relies
upon the substantive standing rule.
A wide range of judges and scholars has recognized that the
substantive standing rule is the key to Cardozo's Palsgraf opinion,
though not of course using that label. Thus, in Sinram v.
Pennsylvania Railroad Co.,26 Judge Learned Hand phrased the ques-
tion this way: "whether, if A omitted to perform a positive duty to B,
C, who had been damaged in consequence, might invoke the breach,
though otherwise A owed him no duty; in short, whether A was
chargeable for the results to others of his breach of duty to B."27 And
Judge Henry Friendly followed this characterization of Cardozo's
framing of the issue in the famous Kinsman case.28 Some scholarship
24. Id. at 100.
25. To my knowledge, the phrase "substantive standing" has not been used elsewhere.
Some readers have suggested to me that what I call "substantive standing" is really just the
notion of "standing" found in the law more generally, and best developed in federal courts
jurisprudence. I do not mean to be taking a position on that issue in this article, but I do note
that the account I present here is consonant, broadly speaking, with the anti-reductive account
of standing offered in William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221 (1988).
26. 61 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1932).
27. Id. at 769-70.
28. Petition of The Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708, 721 (2d Cir. 1964). Notably, how-
ever, Judge Friendly was among those who took Cardozo's answer to be tautologous. See infra
note 170 and accompanying text.
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within the decades following Palsgraf also showed some awareness of
the relevance of standing-like concepts to the opinion. 9 More re-
cently, Professor Ernest Weinrib, in his book The Idea of Private
Law,30 has similarly demonstrated that Cardozo's Palsgraf opinion
centers on an argument that only the plaintiff who herself was
wronged under the law has standing to recover in tort.
But for the most part, judges, lawyers, and academics have not
treated Palsgraf as a standing case, either explicitly or implicitly. On
the contrary, Palsgraf is predominantly treated-at least by schol-
ars-as a "proximate cause" case.3' That interpretation, like the one
offered here, takes the ultimate holding of the case to be that a plain-
tiff whose only injury is one that was not reasonably foreseeable to
defendant may not recover for that injury. At this point the two inter-
pretations diverge. The standard reading of Palsgraf contends that
Cardozo reached this decision by consulting a more general constraint
which usually goes under the label of "proximate cause": A defendant
is liable only for the injuries that he could reasonably have foreseen.
A special case of this, of course, would involve a plaintiff whose only
injury falls in this non-recoverable category of injuries-she will have
no cause of action. Mrs. Palsgrafs injury was unforeseeable,
therefore not proximately caused, and therefore not actionable. That
is why she had no right of action.
29. See, e.g., Cowan, supra note 3, at 48-52; Prosser, supra note 3, at 19-24. Interestingly,
while it seems that Palsgraf has been discussed more extensively than any other torts case,
scholarship on the case tailed off dramatically after the publication of Prosser, supra note 3.
Weinrib's work, supra note 7, is a notable exception. Earlier Palsgraf scholarship includes (and
the list is not exhaustive): Richard V. Campbell, Duty, Fault, and Legal Cause, 1938 WIS. L.
REV. 402; Arthur L. Goodhart, The Unforeseeable Consequences of a Negligent Act, 39 YALE L.J.
449 (1930); Leon Green, The Palsgraf Case, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 789 (1930); Charles 0. Gregory,
Proximate Cause in Negligence-A Retreat From Rationalization, 6 U. CHI. L. REV. 36 (1939);
Fleming James, Scope of Duty in Negligence Cases, 47 NEV. U. L. REV. 778 (1953); Clarence
Morris, Duty, Negligence, and Causation, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 189 (1952); Warren A. Seavey, Mr.
Justice Cardozo and the Law of Torts, 52 HARV. L. REV. 372 (1939); Note, Loss-Shifting and
Quasi-Negligence: A New Interpretation of the Palsgraf Case, 8 U. Cm. L. REV. 729 (1941).
One other work that may shed light on Palsgraf is LEON GREEN, THE RATIONALE OF
PROXIMATE CAUSE (1927). This work was written prior to Palsgraf, and there is anecdotal
evidence that Cardozo was familiar with Green's views, which influenced Francis Bohlen (the
Reporter of the Restatement (First) of Torts) and were probably discussed at a meeting of the
American Law Institute at which Cardozo was present. Prosser, supra note 3, at 4-5. Green's
thesis was that "proximate cause" did not really pertain to causation questions, but to the
question of whether the interest protected by the law was invaded. See GREEN, THE RATIONALE
OF PROXIMATE CAUSE, supra, at 5-11. As Green himself noted, this approach on its own does not
entirely explain Palsgraf, because the question arises as to whether to extend the protection of
the law to Mrs. Palsgrafs interest. See Green, The Palsgraf Case, supra, at 790-92.
30. WEINRIB, supra note 7, at 159-64.
31. See supra note 4.
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The proximate cause reading of Palsgraf arguably has the
advantage of carving up tortiousness and scope of liability in a fairly
comprehensible manner that makes the case seem analagous to a
large body of other negligence cases; this is undoubtedly part of why it
has persisted. But that is no reason to interpret Cardozo as having a
proximate cause view of the case. Such an interpretation simply does
not correspond to what Cardozo actually said. Indeed, Cardozo, in the
clearest of terms, denied making a proximate cause argument: "The
law of causation, remote or proximate, is thus foreign to the case
before us."3 2 He explicitly assumed for the purposes of argument that,
if liability was established, damages would be recoverable even if they
were unforeseeable, "however novel or extraordinary."3a As Cardozo
appears to have recognized, it is not in fact a sound statement of law
that the only recoverable damages are for foreseeable injuries.3 This
did not concern him because the problem, as he explicitly stated, was
not the unforeseeability of the damages, but the fact that plaintiff
herself was not wronged: "The consequences to be followed must first
be rooted in a wrong."35
Although it is unfounded in what Chief Judge Cardozo actually
said, the proximate cause interpretation of his opinion is somewhat
understandable in light of Judge Andrews's dissent. Andrews took
Palsgraf to involve an issue of proximate cause: "[W]here there is an
act which unreasonably threatens the safety of others, is the doer
liable for all its proximate consequences, even where they result in
injury to one who would generally be thought to be outside the radius
of danger?"3 6 Andrews himself clearly recognized that Cardozo had
not framed the issue in terms of proximate cause. Andrews wrote of
two "hypotheses" as to what the central issue of the case was: first,
that the case was about whether there was negligence in relation to
plaintiff, and second, that it was about whether there was proximate
cause.37 Indeed, the first goal of Andrews's opinion was to undermine
Cardozo's "hypothesis" that the case should be framed in terms of the
relational nature of negligence and the need for a breach of duty to
the plaintiff herself. If he successfully rejected that framing of the
issue, he thought, then the only question remaining would be whether
proximate cause required reasonable foreseeability. Under the second




36. Id. at 102 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
37. See id. (Andrews, J., dissenting).
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hypothesis, "we have to inquire only as to the relation between cause
and effect. We deal in terms of proximate cause, not of negligence."38
While Andrews had insightful remarks on the issue of proximate
cause in his Palsgraf dissent, 9 the 1921 case Matter of Polemis4o al-
ready supported his answer-that foreseeability was not required for
proximate cause-and Cardozo appeared willing to accept Polemis.41
The real battle between Cardozo and Andrews was therefore not over
proximate cause. It was over whether the alleged fact that the con-
duct was not negligent in relation to Mrs. Palsgraf-was not a wrong
to her-prevented the court from even reaching the issue of proximate
cause.
In this light, our scholarly tradition's treatment of Palsgraf is
profoundly ironic. It has accepted the dissent's characterization of the
issue in the case as one of proximate cause, and then it has read that
issue back into the opinion of the court and understood the court to
have resolved the issue in the opposite way from the dissent. In other
words, scholars accept that Palsgraf is a proximate cause case, as
Andrews said, but plaintiff loses, so Cardozo must be merely denying
the existence of proximate cause in this particular instance. This is
an odd way to read any case, especially a central case of our torts
canon. While the traditional "proximate cause" reading of Palsgraf
may be consistent with the outcome of the case, it is the reasoning of
the case that imbues it with general importance in torts, not its out-
come. The standard interpretation completely misses this reasoning.
Cardozo had nothing to say about proximate cause; for him, this was
crucially not a proximate cause case, and he was willing to assume
arguendo that Andrews was correct about proximate cause.42 Thus,
neither of the famous opinions in the case agrees with-or even pre-
sents-the argument most commonly attributed to it.
Some scholars and courts have essentially retained the tradi-
tional interpretation of the opinion, but avoided the awkwardness of
calling Palsgraf a proximate cause case by instead using the label
"duty."43 According to this view, Cardozo believed that injuries not
38. Id. (Andrews, J., dissenting).
39. See id. at 103-05 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
40. 3 KB. 560 (1921).
41. See Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 101.
42. See id. at 99.
43. See, e.g., Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 546 (1994) (in context of
discussing restrictions on action for negligent infliction of emotional distress, citing Palsgraf as
basis for such limitations, and reasoning that "[slome courts phrase the limitations in terms of
proximate causation .... Other courts speak of the limitations in terms of duty .... These for-
mulations are functionally equivalent.") (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also Babbitt v.
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reasonably foreseeable should not generally be recoverable, but he
knew that they were frequently tolerated as part of consequential
damages. However, where the plaintiff is in a category of persons
whose sole injury is unforeseeable, a floodgates rationale applies fully,
and the plaintiff should therefore be denied a right of action entirely.
This conclusion is put by saying that the defendant has no duty to
this plaintiff.
This relabeled proximate cause argument is problematic for
the same reasons as was the proximate cause argument by its proper
name: It attributes to Cardozo a view of the central issue of the case
that he explicitly rejected, that the dissent recognized that Cardozo
rejected, and that the dissent did embrace. It adds insult to injury by
suggesting that Cardozo's denials are subterfuge, and the label of
"duty" is brought in to cover his work. And it fails to address
Cardozo's central propositions pertaining to the relational nature of
negligence and the need for a "relational wrong" in order to have a
right of action.
Interestingly, the relabeled proximate cause, or duty, interpre-
tation at least can purport to address language in Palsgraf pertaining
to duty, but its analysis inverts Cardozo's. It takes Cardozo's state-
ment that there is no duty breached to plaintiffs with unforeseeable
injuries to be derived from a prior decision that liability would extend
too far if plaintiffs with unforeseeable injuries were able to recover.
In fact, Cardozo's own reasoning goes just the other way. He infers
that unforeseeable plaintiffs have no right of action from the fact that
no duty to them is breached.44 Furthermore, Cardozo's basis for
finding that there is no breach of a duty to a person with injuries that
are difficult to foresee does not pertain to fear of liability. The scope
of a duty, according to Cardozo, is not the range of liability that may
realistically be imposed upon people, but the range of conduct to
which our norms may realistically hold them to be obliged. We will be
involved "in a maze of contradictions"45 if we hold people to a duty of
care that requires them to have foresight (or "prevision 46) so
extraordinary that they anticipate injuries as indirect as Mrs.
Palsgrafs. "Life will have to be made over, and human nature
Sweet Home Chapter of Communities For A Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 713 (1995) (O'Connor,
J., concurring) (noting that "proximate causation" and "duty" are "'functionally equivalent'
alternative characterizations in terms of foreseeability") (citing Gottshall). See also KEETON ET
AL., supra note 4, § 43, at 281 (treating "duty" question as another label for proximate cause
problem, in the context of unforeseeable consequences).
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transformed, before prevision so extravagant can be accepted as the
norm of conduct, the customary standard to which behavior must
conform."47 Less prosaically, to impose such a demanding duty of care
would be to articulate a norm to which we could not realistically
expect people to conform their conduct.
Scholars have criticized Cardozo for articulating no real argu-
ment and concealing his motivations behind a screen of rhetoric,48 and
it should now be clear why. They have taken the only possible basis
for Palsgraf to be a liability-limiting policy rationale, but found that
Cardozo himself said nothing about liability limitation in his decision
except to deny that this was what he was doing. Indeed, Cardozo's
opinion focused primarily on the morally loaded concepts of rights,
rights of action, relational wrongs, duties of care, and an abstract
standing-like rule that relates relational wrongs to rights of action.
His comments on all of these are somewhat opaque. Critics therefore
have been tempted to conclude that these opaque rights-based notions
are a mere cover for an unexamined policy judgment.49 To be sure,
many commentators have recognized that Cardozo purported to offer
a different argument, but most of them have found that argument
pointless or circular.50
In the end, the problem with Palsgraf is not the absence of an
argument. There is a forcefully stated argument: A plaintiff has no
right of action unless there was a wrong relative to her or a violation
of her right, and there is no such relational wrong or personal-rights
violation in a negligence case where the duty to avoid foreseeable risk
to the plaintiff has not been breached. The problem is that the argu-
ment rests on ideas-relational wrongs, personal rights, and a sub-
stantive standing rule-that are not easily grasped from within the
most prominent theoretical perspectives on tort law.
III. THE SUBSTANTIVE STANDING RULE THROUGHOUT TORT LAW
In Part IV, the Article begins to examine the concepts of rights
and wrongs that will elucidate Palsgraf, but Part III adds an impor-
tant doctrinal dimension to the Article. Some readers may still be
47. Id.
48. See, e.g., NOONAN, supra note 3, at 141-51; POSNER, supra note 3, at 43-45.
49. See Prosser, supra note 3, at 16.
50. See supra note 3.
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tempted to think that Palsgraf is simply an aberrant case, or that it
turns solely on reasonable foreseeability, or that the text of Cardozo's
opinion should simply be ignored, notwithstanding the significance
usually attributed to it. Part III shows that the problem of explaining
the substantive standing rule does not end with Palsgraf. What is
unusual about Cardozo's opinion is the force and clarity with which he
articulates the standing rule, and his ability to abstract the need for
negligence relative to the plaintiff into a general tort requirement of
wrongfulness relative to the plaintiff. The following Part demon-
strates, however, that within every tort there is a black letter rule
that, in effect, constitutes a version of a substantive standing rule.
Preliminarily, it is important for the reader to be clear as to
what I am claiming and what I am not claiming about tort doctrine. I
am not claiming that the term "substantive standing" is found
throughout tort law; on the contrary, it is a term that I have coined.
Nor am I claiming that the variety of doctrinal rules I discuss have all
been conceptualized as standing rules. Indeed, this Article is
intended to contribute to scholarship on tort doctrine by providing a
unified doctrinal explanation, in terms of substantive standing, of
apparently diverse rules of law. Third, I am not claiming that
substantive rules are uncontroversial or without exception within tort
law. Substantive standing rules, like other broad features of tort law,
are often distinguished, exception-ridden, modified, or challenged.
What then am I claiming about tort doctrine? My claim is
that, within every tort, the common law contains a black letter rule
that limits recovery to plaintiffs who are situated in a particular way.
This limitation takes for granted that a defendant has acted in a
manner the law deems tortious, that the plaintiff has been injured as
a result of this tortious conduct, and has suffered harm of a sort that
tort law generally deems real and compensable. In many of these
cases, unlike Palsgraf, the injury to the plaintiff was reasonably fore-
seeable. Yet the common law denies recovery, and hence it is not
surprising that these are often among the most perplexing and con-
troversial areas of tort law. On first blush, the basis for denial varies
across the different torts, e.g., the "of-and-concerning-element" in
defamation, the "reliance" element in fraud, the need for a "possessory
interest" in property torts, and the "duty" element in negligence. But
in looking at how each of these "elements" operates within the respec-
tive tort, I claim that each defines what it is for the defendant's con-
duct to be wrongful relative to the plaintiff, and each requires that a
plaintiff must have been so situated in order to recover under the
respective tort. In this sense, each of these elements presents a ver-
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sion of a substantive standing rule within the respective tort. While
the term "substantive standing" is novel, I am claiming that the limi-
tation of recovery to those relative to whom the defendant committed
a wrong is longstanding and fundamental.
A. Dignitary and Personal Torts
1. Defamation and Privacy
A plaintiff who is injured by a defamatory statement cannot
recover unless she herself was defamed. Courts articulate this point
by saying that the defamatory statement must be "of and concerning"
the plaintiff.51 This requirement applies even if the defendant de-
famed someone and the foreseeable result of this defamation was a
reputational injury to plaintiff.
Thus, in Gugliuzza v. KC.M.C., Inc.,52 parents claimed that
they suffered foreseeable reputational and dignitary injuries when a
television station falsely described their teenaged son as a drug
dealer.53 In Johnson v. Southwestern Newspapers Corp.,54 a woman
claimed that she suffered injury when her husband was falsely ac-
cused of irresponsible conduct.55 The owner of a corporation claimed,
51. See ROBERT D. SACK & SANDRA S. BARON, LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS
§ 2.8, at 149 (2d ed. 1994).
52. 606 So. 2d 790 (La. 1992).
53. Id. See also Zucker v. County of Rockland, 489 N.Y.S. 2d 308 (App. Div. 1985)
(discussing foreseeability of harm to individual whose photograph and name were published in
an article concerning a "Scared Straight" program). In Lee v. Weston, 402 N.E.2d 23 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1980), plaintiffs argued that the coroner's request for an autopsy of plaintiffs' son implied
that the son's death was caused by drug overdose, and thereby besmirched their reputation. See
id. at 24. The court rejected plaintiffs' defamation claim on the grounds that (1) only the party
defamed may bring a defamation action, and (2) there is no cause of action for defamation of a
deceased person. See id. at 28-30. Lee collects cases on both points nationwide.
54. 855 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993).
55. See id. See also Newspapers, Inc. v. Matthews, 339 S.W.2d 890, 893 (Tex. 1960);
Talbot v. Johnson Newspaper Corp., 508 N.Y.S.2d 80, 83 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) ("Since Talbot's
wife was not personally mentioned in either article, she has no claim for humiliation and
embarrassment. Nor may she recover the loss of her husband's earnings."); Morgan v. Hustler
Magazine, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 711, 719 (N.D. Ohio 1987) (holding that where defendant allegedly
put fashion model's photograph on cover of Hustler magazine without her knowledge or consent,
and falsely implied she endorsed hard core pornography, model's husband may not recover for
embarrassment, ridicule, reputational damage, or emotional distress); Tannenbaum v. Foerster,
648 F. Supp. 1300, 1303 (E.D. Wis. 1986) (holding, under Wisconsin law, that a spouse lacks
standing to bring an action based on a statement about the spouse). A few jurisdictions permit
spouses to recover in loss of consortium actions predicated on a tortious injury to the spouse
through libel. See Garrison v. Sun Printing and Publ'g Ass'n, 100 N.E. 430 (N.Y. 1912); Food
Fair, Inc. v. Anderson, 382 So. 2d 150 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980). This is the exception, rather
than the rule, and, as discussed at infra Part I.D, the nature of loss of consortium actions
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in Kesner v. Liberty Bank & Trust Co.,56 that false statements about
the corporation's credit damaged his reputation and finances.57
Partners of the prominent attorney Roy Cohn asserted, in Cohn v.
National Broadcasting Co.,58 that statements undermining Cohn's
professional integrity and trustworthiness as an attorney hurt not
only Cohn but also his firm and his partners. 9 Investors in a for-
profit AIDS testing corporation argued, in AIDS Counseling and
Testing Centers v. Group W Television, Inc.,60 that a television
station's defamatory attack on their corporation caused them
financial injury.61 In all of these cases, courts found that plaintiffs
had no right of action in defamation because defendant's statement
was not of and concerning the plaintiff.
The requirement that the defamatory statement be "of and
concerning the plaintiff' is essentially a substantive standing rule in
defamation. It is a rule that a plaintiff cannot recover unless the
defendant's conduct was defamatory as to the plaintiff herself. As one
court has stated (quoting Prosser and Keeton's Hornbook), "[a] libel
action is 'personal to the plaintiff and cannot be founded on the
defamation of another.' ",62
Not surprisingly, tort actions for invasion of privacy display
limitations similar to those in defamation. Thus, an action for wrong-
ful disclosure of private fact exists only for a person about whom the
private fact was disclosed, 63 and similarly for false light.64
2. Fraud
The general rule in fraud is that a plaintiff has no right of ac-
tion unless she herself has been defrauded. This requirement is
tends to support, rather than undermine, the substantive standing rule. Cf Flamand v.
American Int'l Group, Inc., 876 F. Supp. 356, 372-73 (D.P.R. 1994) (denying the spouse a right to
sue for tort of defamation based on defamation of her husband, but recognizing statutory right
under Article 1802 to "recover damages for specific defamation of spouse").
56. 390 N.E.2d 259 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979).
57. See id. See also Dexter's Hearthside Restaurant, Inc. v. Whitehall Co., 508 N.E.2d 113
(Mass. App. Ct. 1987) (holding that principal stockholder and officer of a corporation cannot
recover for defamation of corporation).
58. 414 N.Y.S.2d 906 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979).
59. See id. at 907-08.
60. 903 F.2d 1000, 1005 (4th Cir. 1990).
61. See id. at 1002.
62. Davis v. Costa-Gavras, 619 F. Supp. 1372, 1376 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (citing KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 4, § 111, at 744).
63. See SACK& BARON, supra note 51, § 10.3, at 570, and cases cited therein.
64. See Morgan v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 711, 719 (N.D. Ohio 1987).
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usually expressed in terms of the reliance element of fraud.65 A
plaintiff may be injured as a foreseeable result of intentional, fraudu-
lent conduct, but that is not enough to recover in fraud. Nor is it
sufficient that someone else may have relied on the fraudulent
statement. Plaintiff must prove that she herself relied on the content
of the fraudulent statement or omission.
For example, in Rosen v. Spanierman, an art dealer inten-
tionally misrepresented a certain piece of art to a couple who were
about to be married.66 The plaintiff offered to buy the couple a piece of
fine art of their choice. Relying on the art dealer, the couple selected
a certain piece of art and the plaintiff paid for it. On learning that
she had paid money for an inauthentic piece of art, the plaintiff sued
the art dealer for fraud. But her fraud action failed, because she
herself did not rely upon the fraudulent statements.67 Similarly, in
Cummings v. Kaminski, a woman fraudulently induced an insurance
company to alter the named beneficiary of an insurance policy, and
the original beneficiary consequently suffered financial injury.68 The
defendant was not liable in fraud to the original beneficiary because
the original beneficiary did not herself rely upon the fraudulent
misrepresentations. 69 In Peerless Mills, Inc. v. American Telephone &
Telegraph Co., a partnership allegedly defrauded a businessman into
joining the partnership.70 The businessman borrowed money from his
parents-in-law to join in the partnership, and the parents-in-law's
money subsequently disappeared. The defrauding partnership was
not liable to the parents-in-law because they did not rely on the
misrepresentations, even though there was fraud and there was
injury as a foreseeable result of that fraud.71
The reliance requirement applied to the plaintiff in a fraud
claim is a substantive standing rule for the tort of fraud. A defendant
has not committed the wrong of fraud relative to the plaintiff him-
self-she has not defrauded the plaintiff-unless the plaintiff has
relied on the content of the fraudulent statement or omission. In
other words, the law denies a right of action in fraud cases where the
65. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 537 (1977) ("The recipient of a fraudulent
misrepresentation can recover against its maker for pecuniary loss resulting from it if, but only
if, (a) he relies on the misrepresentation in acting or refraining from action ...
66. 894 F.2d 28, 30 (2d Cir. 1990).
67. See id.
68. 290 N.Y.S.2d 408,410 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968).
69. See id.
70. 527 F.2d 445, 447 (2d Cir. 1975).
71. See id. at 449-50.
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plaintiff lacks substantive standing. As is true in the emotional
injury case law discussed below,2 a good deal of uncertainty exists in
the courts as to the dimensions, qualification, and justifiability of this
rule73
72. See infra Part HI.C.1.
73. See, e.g., Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 929 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1997). In
Randi W., a student molested by a school administrator sued the administrator's former
employer for misrepresenting the administrator's fitness for employment. See id. at 584. The
court upheld negligent misrepresentation and fraud claims notwithstanding plaintiffs lack of
reliance, based on "duty" analysis typical in negligence law. See id. at 588-94.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts may be plausibly interpreted as distinguishing the law of
fraud from the law of negligent or intentional misrepresentation. The latter context typically
involves cases where, as a result of the possibility that people will be physically injured unless it
is known that a certain hazard exists, a duty of due care is imposed on the persons creating the
risk to provide accurate information concerning the hazard. Breach of this duty subjects the
defendant to liability to any plaintiffs foreseeably injured by the realization of the risk
(assuming they can prove that, had the correct information been imparted, the risk would not
have been realized).
Here, the relevant form of tortiousness is the failure to guard against a certain risk by
providing correct information, in other words, the failure to take a certain precaution (a verbal
one) against a certain risk. The conduct is tortious, in this respect, to anyone who is injured as
a result of the realization of the risk. As is generally the case for accident cases in the
negligence family, the defendant who failed to take the precaution that due care required is
liable, whether this failure to take the precaution was negligent or intentional. Hence, under
the Restatement, a person physically injured by a hazard that the defendant intentionally
misrepresented may be liable without proof of reliance. But this type of case is treated under
the Restatement's chapter on negligence, not fraud, and essentially involves failure to take
reasonable care in warning, exacerbated (as are many negligence cases) by a scienter level on
defendant's part. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 310 & cmt. d (1965) ("Conscious
Misrepresentation Involving Risk of Physical Harm .... The liability stated in this Section is
not confined to those persons whose conduct the misrepresentation is intended to influence, or
to harm received in the particular transaction which the misrepresentation was intended to
induce.").
It is also important to note that the requirement that the plaintiff rely on the content of the
statement is not a privity requirement. Privity is not an element of fraud. Kuelling v. Roderick
Lean Mfg. Co., 75 N.E. 1098 (N.Y. 1905). Hence, if a plaintiff relies on a defendant's representa-
tion or omission, even if such representation or omission was not made directly to the plaintiff
but was communicated indirectly to the plaintiff through third parties, the plaintiff has not
merely been injured by the representation or omission, he or she has been deceived, defrauded
into believing the content of the misrepresentation. Such a plaintiff therefore has substantive
standing in fraud. These cases, like Kuelling, often involve fraudulent misrepresentations as to
the safety of a product which the user of the product relies upon when he uses the product
mistakenly believing it to be safe. Id.
Finally, the Supreme Court's securities fraud jurisprudence deviates from the common law
of reliance. Although this law is almost uniformly rejected by courts interpreting the common
law of fraud, it is instructive to see that even the Court's apparently divergent analysis of
reliance is compatible with the analysis above. In Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406
U.S. 128 (1971), the Court held that where the fraud consisted of a concealment, rather than
affirmative misstatement, reliance by plaintiffs could be proved once the materiality of the
misrepresentation was established. See id. at 153-54. Pushing this conclusion further in Basic,
Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988), the Court held that where a plaintiff who has purchased
securities proves that the defendant knowingly made fraudulent material statements in
connection with those securities to intermediate parties prior to the plaintiffs purchases,
reliance may be presumed. The Basic Court adopted a "fraud-on-the-market" theory:
Information released into the market is converted into prices, which plaintiffs rely upon in
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3. Malicious Prosecution and False Arrest
It is an "established rule" that "actions for false arrest and
malicious prosecution are personal actions which do not give rise to a
cause of action to any other than the person directly aggrieved."74 The
same rule applies in the case of an action for abusive civil
proceedings. Each of these causes of action has a substantive
standing rule: An action for false arrest exists only for one who was
falsely arrested; an action for malicious prosecution is only for one
who was maliciously prosecuted; an action for abusive civil
proceedings is only for one against whom proceedings are abusively
brought.
Jackson v. Kessner sharply illustrates the courts' enforcement
of this rule.7 5 Plaintiff Jackson was the executrix and sole beneficiary
of her mother's estate, which consisted of a commercial building. As
executrix, she entered into a contract to sell this building to Kessner.
Kessner did not perform in a timely manner, so Jackson kept the
security deposit and entered into a contract with another party. At
that point, Kessner filed an action against the estate and Jackson as
executrix, and a notice of pendency against the building. The second
deal consequently fell through. Claiming she suffered damage from
Kessner's malicious destruction of the second contract, Jackson filed a
malicious prosecution action as both the executrix and the beneficiary.
The court rejected Jackson's action as beneficiary, on the ground that
only parties to the original litigation may sue, and Jackson-as-execu-
trix was the only party to the original litigation.76
4. Assault and Battery
Recognizing the tort of battery protects two interests: a "bodily
integrity" interest in remaining free from harmful physical contact,
and a "dignitary" interest in remaining free from offensive contact.77
entering transactions. Id. at 229. What is interesting about both Ute and Basic is that the
Court insisted that the plaintiff-reliance element remained intact, and that it only created an
evidentiary presumption. See id. at 243 ("We agree that reliance is an element of a 10b-5 cause
of action.").
74. Coverstone v. Davies, 239 P.2d 876, 881 (Cal. 1952) (en banc) (citing cases).
75. 618 N.Y.S.2d 635 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
76. See id. But see Rushing v. Bosse, 652 So. 2d 869, 875 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)
(holding that in action for wrongful institution of adoption proceedings brought by infant's
biological grandparents on behalf of infant and individually against attorney assisting hopeful
adoptive parents, infant need not have been named as a "defendant" in allegedly wrongful
adoption proceedings).
77. 3 FOWLERV. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 3.2 (3d ed. 1996).
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Closely paralleling causes of action in defamation, malicious prosecu-
tion, and privacy, a cause of action in battery is personal to one who
has been harmfully or offensively touched. A third person whom the
defendant has not harmfully or offensively touched normally cannot
prevail in a battery action, even if she suffers foreseeable injury.
Thus, for example, in Davis v. Fulton County, Arkansas, 8 a man
whose wife was raped had no standing to bring intentional tort claims
himself.79 In Coon v. Joseph,80 a man who suffered emotional injury in
witnessing his partner physically attacked by a bus driver was denied
a cause of action. In Ntron International Sales Co. v. Carroll,81 a fed-
eral court held that a corporation whose employees were attacked by
the defendant could not bring a cause of action for assault.82
Tort scholars have often cited the doctrine of "transferred
intent" in the law of battery to rebut Cardozo's assertion in Palsgraf
that only those toward whom the defendant's action was tortious are
entitled to recover.8 3 In the standard "transferred intent" case, A
shoots a gun with the intention of hitting B, and instead hits C. C is
able to recover in battery from A.8 Thus, C may recover from A de-
spite the fact that A's conduct was tortious only as to B. This conclu-
sion seems to be an exception to the substantive standing rule.
This conclusion, however, rests on a misunderstanding. The
law of battery forbids each of us from causing a harmful or offensive
touching of others through certain sorts of wrongful conduct toward
others. In specifying what sort of wrongful conduct toward others will
give rise to a battery action, the law imposes a stringent state-of-mind
(or scienter) requirement. Typically, scienter is glossed over as an
78. 884 F. Supp. 1245 (E.D. Ark. 1995).
79. See id. at 1250. The court also thought that the rape victim's husband failed to allege
sufficient injury to himself. But the court's overall analysis suggests that, if the husband had
any cause of action associated with an intentional tort on his wife, it would be for loss of
consortium. See infra Part IM.D.
80. 192 Cal. App. 3d 1269 (1987). This case arguably cuts both ways, because it cites to
cases in which heterosexual spouses or family members are able to recover for emotional injury
as the result of a battery to a third person. Id. at 1272, 1274-77. However, these citations are
misleading. Plaintiffs in such cases must win under a theory of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress through outrageous conduct. The very requirement that the conduct be intended
(or known) to inflict emotional distress, in conjunction with the arbitrary proximity and family
limitations imposed in such actions (see infra text accompanying notes 158-61), underlines the
fact that a substantive standing requirement may severely limit recovery under battery.
81. 714 F. Supp. 335 (N.D. 1. 1989).
82. See id. Note, however, that this case turned in part on the difficulty of attributing
assault-like injuries to a corporate entity.
83. See, e.g., Prosser, supra note 3, at 12.
84. See, e.g., Lopez v. Surchia, 246 P.2d 111 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952). See generally
William L. Prosser, Transferred Intent, 45 TEX L. REV. 650 (1967).
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intent requirement, although, as the case of Garratt v. Dailey indi-
cates, actual intent is not necessary.8 In the standard transferred
intent scenario, A has a specific intent to harm B, and therefore a
rigorous state of mind requirement with regard to B is easily met.
Although A did not have the same intent with regard to C, in the
event that A hits C instead of B, it would be a mistake to infer that A
was not engaging in wrongful conduct toward C, and it would be
equally wrong to infer that A's lack of intent to injure C specifically
undercuts C's battery claim against A. When A shoots at B, he dis-
plays an attitude of extreme subjective indifference toward the physi-
cal and emotional well-being of all those, including C, who might be
hit by his bullet. The law implicitly takes A's extreme indifference to
whether third parties are harmfully or offensively touched to be
sufficient to meet the state-of-mind requirement for battery.87 Indeed,
this point is obvious if one considers the wholly unproblematic battery
claim of a plaintiff who is hit by a defendant shooting into a crowd. A
defendant's extreme indifference to the plaintiffs interest in re-
maining free from harmful or offensive bodily contact qualifies as the
relevant sort of wrongfulness. "Transferred intent" caselaw therefore
does not run counter to the substantive standing rule.
B. Property Torts
1. Nuisance
A private nuisance claim will fail if it is brought by a person
who lacks a property right in the land in question, even if that person
has clearly suffered an injury as a result of the defendant's creating a
private nuisance.8 Only those holding a property right, the use and
enjoyment of which has been invaded, have substantive standing to
bring a nuisance claim. Thus, although a defendant who keeps its
land in a dangerous condition may be liable in nuisance to those who
are thereby injured, it is "firmly established that in order to recover in
a private nuisance action a plaintiff must have an ownership interest
85. 279 P.2d 1091 (Wash. 1955) (holding knowledge of harmfulness is sufficient for intent
under battery).
86. See id.
87. See Lopez, 246 P.2d at 113 (holding, in case where defendant was not aiming gun at
plaintiff, plaintiff was liable because gross or culpable negligence supplied intent).
88. See RESTATEM:ENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 821E (1979) ("For a private nuisance there is
liability only to those who have property rights and privileges in respect to the use and enjoy-
ment of the land affected.").
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in the land."89 In Meizoso v. Bajoros, for example, the plaintiff was
injured on a softball field under the control of the defendant.90
Although the plaintiff adequately alleged that the defendant kept its
property in defective condition and that this caused him to break his
ankle, his nuisance claim was rejected as a matter of law because he
had no ownership interest in the land. Cases like Meizoso are legion.
In landlord/tenant law, master/servant law, and generally law regard-
ing conditions on one's land that are dangerous to those on the land,
nuisance is simply not a viable cause of action. The remedy, if there
is one, must lie within negligence law.
In Arnoldt v. Ashland Oil, Inc., the Supreme Court of West
Virginia considered an oil company's appeal from judgment on a jury
verdict in favor of four plaintiffs who lived on land near the defen-
dant's oil refinery.91 The plaintiffs argued that the defendant's emis-
sions were a nuisance that caused them a variety of damages, includ-
ing "annoyance, discomfort, sickness, or emotional distress."92
Explicitly invoking the concept of standing, however, the Arnoldt
court held that three of the four plaintiffs could not recover because
they "were occupants in the homes of relatives and held no ownership
interest in the respective properties."9 The applicable nuisance law
required "that a person have an 'ownership interest' or 'possessory
interest' in the property alleged to have been affected by the nuisance
in order to have standing to bring an action for private nuisance."94
Arnoldt clearly applies a substantive standing rule. The plain-
tiffs whose claims were rejected had alleged an unreasonable interfer-
ence with the use and enjoyment of a person's private land, and that
they were injured by such nuisance-like conduct. But the plaintiffs
neither owned nor held any possessory interest in property with
which the defendant's nuisance-like conduct unreasonably interfered.
The conduct was therefore not a nuisance with respect to them, but
only with regard to third persons (those with a possessory interest in
the land). The court followed the rule that plaintiffs must lose unless
they had an ownership or possessory interest that was unreasonably
interfered with.
89. Meizoso v. Bajoros, 531 A.2d 943, 944 (Conn. App. Ct. 1987) (citing D. WRIGHT AND J.
FITZGERALD, TORTS § 130 (2d ed.) and Webel v. Yale Univ., 7 A.2d 215 (Conn. 1939)).
90. Id.
91. 412 S.E.2d 795, 799 (W. Va. 1991) (applying Kentucky law).
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2. Trespass
Only those who have a right of possession in the property tres-
passed upon have a cause of action for trespass. Indeed, part of the
reason the right of possession is so carefully defined is that it deter-
mines who has a cause of action for trespass. The structure of the
Restatement's rule of liability for trespass makes this clear:
One is subject to liability to another for trespass, irrespective of whether he
thereby causes harm to any legally protected interest of the other, if he in-
tentionally
(a) enters land in the possession of the other, or causes a thing or a third
person to do so, or
(b) remains on the land, or
(c) fails to remove from the land a thing which he is under a duty to re-
move.
95
The liability imposed by this provision is liability to the person who
has the appropriate kind of possessory interest in the land trespassed
upon. Thus, in defining the contours of the right of exclusive posses-
sion, the courts are in fact defining who has substantive standing to
sue for wrongs incurred through trespass.
Hennigan v. Atlantic Refining Co.9 provides an interesting
example. The plaintiffs in Hennigan were representatives of
construction workers building a sewer for the City of Philadelphia
(the "City"). The workers were killed by an explosion at the
construction site caused by poisonous vapors emitted by the
petroleum of defendant Atlantic Refining Company ("Atlantic").
Atlantic's petroleum had seeped into the property of the City. The
plaintiffs argued that Atlantic had invaded the City's property right
by permitting its petroleum to seep into the City's land, and that
Atlantic had thereby engaged in trespass. The consequence of this
trespass was the construction workers' deaths. The court rejected the
plaintiffs' argument as a matter of law. It conceded that there was a
trespass by Atlantic, that the plaintiffs' injury was of a sort that was
compensable, and that the petroleum caused the plaintiffs' injury.97
95. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 158 (1965) (emphasis added).
96. 282 F. Supp. 667 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
97. In rejecting the trespass claim, the court did not comment on foreseeability of injury;
the plaintiffs' lack of a property right was entirely dispositive. However, the court's treatment
of the negligence claim against Atlantic suggests, on first appearance, that it regarded these
injuries as unforeseeable. That appearance is misleading. The court's entire opinion upholds a
jury verdict for the fuill amount of injuries, plus punitive damages, against the City of
Philadelphia. Atlantic had in fact settled with the plaintiffs prior to trial. The court evaluated
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The trespass action did not lie, however, because "the invasion [of the
property right] was not an invasion of any right of the decedents."98
Hennigan illustrates the substantive standing rule in trespass.
Tortious conduct by the defendant-a trespass-plus a directly caused
injury to the plaintiffs-death--did not yield a cause of action. The
plaintiffs could not recover unless they had substantive standing, that
is, unless the defendant engaged in trespass as to the plaintiffs.99 For
the tort of trespass, substantive standing is a matter of holding the
property right (possession, not ownership, of land) that the defendant
invaded. Indeed, the Hennigan court went so far as to explain why
this substantive standing requirement exists: "[Aictions for trespass
to land are primarily to redress invasions of the right to exclusive use
and possession thereof."1'0
Interestingly, the Restatement attempts to soften the substan-
tive standing rule of trespass law by permitting the members of the
possessor's household who are also members of his immediate family
to sue for trespass.10' The inclusion of household members represents
a pragmatic understanding of the nature of the property rights en-
joyed by, and respected in, the family members of a tenant of record.
Basically, the Restatement expands the definition of the rights-holder
in accordance with contemporary expectations regarding property
rights, while leaving intact the fundamental requirement of substan-
tive standing in the case of trespass: Only those whose property right
is violated are entitled to sue.
Substantive standing is also a fundamental part of the
doctrine of other property torts such as conversion °2 and wrongful
the plaintiffs' claims against Atlantic only in the context of whether the City had a right of
contribution against Atlantic. The court rejected the plaintiffs' negligence claim against
Atlantic on the ground that the City had been so grossly negligent in failing to cease operations
at the construction site once the poison vapors were found that its negligence was a superseding
cause. In the context of this holding, the court stated that the degree of the City's negligence
was unforeseeable. See id. at 677-79.
98. Id. at 679.
99. See also Lal v. CBS, Inc., 726 F.2d 97, 100 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding only person in
possession of property may recover for a defendant's trespass); United States v. Village of New
Hempstead, 832 F. Supp. 76, 81 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding plaintiffs lacking title to and
possession of property may not bring trespass claim); Sky Four Realty Co. v. New York, 512
N.Y.S.2d 987, 989 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1987) (holding owner not in possession of shopping center may
not recover for trespass); Scott v. Elliot, 451 P.2d 474, 480 (Or. 1969) (subsequent owner may
not sue for damages resulting from trespass to land committed prior to his ownership and
possession of land).
100. Hennigan, 282 F. Supp. at 679 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965), Scope
Note to Chapter 7).
101. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 162 (1977).
102. See, e.g., Sigler v. LeVan, 485 F. Supp. 185, 202 (D. Md. 1980) (holding that a survivor
lacked standing to sue in conversion for book that would have passed from decedent but that
[Vol. 51:1
RIGHTS, WRONGS, AND RECOURSE
detention,03 as well as torts predicated on other proprietary interests,
such as tortious interference with contract.'0 4
C. Negligence
The Restatement (Second) of Torts articulates a substantive
standing rule for negligence in the very definition of the tort, stating
that a defendant is liable if "the conduct of the actor is negligent with
respect to the other, or a class of persons within which he is in-
cluded."10 5 The Comment accompanying this section clarifies:
In order for the actor to be negligent with respect to the other, his conduct
must create a recognizable risk of harm to the other individually, or to a class
of persons-as, for example, all persons within a given area of danger--of
which the other is a member. If the actor's conduct creates such a recognizable
risk of harm only to a particular class of persons, the fact that it in fact causes
harm to a person of a different class, to whom the actor could not reasonably
have anticipated injury, does not make the actor liable to the persons so
injured.1°6
Palsgrafs fact pattern is presented as an illustration of this provi-
sion,10 7 and I have shown that the substantive standing rule is at the
root of Cardozo's opinion in that case. 08
Beyond Palsgraf, however, three prominent problem areas of
negligence law present striking illustrations of the substantive stand-
ing rule at work. These areas are emotional harm, economic harm,
and professional malpractice claims brought by third parties. Cases
survivor in fact did not own at the time of defendant's taking); Kemp Motor Sales, Inc. v.
Lawrenz, 505 So. 2d 377, 379 (Ala. 1987) (holding that parties without demonstrable property
interest in boathouse lacked standing to sue in conversion where defendant bore costs
associated with alleged converter's destruction of boathouse); First Bank & Trust Co. v.
Insurance Serv. Ass'n, Inc., 269 S.E.2d 527, 530 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980) (holding corporate president
lacked standing to bring conversion action for converter of corporate funds where he was not
payee or lawful holder of corporate checks).
103. See, e.g., John A. Artukovich & Sons, Inc. v. Reliance Truck Co., 614 P.2d 330, 331
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1979) (holding owner of crane who had leased out right to use crane lacked right
to use crane and therefore lacked standing to bring action for wrongful detention of crane).
104. A substantive standing rule for tortious interference with contract is also, in some
sense, based on a proprietary interest: A plaintiff has substantive standing and thus a right of
action for tortious interference with contract only if the plaintiff was a party to the contract with
which defendant tortiously interfered. See Hufsmith v. Weaver, 687 S.W.2d 130, 131 (Ark.
1985). See also NBT Bancorp, Inc. v. Fleet/Norstar Fin. Group, Inc., 664 N.E.2d 492, 497 (N.Y.
1996) (stating that plaintiff with expectation of contract but no actual legally enforceable con-
tractual right lacked standing to sue for tortious interference of contract).
105. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 281(b) (1977).
106. Id. at cmt. c. (emphasis in original).
107. Id. at Illustration 1.
108. See supra Part II.
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involving these types of harm are striking because the injuries
claimed in them, as in most of the cases we have considered, are
reasonably foreseeable, but courts still deny recovery. Moreover, all of
the cases involve a breach of the duty of due care to someone. The
basis for the denial of recovery is that there is no breach of the duty of
due care to the plaintiff herself.
1. Emotional Harm
At common law, and to a great extent today, a plaintiff who
suffers emotional injury from a defendant does not have a right of
action for negligent infliction of emotional distress unless the defen-
dant's conduct breached a duty to avoid risk of emotional injury to the
plaintiff.10 9  Thus, substantive standing applies to claims of
negligently induced emotional harm. Because negligence law
generally holds that, absent a special relationship, one does not have
a duty to avoid risk of emotional harm to others, there is generally no
right of action for negligently induced emotional harm.10 However, in
negligence cases in which the defendant has breached her duty to
take reasonable precautions against causing the plaintiff physical
injury, and has caused such injury, consequential damages may
sweep in emotional injuries as well."'
The most controversial type of case, however, falls between
these categories. In such cases the defendant has caused physical
injury to a third party through breach of a duty of due care to that
party, and the plaintiff foreseeably suffers emotional harm as a result
of that breach, although the plaintiff remains physically uninjured.
Until this century, the common law's universal treatment of such
cases was to deny recovery. Negligence law has traditionally re-
quired, in a manner dramatically parallel to Palsgraf,"2 that in order
to have a cause of action for emotional injury, a plaintiff must show
that the defendant breached a duty owed to the plaintiff to take
reasonable precautions against causing such injury; breach of the
duty to a third party is not sufficient.
109. See generally KEETONETAL., supra note 4, § 54, at 359-66.
110. See id. at 361.
111. See id. at 362-64. See also David Crump, Evaluating Independent Torts Based Upon
"Intentional" or Negligent" Infliction of Emotional Distress: How Can We Keep the Baby From
Dissolving in the Bath Water?, 34 ARIz. L. REv. 439, 457 (1992) (finding negligently inflicted
emotional distress recoverable in some contexts where there is contractual relation or as conse-
quential damages or in bystander cases).
112. KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 54, at 365 (plaintiff stands "in the position of Mrs.
Palsgraf').
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In the past couple of decades, however, courts have begun to
question this rule."1 Given the dramatic pull of these cases, and
given our scholarly tradition's incapacity to make sense of the
substantive standing rule more generally, this is hardly surprising;
currently, most jurisdictions permit recovery for bystanders under at
least some circumstances."4 More surprising is what has now become
the notorious "zone-of-danger" rule in bystander cases," 5 adopted by
many courts including the United States Supreme Court."6 The
general rule is still that a plaintiff who has suffered foreseeable
emotional injury as a result of the defendant's negligent physical
injury of a third party (such as a child) cannot recover. The zone-of-
danger test created an exception to the general rule: A plaintiff may
recover if she was among those who were physically endangered by
the negligent conduct that actually caused physical injury to the third
party. Thus, for example, a parent who witnesses her child die in an
automobile accident caused by a defendant's negligence cannot
recover for emotional injury unless the parent was sufficiently
connected to the accident that the defendant's negligence could have
caused the parent herself physical injury.
This zone-of-danger rule is in force in many jurisdictions, but it
has been widely criticized as arbitrary."17 For present purposes, I only
wish to point out why scholars might have been tempted-wrongly, in
my view-to use this apparently bizarre test to perform the job of
limiting claims. On first blush, the zone-of-danger rule cleverly
covers the defect in the plaintiffs claim-apparent lack of substantive
standing. If the plaintiff was physically endangered by the negligent
conduct of the defendant, then it seems defendant's act was wrongful
relative to the plaintiff after all, for it involved negligent failure to
take precautions against causing plaintiff physical harm. And hence,
the argument would go, the substantive standing rule is not a bar to
recovery in zone-of-danger cases. Thus, arguably, an apparent re-
laxation of the substantive standing rule is really only a clever appli-
cation of it.
113. See, e.g., Stadler v. Cross, 295 N.W.2d 552, 553-54 (Minn. 1980) (denying recovery
where bystander not in zone of danger); Bovsun v. Sanperi, 461 N.E.2d 843, 84748 (N.Y. 1984)
(adopting zone-of-danger rule and reviewing other courts' adoption of rule).
114. See Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 532 & n.3 (1994) (noting that
nearly all states recognize a right to recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress).
115. See generally Howard H. Kestin, The Bystander's Cause of Action For Emotional
Injury: Reflections on the Relational Eligibility Standard, 26 SETON HALL L. REV. 512 (1996)
(comparing approaches to bystander recovery).
116. See Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 542-44 (interpreting the Federal Employers' Liability Act).
117. See, e.g., Kestin, supra note 115, at 532.
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In fact, the zone-of-danger rule is an intuitively and doctrinally
unstable compromise. Intuitively, courts have been repulsed by the
arbitrariness of granting recovery to one family member and denying
recovery to another when both suffered severe distress at witnessing
the death of a loved one and neither suffered any personal physical
injury, simply because one of them hypothetically could have suffered
injury.118 From a doctrinal point of view, the substantive standing
hole is not really patched because, on a basic level, the breach of duty
to a third party caused the plaintiffs emotional injury.
Aware of the instability of the zone-of-danger rule but unwill-
ing to turn back the clock on bystander plaintiffs, many courts have
taken the more forthright route of the California Supreme Court in
Dillon v. Legg."9 The Dillon court recognized that severe emotional
distress to family members in the vicinity of an accident was reason-
ably foreseeable to defendants. The court effectively created another
exception to the general rule that there is no duty to avoid negligently
causing emotional harm to others when it found a duty to avoid caus-
ing severe emotional distress to family members who witness, and are
in the proximity of, an accident. The holding in Dillon suggests that
in this and similar cases, the substantive standing rule is retained not
by a clever patch-up but by explicitly expanding the category of
duty.120
2. Economic Harm
The law of pure economic injury runs parallel to the law of
emotional injury and likewise contains a substantive standing rule.'2'
The general rule, represented in Holmes's famous decision in Robins
Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint,122 is that there is no recovery for negli-
gence causing pure economic injury unless the defendant was breach-
ing a duty to the plaintiff to avoid risks of economic injury to her. 23
118. See Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 915 (Cal. 1968) (rejecting the zone-of-danger and
impact rule).
119. Id.
120. But see Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 827-30 (Cal. 1989) (narrowing Dillon). More
generally, the discussion infra Part IV provides a framework for thinking about whether courts
that grant recovery for emotional injury of non-physically injured witnesses are genuinely ex-
panding the range of duty or are instead permitting a niche of liability where there is no duty.
121. Cf Peter Benson, The Basis for Excluding Liability for Economic Loss in Tort Law, in
1 PEILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 427 (D. Owen ed., 1995) (stating whether plaintiff
has right of action for economic loss depends on whether plaintiffs injury was a violation of her
right, which is specified independently of instrumentalist considerations).
122. 275 U.S. 303 (1927).
123. See id. at 307.
[Vol. 51:1
RIGHTS, WRONGS, AND RECOURSE
Because there is also a general rule that, absent a special relation-
ship, one does not owe a duty to others to avoid risks of economic
injury, the result is a general rule that there is no recovery for negli-
gently induced economic injury.124  Exceptions exist, most of which
involve persons whose relationship to a plaintiff is such that they
have specific duties to watch out for the plaintiffs economic well-
being. 12 5 For example, a person who hires an accounting firm (or,
likewise, a law firm or business consulting firm) that misperforms its
job can sue the firm for the economic injury she suffers as a result of
this misperformance. 126 And again, as in emotional injury cases, re-
covery for pure economic injury is not barred if the plaintiff also suf-
fered some other kind of injury on which the economic loss claim is
founded. Economic injury absent such an accompanying injury is
generally not actionable. 127
The most controversial cases resemble Rickards v. Sun Oil
Co.m2 In that case, Sun Oil owned a barge that negligently destroyed
a third party's bridge. As a result of this occurrence, Rickards, who
was a retailer on an island serviced by the bridge, lost the business of
those customers who could not reach him because of the destroyed
bridge. The court rejected Rickards's claim on the ground that pure
economic loss is not recoverable.129
What is interesting about Rickards is that the plaintiff, like
the plaintiffs in the bystander cases, seems to have an argument
notwithstanding the general rule that there is no duty to take
precautions against causing economic harm to others. Sun acted
negligently, its negligence breached a duty, and the breach of duty
caused an injury to Rickards. Moreover, courts routinely permit
124. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 129, at 1000-01 (observing that exceptions to rule of
nonliability for negligence turn on "special relationship or an assumption of responsibility by the
negligent promissor").
125. Cf Stephen R. Perry, Protected Interests and Undertakings in the Law of Negligence,
42 U. TORONTO L.J. 247 (1992) (pure economic loss actionable where defendant breaches duty
created by undertaking to plaintiff).
126. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 129, at 1000-01.
127. See generally LANDES & POSNER, supra note 6, at 251-55; W. Bishop, Economic Loss in
Tort, 2 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1982); Robert L. Rabin, Tort Recovery For Negligently
Inflicted Economic Loss: A Reassessment, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1513 (1985).
128. 41 A.2d 267 (N.J. 1945). I focus on Rickards because it is Landes and Posner's chief
example. Ironically, New Jersey itself has more recently shown unusual receptiveness to pure
economic loss claims, at least under sufficiently narrowly defined circumstances. See People
Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 495 A.2d 107, 114 (N.J. 1985) (allowing
recovery to particular plaintiffs or particular class where economic consequences are known or
should be known to be likely).
129. See Rickards, 41 A.2d at 270 (stating that plaintiffs economic loss was not a natural
and proximate result of defendanfs negligence).
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economic loss as an element of damages, and grant it as the only form
of damages in several caiegories of cases (e.g., attorney malpractice to
client, and unfair competition). There is nothing inherently
objectionable about granting recovery for pure economic loss. Finally,
it is foreseeable that if an undue risk of destroying a bridge is
realized, those served by the bridge will be economically injured.
The court's rejection of the plaintiffs claim in Rickards-and
other courts' rejections of scores of similar claims-can be understood
as an intuitive application of the substantive standing rule in negli-
gence law. A plaintiff cannot recover for negligently inflicted
economic loss unless the defendant breached a duty owed to the
plaintiff herself of taking reasonable precautions against causing the
plaintiff economic loss. Of course, much of the difficulty of explaining
Rickards and cases like it lies in explaining why there is no general
duty to take precautions against others' economic losses. But, as in
the cases of emotional injury, the greatest difficulty lies in explaining
a denial of recovery where a defendant breached a duty that he clearly
had to prevent another sort of injury, and that breach resulted in pure
economic loss.
3. Privity
In cases involving emotional or economic harm, plaintiffs can
make two distinct sorts of arguments: 130 an argument predicated on
breach of a duty of due care to a plaintiff, and an argument predicated
on breach of a duty of due care to a third party. The same two types
of arguments appear in a third sort of case which is also pivotal in the
law of torts: privity. Consider the accountant's liability case,
Ultramares Corp. v. Touche,1 1 also a Cardozo opinion. There, the
plaintiff lost money because the defendant accountant had negligently
prepared an audit for a third party. The issue was whether the plain-
tiff could recover despite the absence of privity between it and the
defendant.3 2 In theory, two lines of argument were available to the
plaintiff. One was that, in preparing the audit, the defendant
breached a duty of due care owed directly to the plaintiff. A second
was that the defendant's breach of duty to its client subjected the
defendant to liability to the plaintiff. The Ultramares court denied
liability, ostensibly on a finding that there was no privity between the
130. I am not suggesting, of course, that plaintiffs will always find it in their interest to dis-
tinguish these two lines of argument.
131. 174N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931).
132. See id. at 444.
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negligent accountant and the plaintiff suffering economic loss.133
Essentially, this holding means that an accountant does not have to
take precautions against economic risks to third parties with whom
there is no contractual privity. But a second argument remains: Why
can the plaintiff not recover on the basis of the breach to the client?
The argument is especially compelling in cases where third parties
rely on audits, for these are parties to whom injury is clearly foresee-
able.
Cardozo's denial of liability in Ultramares represents a rejec-
tion of both lines of argument: Cardozo found no direct duty, absent
privity, and implicitly rejected the possibility of liability without a
direct duty. Framed in this light, Ultramares exemplifies the
substantive standing rule in the case of negligence. Indeed,
Ultramares is akin to Palsgraf, but the victim in the former case
belongs to a class of persons to whom injury is foreseeable. Because
the duty to avoid economic harm is not predicated on foreseeability
alone, but requires privity, the foreseeability of the victim's loss does
not make the act negligent as to him.13 Therefore, the case is on all
fours with Palsgraf: no recovery because no negligence as to plaintiff
himself. Substantive standing, not foreseeability, is the key to both
cases.
135
133. See id. at 446.
134. Ultramares is not the majority rule. Nevertheless, those courts permitting recovery
for non-clients do so on the ground that the duty to prepare audits with due care runs to all
those whom the accountant knows will rely on them-the first form of argument, which
incorporates the substantive standing rule. See, e.g., Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138
(N.J. 1983) (finding duty of care owed to reasonably foreseeable recipients of financial
statements).
135. Perhaps the most famous privity case in the law of torts is Cardozo's decision in
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). Buick sold a negligently
constructed car to a retailer, who in turn sold the car to the plaintiff. See id. at 1051. The
plaintiff was injured by the car, because of its negligent construction, and he sued Buick. See id.
Buick argued that there was no contractual privity with the plaintiff, and therefore there was
no duty to him, and therefore there was no cause of action for negligence. Cardozo rejected the
argument and permitted the consumer to sue Buick directly for damages. See id. at 1055.
Note that there were, again, two lines of argument available to the plaintiff in MacPherson.
The first is that Buick's duty to construct the automobile with due care ran to consumers like
the plaintiff himself, even if there was no privity of contract; the second is that there was a
breach of the duty of due care to the retailer, and the plaintiffs injury was caused by this
breach. Cardozo's opinion in MacPherson is a thorough analysis of the first line of argument,
not the second. See id. at 1052-55. For him, MacPherson's ability to recover hinged solely on
the viability of the first line of argument. His decision rings with morality precisely because he
was announcing that a manufacturer has a duty to watch out for the well-being of all
consumers, not just of those persons with whom there is contractual privity. The reason
Cardozo needed to find a duty directly to MacPherson absent privity is that, without it,
MacPherson would have violated the law's implicit substantive standing rule in the case of
negligence. See John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral of MacPherson
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Many courts permit recovery by certain third parties in ac-
countant's liability cases, but they do so because they find there is a
duty of due care running from the accountant to the third party, de-
spite the absence of privity.136 In legal malpractice, 1 7 medical mal-
practice, 138 and economic harm doctrine,3 9 privity remains a hotly
contested issue of law. In all of these areas, there is negligence and
foreseeable injury, and the key issue is whether, notwithstanding the
lack of privity, the defendant breached a duty of due care running to
the plaintiff. In this light, the duty element in privity cases is a
version of the substantive standing requirement.140
4. The Risk Rule
In an important book written several decades ago, then-
Professor (now Judge) Robert Keeton attempted to explain Palsgraf as
a case based on the "risk rule."'4' The risk rule presupposes that a
given act is negligent because it carries with it an unduly high risk of
certain injuries. As such, an act is negligent in relation to certain
risks. The rule states that a defendant is liable in negligence for only
those injuries that are realizations of the risks in relation to which
the act was negligent.42 Keeton posed as an example of the
application of the risk rule a case involving a plaintiff injured by a
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Author) (developing moral conception of duty within
MacPherson and beyond).
136. See, e.g., Rosenblum, 461 A.2d at 145 (finding liability based on reasonable
foreseeability of use); Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 335 N.W.2d 361, 367 (Wis.
1983) (describing liability based on foreseeability of injuries).
137. See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Triangular Lawyer Relationships: An Exploratory
Analysis, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcS 15 (1987) (examining privity in legal malpractice).
138. See, e.g., Cynthia Grant Bowman and Elizabeth Mertz, A Dangerous Direction: Legal
Intervention in Sexual Abuse Survivor Therapy, 109 HARV. L. REv. 549 (1996) (examining and
criticizing recent cases in which therapist is held liable for emotional and reputational injury to
non-patients).
139. See, e.g., Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992) (lack of privity curtails
third party's right to recover for accountant malpractice).
140. In the famous case of Wagner v. International R.R. Co., 133 N.E. 437, 438 (N.Y. 1921),
Judge Cardozo wrote for the New York Court of Appeals that a plaintiff injured while rescuing
someone who suffered from an accident caused by defendant's negligence was entitled to recover
from the defendant for his own injuries. He famously opined that "[dianger invites rescue." Id.
at 437. Cardozo was apparently reasoning that the prospect of a rescuer who might be injured
was within the scope of the hazards the negligent defendant could be expected to foresee.
Learned Hand adopted the same analysis in Sinram. See Sinram v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 61
F.2d 767, 771 (2d Cir. 1932).
141. ROBERT E. KEETON, LEGAL CAUSE IN THE LAW OF TORT 79-80 (1963).
142. See id. at 10 (the second formulation of the risk rule is: "A negligent actor is legally
responsible for the harm, and only the harm, that not only (1) is caused in fact by his conduct
but also (2) is a result within the scope of the risks by reason of which the actor is found to be
negligent.").
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restaurant explosion caused by unlabeled rat poison kept near a
stove. 43 It is negligent to keep unlabeled rat poison near the stove
because it might be added to the restaurant's food, not because of the
risk that it would explode, of which the restaurant could reasonably
have been unaware. Hence, the risk rule demands nonliability in this
case.'"
Like the substantive standing rule more generally, the risk
rule demands nonliability in Palsgraf because the injuries for which
Mrs. Palsgraf sought recovery were not realizations of the risks that
made the conduct negligent. As Keeton and subsequent scholars have
pointed out, liability for negligent conduct causing physical injury is
denied in a wide range of cases, essentially on the basis of the risk
rule,145 that is, on the ground that the action causing the injury was
not negligent in relation to the injury that ultimately occurred, al-
though it may have been negligent in some other respect.146
Although I believe that this topic merits examination beyond
this Article, it appears that the risk rule can be understood as a
conflatation of the substantive standing rule with some form of
causation requirement. The risk rule presupposes that the conduct
must have involved the wrongful taking of a risk of certain injuries to
the plaintiff-in other words, negligence in relation to the plaintiff.
This is essentially a form of the substantive standing rule. The risk
rule adds the requirement that the plaintiffs injury must have been
caused by this specific negligence in relation to her-a particular form
of causation requirement.147 Note that in Palsgraf, Cardozo never had
to reach the issue of causation because the risk rule's first
presupposition was not satisfied-the conduct was not negligent in
relation to the plaintiff. Causation was equally irrelevant in a
number of the cases cited above. 48 By contrast, some of the cases
involved negligence in relation to the plaintiff, but the negligence in
143. See id. at 3-4 (varying the facts of Larrimore v. American Natl Ins. Co., 89 P.2d 340
(Okla. 1939)).
144. See id.
145. See, e.g., authorities cited in KEETON ETAL., supra note 4, § 43, at 281 n.9.
146. See, e.g., Gorris v. Scott, L.R. 9 Ex. 125 (1874) (finding no cause of action in negligence
where shipper's negligence in failing to keep sheep enclosed in pen was negligent in relation to
risk of animals spreading contagious disease to others, but was not negligent in relation to the
accident that occurred-drowning of sheep washed overboard).
147. Interestingly, Richard Wright has offered a forceful theoretical analysis of this causal
requirement in the tort law, or what he calls "tortious aspect causation." Richard W. Wright,
Causation in Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1737, 1759 (1985). The idea is that there is no liability
unless the aspect of conduct in light of which it was tortious was a but-for cause of the accident.
See id.
148. See cases cited throughout Part III.
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relation to the plaintiff is not what caused the injury.149 While
causation notions are analytically central to these latter cases, the
causal explanations themselves presuppose a form of substantive
standing rule.
Interestingly, the Restatement (Second) of Torts (like the
Restatement (First) of Torts) makes this distinction quite explicit,
albeit under the category of "legal cause": "In order that a negligent
actor shall be liable for another's harm, it is necessary not only that
the actor's conduct be negligent toward the other, but also that the
negligence of the actor be a legal cause of the other's harm."150
Ironically, while the Restatement itself explicitly recognizes that sub-
stantive standing (although not labeling it as such) in negligence is
analytically prior to the question of legal causation, it nevertheless
continues to insert this requirement not only under "negligence,"'5'
but also under "legal cause."152 This is presumably in part because, as
I have suggested, the analysis of legal cause offered is one that can be
understood only against a framework in which substantive standing
is required. Nevertheless, discussing a substantive standing require-
ment only in the context of a section on "legal cause" has unfortu-
nately perpetuated the error of thinking that Palsgraf is a causation
case."'
149. See supra note 143, 146 and accompanying text. See generally Wright, supra note 147.
Wright believes that the tortious aspect requirement can replace the risk rule. As I argue in
detail in the discussion of Calabresi, infra, there is a category of risk rule (and substantive
standing) cases that cannot plausibly be handled in this manner. See infra Part IVA3.b.
150. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 430 (1965) (emphasis added). The comment to
this section clarifies:
The actor's conduct, to be negligent toward another, must involve an unreasonable risk
of:
(1) causing harm to a class of persons of which the other is a member and
(2) subjecting the other to the hazard from which the harm results.
Until it has been shown that these conditions have been satisfied and that the ac-
tor's conduct is negligent, the question of the causal relation between it and the other's
harm is immaterial.
Id. at cmt. a (emphasis added).
151. See id. § 281.
152. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
153. The law of defective products treats emotional harm, economic harm, and the risk rule
in roughly the same manner as does negligence law. See, e.g., Walker v. Clark Equip. Co., 320
N.W.2d 561, 562-63 (Iowa 1982) (emotional injury claims based on defective products subject to
same sort of analysis as under negligence); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS
LIABLITY (Tentative Draft No.2) § 6(b) (economic harm not predicated on personal or property
harm must be predicated on interference with plaintiffs legally protected interest); id. § 10
(actual and proximate causation in product liability governed by same rules as in negligence).
Moreover, the Restatement (Second) of Torts explicitly limits liability for abnormally dangerous
activities by reference to a risk-rule criterion. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519(2)
(1977) (IThis strict liability is limited to the kind of harm, the possibility of which makes the
activity abnormally dangerous."); id. at cmt. e ("The rule of strict liability stated in Subsection
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D. Loss of Consortium and Subrogation
Judge Andrews objected in his Palsgraf dissent that the com-
mon law has long permitted recovery for torts to a third party in the
form of loss of consortium awards to a man who loses his wife as a
result of another's tort.'5 Understood historically, this is hardly a
counterexample. 155 As feminist legal scholars have made amply clear,
the common law regarded women and children, as well as slaves, as
chattel.15 6 It is true that our system has retained and even broadened
family members' rights to sue for loss of consortium or loss of services,
and has done so despite contemporary rejection of the property-based
rationale. As a matter of political and historical reality, it was surely
easier to reform this sexist law by increasing generosity to female
plaintiffs whose husbands were tortiously killed or injured than by
denying recovery to both men and women.157
But even leaving history, procedure, and institutional design
aside, the peculiar nature of loss of consortium law supports rather
than undercuts the hypothesis that substantive standing is a re-
quirement of tort law. For even in family member cases, the law is
still so uncomfortable permitting a plaintiff to sue for torts to a third
person that foreseeably injure the plaintiff that it has replaced the
(1) [for abnormally dangerous activities] applies only to harm that is within the scope of the
abnormal risk that is the basis of liability."). To this extent, at least, the substantive standing
rule applies to what is sometimes termed "strict liability," as well as to negligence and the range
of other torts considered. For many torts as well, such as trespass, nuisance, and defamation,
the common law has historically permitted a substantial range of liability without fault, for
which the substantive standing rule also applies.
154. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 102 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J.,
dissenting).
155. The very "need" for loss of consortium as a doctrine demonstrates the strength of the
substantive standing rule; were there no such rule, a loss of consortium doctrine would not be
needed. Moreover, loss of consortium is, in most jurisdictions, a separate cause of action and
not merely an element of damages, see KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 125, at 932, confirming
that plaintiffs who lack substantive standing cannot recover under the tort itself.
156. See, e.g., Lucinda M. Finley, A Break in the Silence: Including Women's Issues in a
Torts Course, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 41, 49 (1989) (discussing blatantly discriminatory limita-
tion of loss of consortium to men based on law's treatment of women as chattel). See also 2
FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS, § 8.9, at 551 n.3 (2d ed. 1986). According to
Harper and James, it is more specifically the husband's common law right to the services of his
wife that grounded the right to loss of consortium under the common law. This action was
originally an action in trespass vi et armis, referred to by Blackstone as the wrong of "beating a
man's wife" which, if "very enormous," that is, if it actually deprived the husband of services,
was a sufficient ground for a recovery for the loss of consortium. Id. (citing 3 WILIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *140).
157. See, e.g., Smith & Co. v. Cole, 242 F.2d 220 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Hitaffer v. Argonne Co.,
183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (permitting loss of consortium action where wife sues for loss of
her husband's companionship).
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property-based rationale in loss of consortium cases with an equally
strong idea that the claim is "derived from the marital relationship
and the rights attendant upon it," and is in a fundamental sense de-
rivative.158 Hence, courts typically deny that the plaintiff spouse is
really suing as a separate person, and treat the spouses as one
person, often stating that a defense personal to the third person will
block the plaintiff herself from suing.159 The same rationale applies
when children seek to sue for torts to their parents, or parents for
torts to their children. 6° Where the family relation does not exist, but
the plaintiff nevertheless has evidently suffered a real injury as a
result of the tort to a loved one, courts are no longer comfortable with
the "one person" metaphor, and recovery is typically denied.' 6'
A similar analysis undercuts the apparent counterexample of
"subrogation[,] suing in the right of the insured," noted by Judge
Andrews in his Palsgraf dissent. 6 2 An insurer can often recover from
a defendant who has acted tortiously as to the insured. The doctrine
of subrogation imports either statutory or equitable authority for the
fiction that the insurer steps into the shoes of the insured. As in the
loss of consortium context, the defenses against the insured apply to
the insurer. More importantly, as is true in the loss of consortium
cases, there must be a legally relevant connection between the
plaintiff and the person whose right was tortiously violated. Just as
an actual family relation is required for a loss of consortium claim, so
a legal obligation between the subrogor and subrogee is required in
subrogation claim. It is this legal obligation, not the fact of foresee-
able harm caused, that creates an equitable basis for a right of action.
In effect, by having incurred the legal obligation to compensate the
party injured in the tort, the subrogee gains an ownership interest in
the victim's right of action. When the subrogee sues, it sues under a
combination of two rights-the victim's right in tort and the subro-
gee's own right in subrogation.
The possibility of a subrogation action actually confirms the
substantive standing rule. In most cases, an insurer's injuries are
clearly foreseeable and provable, but the substantive standing rule
158. KEETONETAL., supra note 4, § 125, at 932.
159. See id. at 937.
160. See id.
161. See id. at 932; 2 HARPER ET AL., supra note 156, § 8.9 at 561 & n.37, 562 & n.38; but
see Bulloch v. United States, 487 F. Supp. 1078 (D.N.J. 1980) (permitting loss of consortium
action where couple had been married, had children, were divorced and reconciled but not
remarried).
162. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 102-03 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J.,
dissenting).
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does not permit recovery on that basis alone; the defendant's act is
wrongful relative to the insured, not the insurer. Only when the
plaintiff/insurer is able to establish a legal basis for treating it as
identical to the holder of the right of action, or as the legal owner of
the right of action, will courts recognize an action.
The third-party insurer's right against a tortfeasor has become
one of the most intensely disputed questions of the day, for it is a
pivotal issue in several states' lawsuits against tobacco manufactur-
ers. 163 In these actions, states assert that tobacco companies should
be held liable to the states in light of the tortious conduct of the
tobacco companies, which has caused injury to the states by forcing
them to pay for the medical expenses of smokers. The tobacco
industry in these cases does not necessarily contest the existence of a
statutory right of subrogation, but argues that subrogation rights
(equitable or statutory) exhaust the states' rights. This is an
important argument for the industry, because it would generally
permit a defendant to assert against the state any defenses it would
have against the smoker-including "assumption-of-risk," which has
proved an effective defense in litigation.164 The attorneys directing
the litigation for each state have attempted to craft legal theories that
fall outside of traditional equitable or statutory subrogation 165 (or to
have the states pass statutes that offer a less restrictive form of
subrogation66). It is difficult to say who will prevail in these claims,
or whether they will ever be fully litigated, in light of the parties'
proposed settlement agreement. 167 The interesting point for our
163. See, e.g., Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Associated Indus. of Florida, Inc., 678 So.
2d 1239 (Fla. 1996); Humphrey v. Philip Morris, Inc., 551 N.W.2d 490 (Minn. 1996). See
generally Graham E. Kelder, Jr. & Richard A. Daynard, The Role of Litigation in the Effective
Control of the Sale and Use of Tobacco, STAN. L. & POLY REV. 63, 73-76 (Winter 1997)
(reporting on 15 states that have filed medical cost reimbursement suits against tobacco
companies).
164. See Michael K. Mahoney, Coughing the Cash: Should Medicaid Provide Independent
State Recovery Against Third.Party Tortfeasors Such As the Tobacco Industry?, 24 B.C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REV. 233, 246-47 (1996) (whether subrogation is limit of action is key issue in light of
assumption-of-risk defense that operates under subrogation theory).
165. See Kelder & Daynard, supra note 163, at 73 (Mississippi Attorney General Mike
Moore chose to proceed on theories of unjust enrichment and restitution; other states have
followed and added a variety of different tort claims).
166. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 409.910 (West 1993) ("Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act"),
stricken in part, modified in part, upheld in part, in Agency for Health Care Admin., 678 So. 2d
at 1243.
167. See John M. Broder, The Tobacco Agreement: The Overview; Cigarette Makers in $368
Billion Accord to Curb Lawsuits and Curtail Marketing, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 1997, at Al
(reporting global settlement agreement proposed, but awaiting approval, in tobacco litigation);
but see David J. Morrow, Spending It: Transporting Lawsuits Across State Lines, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 9, 1997, sec. 3, at 1 ("In September [1997]... monumental tobacco pact scuttled by
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purposes is that, despite alleged tortious wrongdoing and foreseeable
injury, the states must either be satisfied with their derivative status
in subrogation, or engage in what is indeed creative and inventive
lawyering. The common law, traditionally understood, would deny
the insurer a right of action except in subrogation, because while the
defendant's conduct may be tortious with respect to the
smoker/beneficiary, it is not with respect to the insurer. The
historical absence of a direct cause of action for the insurer, which
would avoid the defenses against the insured, is yet another example
of a substantive standing rule at work.
IV. WRONGS AND RIGHTS
A. A Critique of Instrumentalist Theories of Rights
1. Substantive Standing and Instrumentalism: A Problem
The substantive standing rule appears puzzling from a concep-
tual point of view. If phrased in terms of "wrongs"-a plaintiff has a
right of action only if the defendant's conduct was wrong relative to
her-the rule depends upon the notion of "wrong-relative-to someone,"
and this notion seems utterly opaque. A legal wrong is the violation
of a legal rule. It either is a legal wrong or it is not, one might
argue.168
The conceptual puzzle appears different, but equally serious, if
we phrase the substantive standing rule in terms of rights-a plaintiff
has a right of action only if the defendant's conduct was a violation of
the plaintiffs own right. This formulation seems to preserve compre-
hensibility by eliminating the notion of relative wrongs. To most
lawyers, however, it may seem to do so at the high price of becoming
circular. For what does it mean for a plaintiff to have a right against
the defendant under the tort law? According to a very popular under-
President Clinton as being too lenient."). See also John Kennedy, Tobacco to Pay State $11.3
billion; The Industry Avoided A Trial By Settling With Florida and Agreeing to Admit Cigarettes
Are Addictive and Deadly, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 28, 1997, at Al (describing settlement
agreement reached in Florida tobacco case); Barry Meier, Mississippi Settles Suit With 4
Tobacco Companies, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 1997, at Al (describing settlement agreement reached
in Mississippi tobacco case).
168. The possibility that there is a category of borderline cases in which it is unclear
whether an act is a legal wrong sheds no light on the idea of wrongs as relational either.
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standing,169 it simply means the defendant's conduct has invaded the
plaintiffs interests in such a manner that the court will require the
defendant to compensate the plaintiff for that invasion. But then the
substantive standing rule simply says that a plaintiff has a right of
action only if the defendant's conduct was such as to give rise to liabil-
ity on the part of the defendant to the plaintiff, and this formulation
is explicitly circular. This circularity is precisely the problem that
agitated Prosser in his classic article, PalsgrafRevisited:
There are shifting sands here, and no fit foundation. There is a duty if the
court says there is a duty; the law, like the Constitution, is what we make it.
Duty is only a word with which we state our conclusion that there is or is not
liability; it necessarily begs the essential question. 170
In fact, the substantive standing rule presents a single, two-
horned conceptual puzzle, whether we phrase it in terms of wrongs or
in terms of rights. The dilemma is this: If we define legal rights and
legal wrongs simply by reference to rights of action and liability, the
substantive standing rule becomes a mere tautology. Yet if we must
define rights and wrongs independently of rights of action and liabil-
ity, then it is unclear what they could really mean, and how they
could be relational in the sense suggested by the substantive standing
rule. Hence, a "wrong relative to plaintiff" might be defined as the
sort of wrong that could support a right of action by that plaintiff
against the defendant, but such a definition would rekindle the
circularity problem. Alternatively, we might accept that "right" could
not be defined simply by reference to right of action, but then we
would be forced to wonder whether there was anything to the notion
of right in tort law that made sense, and if so, why the violation of
plaintiffs own "right" was a prerequisite to a right of action.
To the extent that our scholarly tradition in tort law has been
instrumentalist, it has been willing to impale itself on the first horn of
the dilemma, and has taken the substantive standing rule to be a
mere tautology. The failure to explain the substantive standing rule
as anything but a vacuous tautology is a significant shortcoming in a
positive theory of the tort law. A positive theory ought to be able to
169. See infra Part IV.A.2.
170. Prosser, supra note 3, at 15. See also In re Kinsman, 338 F.2d 708, 721.(2d Cir. 1964)
("Thus stated, the query rather answers itself; Hohfeld's analysis tells us that once it is
concluded that A had no duty to C, it is simply a correlative that C has no right against A. The
important question is what was the basis for Chief Judge Cardozo's conclusion that the Long
Island Railroad owed no 'duty' to Mrs. Palsgraf under the circumstances."). For an argument
against the notion that this is the important question, see infra Part IV.B.6.
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explain the doctrinal structure of the law, and the substantive stand-
ing rule is an important aspect of the doctrinal structure of the law.
To treat it as a tautology is essentially to concede an inability to ex-
plain that entire aspect of doctrinal structure.
There is another cost to treating the substantive standing rule
as a tautology. All the cases apparently decided under the substan-
tive standing rule must be explained in some other way, because once
we interpret the rule as a tautology, we can no longer treat it as pro-
viding any explanatory value for the outcome of cases. We commit
ourselves to treating the rule as a sham for some other value, end, or
principle that is silently being pursued. For the instrumentalist, an
adequate explanation of the resolution of substantive standing case
law must exist in terms of the social goods that tort law aims to real-
ize. Such an explanation would at least mitigate the damage done to
the theory by its failure to accommodate a central doctrinal notion.
I shall argue that reductive instrumentalism cannot "explain
away" the law decided under the substantive standing rule. I select
the predominant form of reductive instrumentalism-law and
economics-as the focus of my critique, but the reasons presented
against the law and economics view similarly undercut other such
views. We are left to conclude that the substantive standing rule
constitutes significant evidence against law and economics and
instrumentalist theories of tort law. We are also given reason to
probe more deeply into the possibility of a relational conception of
legal wrongs and a non-reductive conception of rights. Part IV.B will
construct a theoretical framework for these conceptions.
2. Holmes's Rights Reductionism
Theories of private law sometimes distinguish between
"primary rights" and "remedial rights."171 An example of a primary
right is the right to use and enjoy one's land, the basic right on which
nuisance law is premised. An example of a remedial right is the right
to be compensated for damages suffered as a consequence of another's
171. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS
IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 127-38 (1994) (prepared for publication from the 1958
Tentative Edition and containing an introductory essay by William N. Eskridge, Jr., and Philip
P. Frickey). See also Stephen R. Perry, Comment on Coleman: Corrective Justice, 67 IND. L.J.
381, 407 (1992) (using similar distinction between primary rights and secondary rights). I
prefer, at this initial stage, Hart and Sacks's terminology of primary and remedial rights,
because the phrase "secondary right" seems to beg the question of whether it is possible to be
entitled to a remedy even if one's primary right was not violated. Ultimately, this Article relies
heavily upon the distinction between primary rights and rights of action.
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interference with the use or enjoyment of one's land. We can also
distinguish between primary and remedial duties. On the one hand,
there is a "primary" duty of conduct not to interfere with certain of
others' interests. On the other hand, there is sometimes a "remedial"
duty of compensation owed to those whose interests have been inter-
fered with. According to a naive version of natural law theory, the
primary rights and duties laid out under the law embody our moral
rights against and duties to one another, and the remedial rights and
duties are created by the state to render the moral rights and duties
concrete and actionable as legal rights and duties. Courts that
presuppose a natural law theory may then see themselves as called
upon, in deciding cases, to resolve what our natural moral rights and
duties are.
Holmes rejected this view of "primary rights and duties" one
hundred years ago in The Path of the Law:
The primary rights and duties with which jurisprudence busies itself again are
nothing but prophecies. One of the many evil effects of the confusion between
legal and moral ideas... is that theory is apt to get the cart before the horse,
and to consider the right or the duty as something existing apart from.., the
consequence of its breach, to which certain sanctions are added afterward.
But... a legal duty so called is nothing but a prediction that if a man does or
omits certain things he will be made to suffer in this or that way by judgment
of the court;-and so of a legal right.72
Holmes, and the legal realist movement that followed him, main-
tained that insofar as judges are called upon to decide what the law
shall be, ascertaining natural rights should not be part of the job.
Rather, judges should assess the desirability of the consequences that
flow from one scheme of liability rules rather than another. Expertise
in law would come to require expertise in ascertaining the conse-
quences of liability-hence, the economist and the statistician were to
be the masters of law in the future173
It is important to note that in the passage cited above, Holmes
was not offering a stipulative definition of what "primary right" and
"primary duty" would be used to mean; rather, he was analyzing
those terms and concepts. This point is easily missed because the
terms "primary" and "remedial" (or "secondary"174) suggest a
definitional link between the terms. To some extent, Holmes was
probably exploiting this ambiguity. However, the idea that primary
172. Holmes, supra note 10, at 991-92.
173. See id. at 1001.
174. See Perry, supra note 171, at 407.
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rights are given their entire content by the consequences of liability
(remedial rights and actions) could not have been intended by Holmes
as a stipulative definition of "primary right"; if it had been, his thesis
could not have been interesting, controversial, or illuminating-it
would simply have been true by his own stipulation. His contention
was interesting precisely because it was a piece of conceptual analysis
that attempted to explain and demystify what are usually called the
"rights" and "duties" of the common law.
The Holmesian view has ripened into the law and economics
movement. According to law and economics scholars, the rules of tort
law are liability rules; they inform people what their liability will be if
they engage in certain conduct and cause certain injuries. The liabil-
ity rule determines the nature of the right.17 5 The phrase "primary
rights" is merely shorthand for describing what sorts of injuries will
entitle someone to recover under the liability rules. Likewise, it
makes sense to talk about "primary duties" only insofar as the phrase
connotes the set of actions that will trigger liability. In order to un-
derstand the normative underpinnings of tort law, we must under-
stand what justifies the liability rules. This, in turn, requires an un-
derstanding of how the liability rules produce socially desirable conse-
quences. Similarly, from a prescriptive point of view, judges deciding
cases should focus on determining what set of liability rules will yield
socially desirable consequences-most particularly, efficient
outcomes. This view is reductive in the sense that it reduces the
content of primary rights to the content of remedial rights (or rights of
action). It is instrumentalist because it alleges that the normative
basis of rights of action (and liability rules) is their capacity to serve
as instruments for the attainment of social goods.
Conventional tort theory since Holmes has not been solely
oriented toward efficiency, but nonetheless has often embraced a form
of reductive instrumentalism. Courts, casebooks, and torts teachers
typically recite "deterrence" and "compensation" as the goals toward
which tort law is to be aimed, and they cite a wide range of social
harms that need to be deterred. Ernest Weinrib has labeled this view
"multiple-goal" instrumentalism, and contrasted it with to the single-
goal instrumentalism of the law and economics theorist.7 6 I shall
argue, at the end of this Section, that multiple-goal instrumentalism
175. See Guido Calabresi, Remarks: The Simple Virtues of The Cathedral, 106 YALE L.J.
2201, 2205 (1997) ("Of course, the so-called remedy defines the nature of the right .... Indeed,
I (probably incorrectly) thought I had said as much in the article itself.") (citations omitted).
176. See Ernest J. Weinrib, Understanding Tort Law, 23 VAL. U. L. REV. 485, 502-04
(1989).
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does no better than law and economics in explaining away the doc-
trine of substantive standing.177
It is worth emphasizing that the fundamental problem which
the substantive standing rule presents for reductive instrumentalist
theories is not the outcome of cases. It is the analytical structure of
the doctrine. Throughout this area of tort doctrine, courts reject
plaintiffs' claims because the conduct has not been wrong relative to
the plaintiff, has not been a violation of her right. Reductive instru-
mentalist theories leave no conceptual place for a non-circular under-
standing of this basic idea.
3. Law and Economics
a. Foreseeability
The most prominent economic theory of tort law is that of
Landes and Posner,178 and indeed it is the most comprehensive
positive tort theory to be produced by any scholars. It maintains that
the point of tort law is to promote the efficient allocation of
resources. 79 In part, it solves the problem of "social costs." Human
conduct has costs to the person who engages in that conduct, as well
as to other persons. While a rational decisionmaker will consider the
costs to herself before she undertakes a course of action, rationality
(conceived in economists' terms) does not require her to consider the
costs to others, at least in the absence of liability rules. Hence (in the
absence of sufficiently low transaction costs to permit others to strike
a bargain), her decision as to whether to undertake a course of action
will exclude consideration of important costs of the activity. These
excluded costs to others-often called "externalities'"-sometimes lead
decision makers to act in ways that are not, from the aggregate point
of view, efficient. 8°
177. See infra Part IV.B.4.
178. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 6.
179. Id. at 1 ("Ihis book explores the hypothesis that the common law of torts is best
explained as if the judges who created the law through decisions operating as precedents in
later cases were trying to promote efficient resource allocation.").
180. There is an irony in the economic literature about the problem of social costs. A.C.
Pigou, in A.C. PIGoU, THE ECONOMIcs OF WELFARE 134, 192 (4th ed. 1992), described the prob-
lem of externalities, or the problem of "social cost." The subject of how to internalize costs has
indeed been central to the work of leading theorists in positive and prescriptive economic
analysis, including Calabresi. See, e.g., CALABRESI, supra note 6, and, more pertinently for
present purposes, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 6. Nevertheless, the most famous single
article in the field, Coase's The Problem of Social Cost, supra note 6, is a sustained critique of
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Tort law solves the problem of social costs by creating a net-
work of legal rules, typically liability rules.181 These rules tell deci-
sionmakers that, under certain conditions, they will be forced to bear
the costs of their activities to others. The effect of such rules is to give
rational decisionmakers an incentive to incorporate the costs to others
into their decisions about whether to engage in the activity, and
hence, to create a situation in which the activities chosen by the ra-
tional decisionmaker are efficient from an aggregate point of view. In
this way, externalities are "internalized."
The simplest explanation of Palsgraf within this framework is
as follows. Like ripples in a pond, the effects of an activity continue
on indefinitely.8 2 Insofar as these effects constitute costs to others
that the decisionmaker would not consider absent liability rules, they
are all externalities. Tort law must decide which of these
externalities need to be internalized by the decisionmaker. Palsgraf
stands for the proposition that the tort law does not require an
individual to consider, in selecting her activity, costs to persons to
whom harm is not reasonably foreseeable. Unforeseeable harm
cannot be internalized because, by definition, the decisionmaker could
not have foreseen it. Imposing liability where there is no
foreseeability will "confer no economic benefit; it will merely require a
costly transfer payment."'3
It is possible to add nuance to the idea of foreseeability within
this framework. There is not necessarily a sharp line between what
Pigou's assertion that the law is needed to internalize costs. Coase, of course, explained that
externalities could be a problem to the degree that transaction costs were significant, but the
mixed treatment of the topic of externalities remains.
For these reasons, Stephen Perry is both right and wrong to suggest that internalization
theories have been abandoned in favor of deterrence theories in the economic theory of tort law.
See Stephen R. Perry, Tort Law in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 57,
61 (D. Patterson ed., 1996). Certainly the Pigouvian notion of tort law as solving an essential
problem of externalities has been rejected, and, more generally, deterrence-based approaches
such as Landes's and Posner's lead contemporary tort theory. But the deterrence approach, as
explained in the text, depends essentially on internalizing externalities, interpreted in a
suitably broad sense.
181. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972)
(stating that negligence law internalizes costs of accidents through liability rules). Of course,
law and economics theory does not assume that liability rules constitute the only form of legal
rules; indeed, economists purport to offer a theory of when liability rules are appropriate and
when property rules are appropriate. See generally Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 6; Louis
Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109
HARV. L. REV. 713 (1996); Symposium, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: A
Twenty-Five Year Retrospective, 106 YALE L.J. 2081 (1997).
182. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J.,
dissenting) (analogizing causation issues to flow of a stream).
183. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 6, at 247.
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"could be foreseen" and what could not be foreseen. 184 Decisionmakers
will be able to anticipate a wider range of the effects of their actions if
they expend more resources gathering information about the possible
effects of their actions. The law's liability rules affect the amount of
resources decisionmakers will devote to doing this. Imposing liability
in cases like Palsgraf would either have no effect on conduct (if the
outcome were not foreseen on subsequent occasions) or it would create
an incentive for decisionmakers to spend a greater amount of re-
sources gathering information. Beyond a certain point, such informa-
tion-gathering is socially inefficient. Palsgrafs holding that unfore-
seeable victims cannot recover prevents the tort law from being ineffi-
cient in this way. More particularly, it embodies the economic insight
that it is inefficient to place certain actors in the position of avoiding
certain costs if it would be very expensive for them to avoid those
costs, because it would be expensive for them to gather information
even to learn about those potential costs.
Because the law and economics model relies upon
foreseeability in this way, it is ill-equipped to explain the substantive
standing requirement. The domain of cases decided under the
substantive standing rule includes many in which the harm to the
plaintiff is foreseeable. Consider defamation cases. It is foreseeable
that if a company's business reputation is injured, its owners will also
be injured; that vicious lies about someone's "deviant" sexual practices
will be hurtful to the reputation of a spouse; that an attack on the
professional integrity of a lawyer will be harmful to her law partners.
In short, it is not only the person actually defamed who will
foreseeably be injured by defamation. Yet defamation permits
recovery only by those defamed, that is, only if the statement was
made of and concerning the plaintiff.
In virtually all of the cases presented in Part III, injury to the
victim was reasonably foreseeable. Indeed, as we saw, even in cases
involving the tort of negligence itself, foreseeable victims of tortious
conduct may not always recover. A parent's severe emotional distress
at the negligent death of a child is surely foreseeable; an investor's
loss due to a negligently prepared financial audit is equally foresee-
able. Yet recovery in such cases has been the exception rather than
the rule, despite the presence of foreseeability. The denial of recovery
in substantive standing cases is therefore not based on the lack of
foreseeability. If the point of tort law is to internalize externalities,




the law should be imposing liability even where substantive standing
is lacking.185
b. The Cheapest Cost-Avoider
Substantive standing case law is also not explained away by
Calabresi's subtle account of Palsgraf and proximate cause in terms of
market deterrence and the cheapest cost-avoider.16 According to
Calabresi, whether liability should be imposed for a plaintiffs injury
depends upon whether we want defendants, in selecting the most
efficient course of action, to contemplate a level of liability that in-
cludes the costs of injuries suffered by plaintiffs so situated, or
whether we want plaintiffs or some third party to have these costs
figure into their decisions.187 The choice turns upon a determination
of who, among these candidates, would most cheaply avoid these costs
if they were internalized by law.1' Thus, following Calabresi's analy-
sis, a decision that a certain act is tortious may be understood as a
decision that the defendant is the cheapest avoider of the cost plaintiff
suffered. In this sense, the decision relates a particular kind of con-
duct to a particular kind of injury. In a case like Palsgraf, the injury
suffered falls outside the range of injuries that the defendant was
judged to be the cheapest at avoiding. Hence, a judgment that the
defendant should bear the cost for this injury does not follow auto-
matically from a finding that the defendant's conduct was tortious.8 9
Thus, for example, the law might decline to impose liability on
a defendant who handed a child a loaded gun, where the child's
parent seeks compensation for a toe broken when the child dropped
the gun on it.190 Tort law's inclination would be to say that the
plaintiff cannot recover because the risk that made the conduct
185. Landes and Posner also discuss the high administrative costs of permitting recovery in
cases like Palsgraf, but their arguments are based on the unforeseeability of the injury, which is
not applicable to substantive standing cases. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 6, at 247. Note
also that many of the substantive standing cases do not involve particularly remote, difficult to
identify, or difficult to prove issues. For further discussion of administrative costs, see infra
text accompanying notes 196-98.
186. See Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry
Kalven, Jr., 43 U. CMI. L. REv. 69 (1975).
187. See id. at 84-91.
188. See id.
189. See id. at 90, 91-100. See also Part III.C.4 (discussing risk-rule cases).
190. Calabresi, supra note 186, at 98. I have embellished Calabresi's example to
strengthen it as an illustration of his insight; the parent is arguably the cheaper cost-avoider
with respect to injuries caused by his or her child dropping things, while the defendant is still
probably a cheaper cost-avoider as to injuries from a gun firing accidentally. Calabresi's
example is taken from RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281, cmt. f. lus. 3 (1965).
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negligent was not the risk whose realization caused the injury.
Calabresi's analysis would be that the cheapest avoider of the broken
toe is not necessarily the cheapest avoider of accidents from the
misfired gun.
While Calabresi's account provides insight to the notion of
proximate cause, it too is unable to explain away the substantive
standing rule. To see why, it will be useful to distinguish two sorts of
cases-what I will call "pathway-dependent" and "pathway-independ-
ent" cases.191 A pathway-dependent case is one in which the injury of
which the plaintiff complains occurred as a consequence of the
realization of the hazard with relation to which the defendant's
conduct was negligent. Palsgraf was a pathway-dependent case: The
defendant's conduct was negligent because it risked knocking a
package out of the passenger's hands. Mrs. Palsgrafs injury was
distinct from the occurrence of that risk, but it was a consequence of
the occurrence of that risk. By contrast, the case of the dropped gun
above may be called "pathway-independent." In that case, the hazard
of a mistakenly fired gun was what made it negligent to hand over the
loaded gun; the hurt toe was not a consequence of the realization of a
mistakenly fired gun. Note that with regard to each of these cases,
one may ask both whether the injury was pathway-dependent, and
also whether it was foreseeable; all four possible combinations in
principle could exist.
Calabresi's account arguably makes sense with respect to all
pathway-independent risks, and to unforeseeable pathway-dependent
risks (as in Palsgraf). But for foreseeable pathway-dependent risks,
the situation is different. In these cases, a party who is good at fore-
seeing the "target" hazard, and can cheaply avoid it, will a fortiori be
in a good position to avoid the sort of injury the plaintiff suffered.
Avoiding the hazard will minimize the risk of the plaintiffs injury too.
Moreover, the defendant is hypothetically capable of foreseeing the
extra costs to the person in the plaintiffs situation. For this type of
case, the judgment that the defendant is the cheapest cost-avoider of
the target hazard carries considerable force with respect to whether it
would be a cheap cost-avoider of the plaintiffs injury. Indeed, in the
absence of a reason to think the plaintiff would be well situated to
avoid such injuries cheaply, shifting .the loss to the cheapest cost-
avoider of the original hazard-the defendant-would seem to be
warranted.
191. This terminology is coined for the purposes of this Article, and should not be confused
with the terminology of "path-dependency."
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Substantive standing case law is replete with foreseeable
"pathway-dependent" injuries: the parent hurt by defamation of the
son, the bystander hurt by the tortiously caused suffering of another,
the business destroyed by the negligent destruction of another's prop-
erty, the investor ruined by the defrauding of a borrower. In all of
these cases, the injury suffered is one that the defendant would seem
to be in the best position to avoid (this is particularly true of inten-
tional torts). Moreover, even when the torts are not intentional, they
are typically foreseeable pathway-dependent injuries, where the
finding of liability for the "target" injury should entail a finding of
liability for the plaintiffs actual injury.192 The Calabresian model of
cheapest-cost avoiders is therefore unable to explain away the doc-
trine of substantive standing.
c. An Analogy to Antitrust Law
Private antitrust law contains a well developed jurisprudence
of standing,193 particularly in the context of the application of the
"indirect purchaser rule" formulated in Illinois Brick v. Illinois.194
The indirect purchaser rule states that indirect purchasers lack
standing to sue for antitrust violations. 9 This rule offers possibilities
not yet canvassed, including: (1) that imposing liability on defendants
would result in overdeterrence, because the defendant already has
liability to a third party for the same conduct; 196 (2) that permitting
plaintiffs to recover would involve overcompensation of plaintiffs,
since they already are indirectly benefiting from the third parties'
recovery;97 and (3) that in light of liability to third parties, the admin-
istrative costs would become too high.198 It is worth considering these
rationales, both because courts have developed them and also because
law and economics scholarship has supported them.1'
192. The domain of foreseeable pathway-dependent injuries that do not suffice for substan-
tive standing explains why Richard Wrighfs account of causation would also fail to explain the
substantive standing rule. See Wright, supra note 147 at 1766-71 (causation element satisfied
only if injury caused by aspect of conduct that made it tortious).
193. See generally 2 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 3G (rev.
ed. 1995).
194. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
195. See Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 724. See also Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe
Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968) (setting up Illinois Brick by forbidding defendants to
offset damages that plaintiff/direct purchasers "passed on" to indirect purchasers).
196. See id. at 730.
197. See id.
198. See id. at 732.
199. See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Should Indirect Purchasers Have
Standing to Sue Under the Antitrust Laws? An Economic Analysis of the Rule of Illinois Brick,
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The substantive standing rule is not explained by any of these
rationales. One premise of the overdeterrence rationale is that the
harm caused to the plaintiff has already been counted once.200 But
this is not true, as a general matter, in the substantive standing case
law where plaintiffs are denied recovery altogether. In some cases,
defendants will be deterred from wrongful conduct, but only in
connection with the harm it may cause to third parties, and that
harm is not construed broadly enough to include plaintiffs who lack
substantive standing. For example, in Palsgraf, the man whose
package was dropped may be able to sue the Long Island Railroad,
but there is no sense in which his recovery will include Mrs. Palsgrafs
loss. Of course, one could imagine a case in which Mrs. Palsgraf could
sue the firecracker carrier for negligence, and he could in turn sue the
Long Island Railroad for indemnification or contribution. Perhaps
there would be an interesting analogy to antitrust standing rationales
in that case. However, the denial of recovery in Palsgraf is in no way
contingent on a theory that the harmfulness of the conduct is being
otherwise reflected in the damages against the defendant. Indeed, for
every tort, the substantive standing cases demonstrate the same
problem: The injury done to the plaintiff is not reflected in an award
to a third party. The problem is most severe where there is no other
plaintiff at all.201
The problem with the second rationale-overcompensation of
plaintiffs-has already been anticipated. Mrs. Palsgraf could recover
from no one; that is partly why the case is famous. The same thing is
true in most of the substantive standing case law we considered.
The third rationale also fails, for the key to the administrative
and efficiency arguments in the antitrust context is that optimal de-
terrence and appropriate compensation require choosing a scheme
that permits a smaller set of plaintiffs to recover all losses or a larger
set of plaintiffs each to recover some losses. As between these two
schemes, either of which could provide deterrence in proportion to
harm and compensation for those wronged, efficiency of enforcement
and administrative ease may be powerful reasons for non-recovery.
46 U. Cm. L. REV. 602 (1979) (presuming that if indirect purchasers have standing, then direct
purchasers will not be able to recover damages that are passed on to indirect purchasers, and
arguing that efficient enforcement favors permitting direct purchasers to sue unhampered by
passing-on defense).
200. This is particularly evident in actions brought by indirect purchasers who seek to
recover "pass-on" costs, in a system that does not allow defendants to use a "pass-on"/mitigation
defense against direct purchasers. See Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 730.
201. It is also worth noting that the overdeterrence problem in antitrust law, where actual
damages are trebled, is particularly severe. Treble damages do not, of course, apply in torts.
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But what the previous discussion has shown is that denial of compen-
sation where the plaintiff lacks substantive standing fails to provide
deterrence in proportion to harm, and fails to compensate those
harmed by wrongdoing. It is precisely in these cases where
administrative ease arguments should not be decisive.
Finally, it is worth noting that, unlike many antitrust suits in
which there is no right of action (and some in which a right of action
is nevertheless found), tort claims denied because substantive
standing is lacking do not appear to be accompanied by particularly
high tertiary (or administrative) costs. In most of the cases surveyed
in Part III, the injuries were relatively concrete and measurable, and,
at a minimum, were the sorts of injuries for which courts typically do
find it tenable to have tort litigation. The causal pathways were
typically foreseeable, and hence the tertiary costs associated with
difficult questions of causation were not generally evident. These
considerations all cut against the capacity of law and economics to
explain why tort law treats substantive standing as a condition for a
right of action.202
4. Conventional Instrumentalism
Conventional instrumental tort theory looks at compensation
and not just deterrence, and we might therefore look to the goal of
compensation to explain away substantive standing. However, the
goal of compensation would be served by permitting recovery in all of
the cases considered in Part III. The injury suffered in each case was
of the type that tort law deems sufficiently provable and sufficiently
important to be compensable-for example, reputational injury in
defamation, and economic injury in fraud-and in many of the cases
the injuries were quite severe.
While the law and economics framework attempts to translate
all harm into economic terms, conventional tort theory does not. Even
if it did, conventional tort theory would not provide a different answer
along the deterrence axis, for in all of the substantive standing cases,
the defendant has acted in precisely the socially harmful manner that
tort law has identified and seeks to deter, and the defendant has
202. The "antitrust injury" rule set forth in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-o-Mat, Inc.,
429 U.S. 477 (1977), and its progeny is similar to a substantive standing rule. In Brunswick
Corp., the plaintiff suffered harm as a result of a violation of the antitrust laws. See id. at 486.
The harm was foreseeable. However, the plaintiff lost because it failed to allege what the Court
has called "antitrust injury," that is, it failed to allege that the injury suffered was the sort of
injury that the antitrust laws were designed to protect people against. See id. at 489.
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caused an injury of the sort the law deems it expedient to force defen-
dants to compensate. The goal of deterrence, even broadly construed,
would seem to be fostered by recovery even where there is no
substantive standing.
Perhaps the most common instrumentalist approach to ex-
plaining away substantive standing cases would focus on the need to
limit a tortious defendant's liability. A tortious act will inevitably
cause many injuries, as Andrews pointed out in his Palsgraf
dissent.203 We must draw the line for imposing liability somewhere.
Otherwise, defendants will face crushing liability and courts will be
flooded with cases. In light of the need to limit liability, recovery is
denied where the injury lies outside of the risk that made the conduct
tortious;2 °4 a fortiori, recovery is denied (in the terminology of this
Article) where substantive standing is lacking.
This "crushing liability" argument is unsatisfactory for a num-
ber of reasons. First, such an argument is interpretively weak in that
(1) it does not capture what courts actually say in these cases, and (2)
it leaves the substantive standing rule hanging in the wind as a mere
tautology that conceals courts' real reasons for denying liability.
These remarks are not dispositive, of course, for courts may in fact be
dressing up what they say. Notably, however, modern courts are
typically not afraid to say that they are denying recovery in order to
avoid "opening floodgates" or imposing crushing liability.20 5 Indeed,
these are now among the most popular rationales for denying liability,
yet they are not usually applied in substantive standing cases.
Second, the liability-limiting rationale is unpersuasive in light
of the above discussion of foreseeability. Foreseeability is often hailed
as an extremely important and appropriate liability-limiting rule,
and, indeed, many scholars have held that foreseeability effected too
severe a limitation of liability in Palsgraf.2°6  Foreseeability
admittedly provides an important and principled limitation, but the
substantive standing rule adds an independent limitation. No
203. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J.,
dissenting).
204. See, e.g., KEETON, supra note 141, at 18-20; KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 43, at 287.
205. See, e.g., Strauss v. Belle Realty Co., 482 N.E.2d 34, 36, 38 (N.Y. 1985) (declining to
find grossly negligent electric company owed a "duty" to a tenant who fell down stairs during
negligently caused blackout in landlord/customer's building on ground that it is the
"responsibility of courts... to protect against crushing exposure to liability" and "permitting
recovery to those in plaintiffs circumstances would, in our view, violate the court's
responsibility to define an orbit of duty that places controllable limits on liability").
206. See, e.g., NOONAN, supra note 3, at 136-38, 191 (criticizing injustice of denying
recovery to Mrs. Palsgraf).
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explanation is offered for why the substantive standing limitation is
more appropriate than the foreseeability limitation, and the extant
tort theories suggest that the latter is actually more appropriate.207
Third, even if foreseeability is not an adequate limit, this does
not explain courts' use of the substantive standing rule to limit liabil-
ity. There are other more easily rationalized ways to limit liability
and stem a flood of litigation. For example, to mention just a few
obvious modes of demarcation that seem to have clearer, more man-
ageable, and more intelligible rationales, courts could: (1) adopt a
threshold of severity of injury; (2) tighten the description of wrongdo-
ing; (3) utilize (or tighten) a conception of remoteness of injury;
(4) limit the categories of damages available; or (5) raise the
evidentiary burdens on plaintiffs. While a substantive standing rule
may limit liability, it seems to do so on an arbitrary basis that is
much less defensible than these other ways.
Fourth, the crushing liability argument is really just another
version of the argument discussed in the context of antitrust law:
Overdeterrence and administrative ease demand that there be a limit
on wrongdoers' liability. As the discussion there showed, that argu-
ment is fatally incomplete, for administrative ease serves as sufficient
reason for cutting off liability only if there is some analytical bench-
mark for deciding whether deterrence and compensation goals are
being adequately realized. The crushing liability argument provides
no such benchmark.
Thus, the tools of deterrence-plus-compensation instrumental-
ism and of law and economics do not successfully explain away the
substantive standing rule. Concededly, this Article has not antici-
pated all possible instrumentalist strategies for explaining away
substantive standing doctrine on instrumental grounds. But those it
has anticipated are not promising. In one sense, the failure of those
arguments to explain substantive standing is not surprising, for the
task is an ambitious and defensive one. Recall that tort law appears
to create categories of treatment based on whether conduct was
wrongful relative to the plaintiff, or whether it violated the plaintiffs
right. Within the context of reductive instrumentalism, "relative
wrongs," and "rights" apart from rights of action make little sense.
The instrumentalist must shoulder the burden of showing that the
apparent conceptual structure of substantive standing doctrine simply
207. See supra Part IV.MA.3.a (foreseeability is highly relevant in law and economics); see
infra text accompanying notes 263-64 (foreseability is highly relevant in corrective justice
theory).
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could be abandoned, and that the contours of liability produced by the
substantive standing rule could be explained away through some
entirely different instrumental terms. I have provided a basis for
questioning whether the reductive instrumentalists can carry this
burden.
B. A Relational Theory of Wrongs and Rights in Tort Law
1. Liability Rules
My positive account grows out of an analysis of the shortcom-
ings of reductive instrumentalism, and particularly of law and eco-
nomics. Recall that the economic theorist regards tort law as
(overwhelmingly) a series of liability rules.208 These rules protect
entitlements by pricing them, informing potential tortfeasors that
they will have to pay those prices if they invade the entitlements.
Our system of rights of action is a system of carrying through on these
statements about price, basically by forcing the takers of the entitle-
ments to pay the owners for what they have taken. For something to
be a right is for it to be among the entitlements the invasion of which
will trigger liability in the defendant. To say that the defendant has a
duty not to invade the entitlement is simply to say that she will have
to pay the plaintiff a certain amount if she does.
Jules Coleman and Jody Kraus have presented powerful argu-
ments against the view that tort law consists solely of liability rules
thus understood.209 In particular, they argue that this view implies
that ex post compensation by a tortfeasor legitimates the tortfeasor's
conduct. To use Coleman and Kraus's example, the liability rule view
implies that if a reckless driver injures someone, her recklessly
injuring that person will be legitimate so long as she compensates him
afterwards .210 This is highly implausible from the perspective of the
ordinary citizen.21' The rules of tort law do have implications about
what defendants must pay, but it is a mistake to infer that ex post
208. See supra text accompanying notes 178-81.
209. See Jules L. Coleman & Jody Kraus, Rethinking the Theory of Legal Rights, 95 YALE
L.J. 1335 (1986).
210. See id. at 1358. See also Dale A. Nance, Guidance Rules and Enforcement Rules: A
Better View of The Cathedral, 83 VA. L. REV. 837, 848 (1997) (the fact that one can commit a tort
and pay damages afterward should not be interpreted to mean that society regards the conduct
as permissible).
211. See Coleman & Kraus, supra note 209, at 1358.
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payment legitimates the conduct.212 To put it differently, while there
is a liability rule, that is not all there is. The salient point in the
reckless driver example above is that the defendant did breach a duty
by negligently injuring the plaintiff, regardless of whether compensa-
tion is paid. If tort law is taken to be simply a series of rules stating
what amounts defendants will be required to pay to those whom they
injure, then it is difficult to explain in what sense the defendant who
has paid compensation has even broken a rule.
The point is more powerful still if we switch to the language of
rights. Under the liability rule view, the core of having a right is
having a claim for compensation if a certain kind of injury is suf-
fered.213 The performance of an action that triggers an entitlement to
compensation-the tortious action-is therefore not an invasion of the
legal right, rather it actually gives rise to a right. There has been no
illegitimate transfer, so long as compensation is paid ex post.
In fact, this is not how legal rights are normally considered
and it is not how the protection of negligence law is normally con-
ceived. Tort law prohibits individuals from interfering with others'
interests in certain ways. The tortious action is a prohibited-and in
that sense, illegitimate-interference with an interest. The damages
caused by the interference will, if proved (and if other procedural
requirements are met), trigger an additional legal obligation to pro-
vide the plaintiff some form of relief available under the tort law. But
while the provision of the relief may dispatch that secondary legal
obligation, it does not diminish the fact that a rule of tort law was
broken and the plaintiffs right was violated. It does not make the
original action of the defendant lawful.
This point applies in the context of every kind of tort.
Someone who uses another's property without consent, absent some
justification, has trespassed and invaded another's legal rights in his
property whether or not she ultimately compensates him. The use of
property there has been illegitimate. Someone who falsely calls
another person a murderer in the local newspapers has acted
illegitimately and violated that person's reputational rights whether
or not compensation is paid. A fraudulent sale of a failing business is
again a breach of a duty to the party defrauded, and thus an invasion
of that party's interest in not being defrauded. Even if there is
212. See id.
213. Whatever questions were left open in the Calabresi-Melamed article (see supra note 6),
regarding the connection between forms of rules and the nature of rights, Calabresi has now
explicitly stated that the article intended to link the nature of rights to the nature of rules. See
Calabresi, supra note 175, at 2205.
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rescission or compensation or punishment, the unlawful, illegitimate,
rule-breaking activity actually occurred. And similarly, to injure a
patient by performing an operation with non-sterile instruments,
thereby causing serious infection, is to invade the patient's right to be
free from medical malpractice and its consequent injuries. In each
case, the point is not merely that the conduct is immoral or that the
law should prohibit such conduct. The point is that in each case, tort
law does prohibit such conduct.
This account is not about whether we regard people as having
violated one another's moral rights. Rather, it is about whether they
have violated others' legal rights. Moreover, this is a descriptive legal
account, not a prescriptive one. And it is not about the normative
underpinnings of our actual tort law. It is about the conceptual struc-
ture of our tort law, and notions of legitimacy, primary rights, and
primary duties that are embedded in our law.
2. The Force of the Norms of Tort Law
At the root of reductive instrumentalism is a narrow view of
how law guides human conduct, and more generally, of what law is.
For the reductionist, law is a pattern of enforcing liability upon per-
sons for certain conduct, and having a series of explicit legal rules
stating the conditions under which liability is imposed. The legal
norms inform people that they will incur certain liabilities if they
engage in certain conduct. A rational person takes this information
and integrates it into her decision about how to behave. The norm
changes her incentive structure, thereby giving her a reason to refrain
from engaging in certain conduct. To the extent that the existence of
a law making it tortious to treat others a certain way actually has an
effect on conduct, that is how it does so.
It is worth noting that the conception of how law is capable of
guiding conduct is in fact the flip side of a conception of what legal
norms mean. If the prototype of understanding a legal norm is being
aware of the conditions for imposing liability, then it makes sense
simply to regard the content of the legal norm as a representation of
the conditions of liability. For the meaning of a statement is just that
which one has understood when one understands the statement. The
converse is also true: Analyzing legal norms as liability rules dictates
a picture according to which the understanding of a legal norm is the
grasping of a liability rule and, insofar as the compliance with norms
is explained by awareness of those norms, it is explained by
awareness of one's potential liabilities.
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This conception of how law guides, and what laws mean, has
its roots in Holmes, and it has carried through to the current law and
economics movement. There is undoubtedly much to be learned from
this view, but as H.L.A. Hart and many others have pointed out, it is
woefully incomplete. 214 As Dale Nance argues effectively in a recent
article criticizing the liability-rule view, citizens are often motivated
to act in compliance with the law because it is the law.215 The fact
that the law says that some conduct is not to be done is typically
taken as a reason not to engage in that conduct. This is not simply
because there is a rational calculation that a certain degree of liability
is a likely consequence of the conduct. It is also because legal rules
are typically regarded as possessing a sort of authority.216
This view of how laws are able to guide conduct accompanies a
particular understanding of the sort of meaning some laws have:
Some legal norms enjoin citizens to behave in certain ways and to
refrain from behaving in other ways. The law against homicide, for
example, enjoins people from murdering one another. That is to say,
it is essentially a directive statement whose force is to prohibit people
from murdering others. It would be a mistake to understand the law
as merely conveying information as to what will happen to someone
who does commit homicide.
I shall call laws that enjoin, prohibit, or require certain
conduct "directive legal norms," or "directives." Of course, there are
also many other legal provisions specifying what happens to those
who violate legal norms, and when the inclination simply to do what
the law says fails, we certainly consider the costs of violating the law.
But that is just the point: We can speak intelligibly about what
counts as violating the law, before we even address the question of
liabilities and remedies.217
214. See H.LA. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 88 (1961).
215. See Nance, supra note 210, at 858-63 (observing that ordinary citizens treat legal rules
as guidance rules, not simply as enforcement rules).
216. Cf JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAw: ESSAYS ON LAw AND MORALITY (1979)
(analyzing the sense in which law claims authority for itself, and assessing extent to which it
should be treated as possessing such authority).
217. I leave open the possibility that in order for a directive to be law, there must be a
means of enforcement attached to it. I similarly leave open the possibility that in order for a
directive to be law, those subject to the directive must believe that a means of enforcement is
attached to it. Neither of these entails that legal provisions are best understood as statements
about the conditions under which liability will be imposed and the kind of liability that will be
imposed.
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3. Directives and Relational Wrongs
In this Section of the Article, I will attempt to make sense of
the notion of a relational wrong, beginning by setting forth how I shall
be using various terms. "Acts enjoined by directive legal norms,"
"legal wrongs," and "breaches of legal duties," I intend as three differ-
ent ways of referring to the same thing. When I refer to a person's act
as a "legal wrong," I shall mean simply that there is a directive legal
norm enjoining people from engaging in that act. For example, to say
that vandalism is a "legal wrong" in the sense I use that term is sim-
ply to say that there is a directive which states that one shall not
engage in vandalism. When I say that there is a "legal duty" not to
commit a particular act, I shall mean that there is a directive legal
norm enjoining people from engaging in that act. Hence, to return to
the above example, there is a legal duty not to vandalize. If one
breaches that legal duty, one commits a legal wrong.
For my purposes, it is useful to distinguish two kinds of direc-
tives: "simple" and "relational." Simple directives enjoin persons
from committing certain acts. Laws enjoining people from polluting,
flag-burning, or conspiring to traffic in narcotics are simple directives.
They share the following form: For all x, x shall not A.
Relational directives, by contrast, enjoin persons to treat or to
refrain from treating other persons in a particular way. Laws prohib-
iting eavesdropping, fraud, rape, and murder are all relational direc-
tives. They enjoin people from eavesdropping on another person, from
defrauding someone, from raping someone, and from murdering some-
one. They all share roughly this form: For all x, for all y, x shall not
A y.218
We can distinguish two types of legal wrongs based on the
distinction between simple and relational directives. To say that an
act is a "simple legal wrong" (or "simple wrong") is to say that there is
a simple directive under which it is a legal wrong. To say that it is a
"relational legal wrong" (or "relational wrong") is to say that there is a
relational directive under which the act is a legal wrong. Similarly, to
say that an act is a breach of a "simple legal duty" is to say that there
218. Or, "for all x, for all y, x shall B y." I do not mean to suggest that all relational di-
rectives are phrased in terms of obligations held by "all people," or even that they specify norms
running to all people. The form of the relational directives (and of the simple directives
presented earlier), can be modified to accommodate various special relationships within tort
law. For example, "Doctors have a duty to provide all material information regarding a
procedure to their patients," would be "For all x, for all y, if x is a doctor and y is a patient of x, x
nust provide all material information to y."
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is a simple directive under which it is a breach of duty, and to say
that an act is a breach of a "relational legal duty" is to say that there
is a relational directive under which it is a breach of duty. Thus,
polluting, flag-burning, and conspiring to traffic in narcotics are
simple wrongs and breaches of simple legal duties, while
eavesdropping, fraud, rape, and murder are relational wrongs and
breaches of relational legal duties.219
Tort law contains relational directives: Fraud law enjoins each
from deceiving others; negligence law enjoins each from failing to take
due care not to injure others; defamation enjoins each from defaming
others; battery enjoins each from battering others; trespass enjoins
each from using or possessing another person's land. As contended in
the previous section, each of these areas of the law contains not only
liability rules but also legal norms that have directive force. And in
each case, the structure of the norms is relational, not simple.
It is plausible that my definition of "legal wrong" as a violation
of a directive captures the concept of a legal wrong. An act is a legal
wrong if it is wrong under some law, and it is wrong under some law
if there is a law that enjoins the act. It is similarly plausible to think
of relational legal wrongs as acts that violate relational directives.
My account therefore suggests that torts are relational legal wrongs.
Likewise, it is also plausible that the concept of legal duty in the tort
law is captured by the concept of "relational legal duty" that accompa-
nies the relational directives of torts. To say that there is a duty
under the law of torts not to invade someone's privacy, for example, is
the equivalent of saying that there is a directive enjoining people not
to invade others' privacy. For each tort, what it means for a person to
have a duty not to commit that tort upon others is for there to be a
directive applicable to that person enjoining her from treating others
that way.220
4. Relational Wrongs and Substantive Standing
For simple wrongs, it makes no sense to ask whether the
wrong was committed relative to a particular person. If the wrong is
219. These formulations leave open the possibility that certain acts are both simple legal
wrongs and relational legal wrongs, and both breaches of simple legal duties and breaches of
relational legal duties, since an act may be a wrong under both a simple directive and a rela-
tional directive.
220. Cf Peter Birks, The Concept of a Civil Wrong, in 2 PHIOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
TORT LAW, supra note 121, at 29, 32 (analyzing notions of "civil wrong" and "legal duty" involved
in tort law).
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flag-burning, then either the defendant committed the wrong or he
did not.
In the context of relational wrongs, however, it makes sense to
ask whether the wrong was committed relative to a particular person.
Take murder, for example. It is true that either D murdered someone
or she did not. Even after we decide this question, we can still ask
whether D committed murder with respect to P. This is simply to ask
whether D murdered P. D might have murdered 0 but not P.
This analysis permits us to come to grips with the meaning of
the substantive standing rule. Let us suppose there is a wrong of T-
ing, and there is a directive legal norm ("LN") that states:
(LN-T) For all x, for all y, x shall not Ty.
The substantive standing rule says that P has a right of action
against D for T-ing only if D T'd P. In cases where D Td some other
person 0, but not P, D has violated LN-T and P may have suffered in-
jury-perhaps reasonably foreseeable injury-as a result. The sub-
stantive standing rule demands that P lose such a case, however,
precisely because P herself was not T'd by D (although 0 was).
The scheme is merely an illustrative device and can easily by
applied to concrete cases. Take, for example, Talbot v. Johnson
Newspaper Corp.,221 in which the plaintiff (Mrs. Talbot) claimed that
she suffered embarrassment and humiliation caused by the defen-
dant's publication of a defamatory article about her husband (Mr.
Talbot).22 Mrs. Talbot appropriately alleged that the defendant vio-
lated the tort law of defamation by defaming Mr. Talbot; if the defen-
dant did defame him, it violated (LN-defame). (LN-defame) states:
"For all x, for all y, x shall not defame y." But even if Mrs. Talbot was
foreseeably injured, she did not have a cause of action. The sub-
stantive standing rule requires that Mrs. Talbot herself be defamed
by the defendant, and courts typically express this requirement in the
"of-and-concerning" element of defamation law.22
Some of the confusion over the substantive standing rule
evolves, I believe, out of a mistake in the logical analysis of the legal
norms of tort law. Recall that some directives are simple and some
relational. It is easy to mistake the directives of tort law as being
simple rather than relational. For example, instead of taking defama-
221. 508 N.Y.S.2d 80 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986).
222. See id. at 83.
223. See supra note 51 ahd accompanying text.
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tion law to express the directive "For all x, for all y, x shall not defame
y," one could take it to express the directive "For all x, x shall not
defame anyone." Under this view, once Mrs. Talbot has proved the
defendant published a defamatory statement, and that simple direc-
tive was violated, there should be nothing left to say about whether
the conduct was a legal wrong in relation to her. Questions may of
course remain concerning foreseeability, damages, and causation, but
the legal wrong would be clearly established.
Courts' actual resolution of Talbot and scores of cases like it in
defamation law-applying the "of-and-concerning" element of defa-
mation law-provides strong evidence that the principal legal norm in
our actual defamation law is a relational directive, not a simple direc-
tive. Moreover, consistent application of the substantive standing
rule in other areas of tort law is further evidence that the legal norms
of tort law have the relational structure I have described.
Let us look at Palsgraf in this light. Cardozo's statement that
"[nlegligence, like risk is... a term of relation"22 reflects a particular
way of conceptualizing the tort of negligence. Cardozo understood
negligence to be a relational wrong, and its directive to be a relational
directive. Negligence law requires that one take due care to others:
(LN-negligence) For all x, for all y, x shall take due care not
to injure y.
In Palsgraf, Mrs. Palsgraf claimed that the Long Island
Railroad violated (LN-negligence), and Cardozo accepted this claim
for the purposes of argument. It did not follow, however, that she had
a right of action. A negligence plaintiff must show, in addition, that
the conduct was negligent in relation to her. As (LN-negligence)
indicates, this means she must show that the defendant did not take
the care due to her. Mrs. Palsgraf could not show this, because the
failure to take precautions against an injury to Mrs. Palsgraf that was
not reasonably foreseeable was not a failure to take the care due to
her.
Andrews, by contrast, understood negligence to be a simple
wrong and the directive of negligence law to be a simple directive:
(LN-negligence) For all x, x shall take due care not to injure
others.
224. Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928).
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According to Andrews's view then, once Mrs. Palsgraf had shown that
(LN-negligence) was violated, no other showing was necessary to
prove the wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct. The only
questions remaining pertained to injury, causation, and liability
limitation.
The substantive standing rule in negligence law shows that
negligence is a relational wrong and the directive of negligence law is
relational. More generally, the possibility of relational directives
explains what it could mean to say that an act is a legal wrong in
relation to one person, but not in relation to another.225
5. Primary Rights
The foregoing account of relational legal wrongs was based on
a certain analysis of the force and form of relational legal directives.
The same account is capable of generating an attractive account of the
place of rights in tort law, an account that provides a non-metaphysi-
cal alternative to the reductive instrumentalist's conception of rights
in terms of liability rules.
Where relational legal duties are involved, it is also plausible
to speak of "legal rights." Hohfeld argued that there is one sense of
"legal right" that, as a purely analytical matter, is simply correlative
to "legal duty."226 In this sense, to say that B has a legal right that A
treat him a certain way is equivalent to saying that A has a legal duty
to treat B that way. For example, to say that B has a legal right that
A not eavesdrop on his conversations is to say that A has a legal duty
not to eavesdrop on B's conversations.
I have argued above that the tort law contains relational direc-
tives generating relational legal wrongs and relational legal duties.
Thus, for example, each person has a relational legal duty to every
other person to refrain from defaming that person. If A and B are
randomly chosen, A has a relational legal duty to B not to defame
him. It follows, through Hohfeldian analysis, that B has a legal right
not to be defamed byA. The point can be generalized to say that each
person has a right not to be defamed by anyone. Hence, where the
225. Note that my rejection of the liability-rule view of the meaning of the norms of tort law
clears the way for a "directives"-based account of those norms. However, standing on its own,
the directives-based account does not necessarily explain how an act may be a wrong relative to
one person but not a wrong relative to another person. This problem is solved by distinguishing
the logical structure of relational directives from the logical structure of simple directives.
226. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions As Applied in
Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 30-32 (1913).
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body of tort law contains universal relational legal duties to treat all
others in certain ways, it must correlatively contain universal rela-
tional legal rights not to be treated in those ways. More generally,
the relational directives of tort law, in creating relational legal duties,
also create relational legal rights, for the latter are just the analytical
reflex of the former.227
The primary rights and duties of tort law are the legal rights
and duties that go hand in hand with relational directives. The pri-
mary right each person enjoys under the law of defamation, for exam-
ple, is the right not to be defamed by others. For'such a primary right
to exist is simply for there to be a valid legal relational directive stat-
ing that no one shall defame another. The primary right created by
the law of battery is the right not to be battered by others; under
fraud, the right not to be defrauded, and so on, for each tort. Under
negligence law, the primary right is a right not to be injured by
another through his failure to take the care one is owed.
This analysis of rights elucidates, at least from a conceptual
point of view, the alternative formulation of the substantive standing
rule: A plaintiff has a right of action against a defendant only if the
defendant violated the plaintiffs right. This means that a plaintiff
has a right of action against a defendant only if there is a legal norm
proscribing individuals from doing a particular sort of wrong to
others, and defendant has done that wrong to a plaintiff. Thus, one
has a right of action in battery only if one's right not to be battered
has been infringed, a right of action in fraud only if one's right not to
be defrauded has been infringed, and so on.
The relational directives of tort law (like, for example, those of
constitutional law) are found, to a great extent, in judicial opinions.
In the early common law, many tort actions were predicated upon a
violation of the "King's Peace"-essentially extrapolated from the
simple directives of criminal law issued by the King or those under
his control.2 8 Today, of course, these directives are uttered by courts,
not through executive order or legislatively enacted statutes. Thus,
for example, courts, not legislatures, announced that a psychiatrist
227. My account of relational duties is distinct from other accounts of relative duties
offered by analytic philosophers. See Carl Wellman, Relative Duties in the Law, 18 PHIL. TOPICS
183 (1990) (reviewing and criticizing variety of theories of relative duties). It also differs from
most theories of legal rights in the analytic philosophy literature, in being neither an interest
theory, nor a choice theory. See generally Jules Coleman, Introduction, in RIGHTS AND THEIR
FOUNDATIONS ix (Jules Coleman ed., 1994) (classifying rights theories into two general catego-
ries-interest theories such as Raz's and choice theories such as Hart's).
228. See infra notes 300-03 and accompanying text.
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has a duty to warn a third party in danger,2 9 and courts decide
whether a person has a right to exclude the media from her
property.20 In general, courts, not legislatures, announce day in and
day out what sort of care one is required to give and entitled to expect
in a wide variety of contexts.23 ' Perhaps more importantly, of course,
courts, in announcing relational directives, primary rights, and
primary duties, usually follow precedent, building incrementally, if at
all, upon established case law. In this sense, the relational directives,
rights, and duties of the law of battery, trespass to land, libel, fraud,
and conversion, for example, have been handed down, with some
modifications, from the English "criminal" law to the English civil
common law to the American common law to our contemporary
courts. Other directives, rights, and duties, such as those of
negligence law, were born within the courts themselves.
Of course, in ascertaining these directives, lawyers and courts
interpreting judicial opinions must look not merely at what prior
courts explicitly stated about the content of directives, but also at
what prior courts did, in enforcing directives with remedies. In tort
law, the predominant form of remedy is damages. Thus, lawyers
often consider a damages award as an indication that the court is
pronouncing the existence of a legal duty or legal right. Likewise,
courts often announce the legal rights and duties in a manner that is
interwoven with their imposition of a remedy.
This does not mean that the articulation of a legal right or
duty is just the imposition of a remedy (or pattern of remedies), as
reductive instrumentalism insists. That is to confuse the effect of
such a directive and the evidence for the directive, on the one hand,
with what the directive actually is, on the other. To put it differently,
it is to confuse the means of enforcement of the law with the law's
content. We have no inclination to take that view toward, for
example, constitutional directives articulated by courts, or a wide
range of statutory directives either. Moreover, there is often a wide
gap, even in tort law, between a remedy and a directive that was
229. See, e.g., Tarasoffv. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
230. Compare, e.g., Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 951 F. Supp. 1217, 1220-24
(M.D.N.C. 1996) (holding, in effect, that a grocery store had a right not to be deliberately
misinformed about defendant/reporter's identity in deciding whether to permit defendant on
property), with Desnick v. American Broad. Co., Inc., 44 F.3d 1345, 1351-52 (7th Cir. 1995) (per
Posner, C.J.) (finding that public entities such as professional businesses and restaurants are
not entitled to bar from their premises those surreptitiously doing critical evaluation for the
public).
231. In many areas of personal injury and other tort law, state and federal legislatures
obviously complement and supplant some of what the state courts do.
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breached. Statutes of limitation, governmental immunity, unclean
hands, and estoppel are just a few examples of doctrines that may bar
a remedy. But the pivotal point, as I have argued in the preceding
sections, is that reductive instrumentalism fails to make sense of our
understanding of what it is to have legal rights and duties, of what we
understand in grasping legal norms, and how those norms are capable
of guiding our conduct.
Although reductive instrumentalism has had a great impact
across all of law, it has made its greatest impact on the common law,
and I think the analysis above suggests one of the reasons why. In
the common law, there is little text outside of judicial opinions, and so
the evidentiary link between the remedies courts provide and the
rights they announce is often quite close. In statutory law, by con-
trast, there is typically a written directive or series of directives that
one can point to outside of judicial opinions. In the latter context, it is
much less likely that the content of the directive will be confused with
its means of enforcement. But in the common law, the risk of this
error is high.
Holmes, and many following him, have been attracted to a
reductive account of primary rights largely because they reject, for
anti-metaphysical and political reasons, a natural law approach to
primary rights. The account I have offered thus far says nothing
about natural law or the substantive moral conceptions underlying
primary rights and duties. My thesis is a descriptive and conceptual
one: The tort law does announce rules or directives which citizens
understand as enjoining them from behaving in various ways and as
enjoining others from treating them in various ways. If this proposi-
tion is correct, then a claim that some legal duty exists should not
generally be justified by showing that one is morally obliged to act in
a certain way. It should (from the point of view of positive tort law)
be justified largely by showing that courts or other authoritative
sources of law in fact articulate or have articulated the relevant
relational directives.2 2 This conception of primary rights and duties
is utterly non-metaphysical, and Holmesian anti-natural-law
arguments have no force against it.
232. This is not to deny, of course, that courts could engage in moral thinking in deciding
what the relational directives of the law are or ought to be. It is only to point out that the non-
instrumental and non-reductive conception of legal rights and duties offered here in no way
entails natural law commitments.
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6. The Contours of Primary Rights and Duties in Tort Law
Thus far in this Section, I have attempted to accomplish three
things: First, I sketched a theory of the force and structure of legal
directives, and primary rights and duties in tort law; second, I out-
lined the primary rights and duties that are in fact imposed by our
tort law; and third, I commented briefly on how primary rights and
duties are to be identified. I have not offered a descriptive theory of
the normative underpinnings of primary rights and duties in tort law.
The tort theory literature includes global, tort-specific, and issue-
specific writings on this question from moral, economic, political, and
pluralistic perspectives. As Jules Coleman has argued persuasively, a
theory of the conceptual structure of rights and wrongs may leave
open the question of the normative foundations of the rights we actu-
ally have.2.3
It is worth noting, however, that the relational directives the-
ory I have offered does tell us something important about what might
be called the "contours" of primary rights and duties. Recall that
relational directives enjoin people from treating others in certain
ways. A particular person has a primary right under the tort law not
to be treated a certain way by another person only if there is a rela-
tional directive enjoining people from treating others that way. Thus,
for example, a court cannot decide that P's right was violated when
economic harm was negligently inflicted on her by D without deciding
something roughly of the following form: "For all x, for all y, x shall
take reasonable care not to inflict economic injury upon y." Perhaps
the domain could be narrowed to certain subsets of people, or certain
defenses could be created, or perhaps a level of severity of injury or
some detail in the level of care could be added. But the basic point is
that it is in the nature of primary rights, as I have analyzed them,
that a court cannot find that there is a primary right without commit-
ting itself to a form of relational directive that requires people to treat
others a certain way as a general matter.
This is not just a matter of courts needing to treat like cases
alike in future proceedings. Obviously, one can draw the criteria of
similarity very narrowly. Courts must say something about what
category of conduct by one person affecting another is from now on to
be considered enjoined by law, not simply about what fact patterns
will now lead a court to provide a remedy. In a case like Rickards, a
233. See COLEMAN, supra note 7, at 335-40.
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court granting a remedy would be imposing a duty to take care
against causing pure economic harm to others.234 In Palsgraf, Cardozo
thought, for the court to provide a remedy would be tantamount to
announcing a duty to anticipate injuries as remote from one's conduct
as those suffered by Mrs. Palsgraf were from the trainman's con-
duct.235 In the defamation cases we considered, courts would be an-
nouncing a duty to guard against causing a person reputational in-
jury, above and beyond what one says or implies about that person.2 36
And in each of these areas, courts would be prima facie committed to
recognizing a right of action on behalf of those who were so treated.
Good attorneys for the plaintiffs in any of these cases would, of
course, not usually be asking the courts for the announcement of a
broad relational directive, just the provision of a remedy for those
situated as their clients are. This produces the appearance of a care-
fully carved niche of liability, a niche that the "zone-of-danger" case
law on emotional injury of bystanders so forcefully illustrates. It
would be the worst kind of formalism to deny the possibility of such a
niche of liability. But if a court takes up the offer to create this niche
of liability, in other words, if it finds a right of action without
announcing an appropriately structured relational directive,
then-however it labels its conclusion-the court is giving the
plaintiff a right of action without finding that she had a primary right
that was violated, and without finding a legal wrong as to the plaintiff
herself. In such a situation the court is not altering the realm of how
a defendant is legally required to treat others or how others are
legally entitled to be treated; it is only altering the scope of liability.
The nature of primary rights and duties therefore limits the
contours of such rights and duties and dictates a choice: A court must
either (1) find a primary rights violation by announcing a relational
directive that recognizes a category of primary duties to treat others
in a certain way, and a corresponding range of liability, or (2) simply
permit a right of action without recognizing a violation of the
plaintiffs primary right, presumably predicating the action on the
fact that the defendant did violate a directive (even if it was relative
to a third party), and the plaintiff was injured and needs
compensation.
The most obvious question is what are the normative grounds
for declining the first option, the broader category of primary rights
234. 41 A.2d 267 (N.J. 1945). See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
235. See Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928).
236. See supra Part IIIA..
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and duties. In Palsgraf, Cardozo answers this question in florid
prose: "Life will have to be made over, and human nature
transformed, before prevision so extravagant can be accepted as the
norm of conduct, the customary standard to which behavior must
conform."237 This statement is not about excessive liability, but about
an excessive primary duty-that is, an unrealistically stringent
obligation to think about the well-being of others as one leads one's
daily life. Note also that Cardozo appears to be working from the
precise analytical framework I have just described, presupposing that
to find that what Mrs. Palsgraf suffered was indeed a violation of her
right, he must be willing to articulate a "norm of conduct," a
"customary standard to which behavior must conform,"238 which has a
commensurably broader scope. Because he rejects that broader norm,
he is left thinking that Mrs. Palsgraf is trying to recover
"derivatively," i.e., that no wrong to her was committed, no duty to
her was breached, and no right of hers was violated.
The suggestion in Palsgraf that judicial rejection of unrealisti-
cally stringent formulations of "duty" may underlie restrictions on
primary duties is interesting, and may well explain the absence of
many general primary duties in tort law, such as those involving non-
feasance, duty to rescue, or emotional and economic harm; I will not
pursue that line of thought here.2 9 There are many other principles
that might underlie the law's refusal to articulate more general rela-
tional directives, including moral, social, and economic ones. But
even if the broader duty point is decided against the plaintiff-even if
she lacks a primary right in the sense I described it-it is still far
from clear that she should lose, for what might be called the "niche"
argument still remains. The question of why our system generally
rejects the niche argument-why, in other words, a plaintiff is
required to show a rights violation in order to have a right of action,
and why she must have substantive standing-is addressed in the
remainder of the Article.
It is tempting to argue that Cardozo begged the question when
he said that no right of Mrs. Palsgraf was violated: Arguably, the real
question is why she had no primary right. We have now considered
two versions of that argument. The first version dealt with a form of
question-begging that is logically flawed, a vicious circle. The idea
there was that statements regarding primary rights are simply termi-
237. Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 100.
238. Id.
239. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 135.
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nological devices for referring to what would give rise to a right of
action. This version was the reductive instrumentalist's, and I offered
a plausible alternative account of primary rights.
But there is a second, softer version of the "question-begging"
argument which is sometimes made. This version concedes the possi-
bility that the term "primary right" has content independent of "right
of action," but still contends that the interesting question about sub-
stantive standing is why there is no primary right. This argument
has things backwards, however. The question of why there is no pri-
mary rights violation in a case like Palsgraf may be an interesting
question, but it is not a question about substantive standing at all.
The substantive standing rule-the principle that there is no right of
action where there is no rights violation--comes into play precisely
where there is no violation of a primary right. The real question is
why it matters whether there is a primary rights violation, why it
matters whether plaintiff herself was wronged. That is where we
turn next.
V. RIGHTS OF ACTION
A. Corrective Justice and Substantive Standing
The most prominent challenge to the law and economics
movement in tort theory is corrective justice theory. One might there-
fore hope that corrective justice theory would provide an explanation
of the substantive standing rule. My treatment of corrective justice
theory will be similar to the above treatment of law and economics,
and warrants similar caveats. I cannot claim to have discredited an
entire theoretical approach, to have examined every possible version
of it, or to have shown that no version of the theory could possibly
accommodate the doctrinal evidence I present. Rather, by examining
certain prominent examples of this approach,20 I intend to highlight
significant tensions between corrective justice theory's analysis of the
conceptual and normative structure of tort law, on the one hand, and
actual tort case law, on the other. I then use this doctrinal argument
as a stepping stone to an argument that there is something funda-
240. See COLEMAN, supra note 7; WEINRIB, supra note 7; Perry, supra note 7. It is unclear
to what extent Coleman adheres to the positions expressed in Risks and Wrongs, in light of
what appears to be the rather different theory offered by himself and Arthur Ripstein in Jules
Coleman & Arthur Ripstein, Mischief and Misfortune, 41 MCGILL L.J. 91 (1995).
[Vol. 51:1
1998] RIGHTS, WRONGS, AND RECOURSE
mentally wrong with the conceptual structure of corrective justice
theory. Both the doctrinal and the conceptual arguments are
intended as evidence against corrective justice theory as a positive
theory of tort law.
In a rather broad sense, any view that attempts to give a
prominent role to fairness in explaining tort law might be labeled a
"corrective justice" theory;241 in this sense, my own view is ultimately
a "corrective justice" theory.242  But the fundamental basis of
corrective justice theory, understood more narrowly, is that justice
requires that a tortfeasor restore those whom his wrongdoing has
injured.243  This conception of "corrective" justice stems from
Aristotle,2" and the modern tort lawyer might simplify it into the idea
that where a tortious defendant has caused an innocent plaintiff to
suffer an injury, justice requires that the defendant provide that
plaintiff with compensation for the injury. The version of corrective
justice theory stemming from Aristotle offers a conception of justice
that involves a duty of repair running from the defendant to the
plaintiff, and claims that our tort law, in recognizing and enforcing
legal duties of repair, can be understood as an embodiment of this
conception ofjustice.
241. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 7 (contrasting paradigm of "fairness" and "reciprocity"
with paradigm of "utility" and "reasonableness" in tort theory). Several important fairness-
based accounts of tort law do not lay heavy emphasis on the notion of rectification; it is not
obvious whether they ought to be called "corrective justice" views. See, e.g., Gregory C. Keating,
Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48 STAN. L. REv. 311 (1996) (arguing that
the Rawlsian notion of reasonableness better accounts for reasonableness in negligence doctrine
than economic conception of rationality). See also CHARLES FRIED, AN ANATOMY OF VALUES 177-
93 (1970) (reciprocity in tort theory).
242. See Ripstein & Zipursky, supra note 7; infra Part VIA.
243. Cf Jules Coleman, The Practice of Corrective Justice, in PHOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS
OF TORT LAW, supra note 121, at 53, 66-67 (stating agency, rectification, and correlativity are
central to corrective justice). I differ with Coleman's interpretation of Perry. See id. at 68
(describing Perry as not a corrective justice theorist in a core sense, in light of his distributive
concerns with allocation of losses). I believe Perry is a corrective justice theorist in this narrow
or core sense, and that he does give substantial central theoretical importance to the notion of
rectification, as his recent work makes clear. See Stephen R. Perry, Responsibility for
Outcomes, Risk, and the Law of Torts, 146 U. PA. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 1997) (justice of tort
law rooted in moral obligation of tortfeasor to compensate; distributive concerns secondary).
244. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 120-23 (Martin Ostwald trans., 1962). Cf
James Gordley, Tort Law in the Aristotelean Tradition, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
TORT LAW, supra note 121, at 131-58 (defending quite strict version of Aristotelian corrective
justice theory in modern American tort law). But see, e.g., Perry, supra note 7, at 457-58
(arguing that Aristotelian notion requiring proportionality between wrongful loss and wrongful
gain is untenable); WENRIIB, supra note 7, at 115-28 (recognizing untenability of Aristotelian
account, if interpreted in terms of actual loss and actual gain and proposing modified
Aristotelian account in terms of "normative" loss and gain).
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The substantive standing rule is prima facie problematic for
corrective justice theory. According to corrective justice theory, the
fact that a plaintiff has suffered harm as the result of a defendant's
wrongdoing is what triggers an obligation on the part of the tortfea-
sor, and should therefore trigger liability. As a wrongdoer, the defen-
dant should have to pay for the harm,245 because it is not fair that the
innocent plaintiff should be made to bear the burden of the loss.
Indeed, it is perhaps from this perspective that the substantive stand-
ing cases appear most problematic. Beginning with Palsgraf itself, we
have a completely innocent plaintiff who has suffered real harm as a
result of something the defendant did, and we have a jury finding that
the defendant acted tortiously. Why not make the defendant pay?
The problem is even more acute in cases involving emotional or eco-
nomic harm, or injuries foreseeably caused through defamation,
fraud, and property torts. In all of those situations, the victims have
been injured-often seriously-as a foreseeable result of conduct that
is tortious or even, in some cases, intentional. Yet under the
substantive standing rule, there is no recovery. Thus, there is reason
to believe that corrective justice theory cannot account for substantive
standing.
Corrective justice theory is open to relational and non-reduc-
tive conceptions of legal rights, 246 but this does not solve the problem.
There is surely symmetry in saying that only a person whose legal
right has been violated has a right of action,247 yet it is far from clear
why symmetry matters in a positive (or prescriptive) theory of tort
law.24 If a plaintiff has been harmed in a manner the tort law recog-
nizes, and the defendant foreseeably caused the harm by conduct the
law regards as wrongful, it seems that the defendant should
compensate the plaintiff for his loss. Once "right" is defined
independently of liability and rights of recovery it is unclear why the
corrective justice theorist should care whether the conduct violated
the plaintiffs right or someone else's right. Similarly, it will not do to
245. The substantive standing rule is particularly at odds with Epstein's view, which main-
tains that corrective justice demands rectification of plaintiffs injury by a defendant who caused
the injury, even if the defendant's conduct was not wrongful. See Epstein, supra note 7. A
fortiori, under Epstein's view, liability should not turn on whether the conduct was wrongful
relative to the plaintiff.
246. See, e.g., COLEMAN, supra note 7; WEINRIB, supra note 7; Perry, supra note 7.
247. See WEINRIB, supra note 7, at 144 ("[Plaintiffs right to be free of wrongful
interferences with his or her entitlements is correlative to the defendant's duty to abstain from
such interferences .... [E]ach litigant's position is the mirror image of the other's.").
248. Cf Robert L. Rabin, Law for Law's Sake, 105 YALE L.J. 2261, 2270-72 (1996)
(reviewing ERNEsT J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW (1995)) (aesthetic value of formalism,
coherence, and bipolarity do not justify them or explain their justification).
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say that the corrective justice theorist recognizes that the conduct is
only a legal wrong in relation to the third party and not to the
plaintiff. The question is why that should matter in determining the
proper scope of liability.
The place to begin is with Ernest Weinrib, a leading corrective
justice theorist whose recent book, The Idea of Private Law, presents
a reading of Palsgraf similar to my own.2 9 While he does not use the
phrase "substantive standing" Weinrib contends that a central feature
of tort law is that "the duty breached by the defendant must be with
respect to the embodiment of the right whose infringement is the
ground of the plaintiffs cause of action."250 In other words, the duty of
repair can run only to a plaintiff to whom the defendant breached a
primary duty.
Unfortunately, Weinrib's own theory does not seem to yield his
conclusion. Weinrib's account of the duties we owe one another under
tort law, and the rights we consequently enjoy against one another, is
a Kantian theory of primary rights and duties.251 Weinrib believes
tort law embodies a set of norms that accommodate our conflicting
needs and interests by shaping them into rights and duties we each
hold against every other person.22 For Weinrib as for Hohfeld, as we
saw in Part IV.B, a primary right in one person is correlative to a
primary duty in another.
Within Weinrib's framework, Palsgraf stands for the principle
that a defendant has a duty of repair to a plaintiff only if the
defendant has violated the plaintiffs primary right, by breaching a
duty correlative to that right. Weinrib explains:
When the defendant thus breaches a duty correlative to the plaintiffs right,
the plaintiff is entitled to reparation. The remedy reflects the fact that even
after the commission of the tort the defendant remains subject to the duty with
respect to the plaintiffs right. The defendant's breach of the duty not to
interfere with the embodiment of the plaintiffs right does not, of course, bring
the duty to an end, for if it did, the duty would-absurdly-be discharged by its
breach. With the materialization of wrongful injury, the only way the
defendant can discharge his or her obligation respecting plaintiffs right is to
undo the effects of the breach of duty.23
249. See WEINIB, supra note 7, at 159-70.
250. Id. at 134.
251. See id. at 84-113.
252. See id. at 128-29, 150-52.
253. Id. at 135.
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This explanation is unpersuasive for numerous reasons. First,
it is highly implausible that one is discharging the duty to refrain
from wronging someone by compensating her ex post for the harm she
has suffered in consequence of being wronged. That suggestion is a
variation on the reductive instrumentalist's mistaken conception of
tort rules as liability rules.2  It is particularly unsatisfactory as an
aspect of Weinrib's Kantian view, for he has told us that it is in the
nature of primary duties that they are (rational) constraints on the
liberty of action. Presumably, the constraint has been crossed when
the plaintiff has been acted upon in a tortious manner. The duty
discharged when repair is made is a different duty, not the (primary)
duty of action with regard to how others are to be treated.
Second, Weinrib's account does not explain why a tortfeasor
might not owe a duty of repair even to those whose right was not
violated. As I shall show, Coleman and Perry suggest there may be
reason to impose on those who have wrongfully caused losses to cer-
tain others an obligation to compensate those others regardless of
whether the duty breached was a duty to these others. Weinrib him-
self sometimes suggests that corrective justice is a matter of restoring
the plaintiff to the situation she would have been in had the
defendant not disturbed normative equilibrium.25  Hence it is unclear
why having breached a primary duty to the plaintiff should be a
necessary condition for owing a duty of repair to the plaintiff, even if,
arguendo, it is a sufficient condition.
Third, and more generally, Weinrib appears to be mixing cate-
gories. The question of how one is obligated to conduct oneself toward
another is different from the question of what one ought to do if one
harms another through breach of that obligation. Perhaps one should
repair the harm done to another to whom one has breached a duty.
But what we need is an explanation of why one should provide this
repair. As Stephen Perry has forcefully argued in his critique of
Weinrib, we need an explanation of how breach of a duty is connected
to the obligation to repair harm done by that breach. s5
254. See supra text accompanying notes 178-82.
255. See WERI, supra note 7, at 135 ("[Tlort law places the defendant under the
obligation to restore the plaintiff, so far as possible, to the position the plaintiff would have been
in had the wrong not been committed.").
256. See, e.g., Stephen R. Perry, Loss, Agency, and Responsibility for Outcomes: Three
Conceptions of Corrective Justice, in TORT THEORY 24 (Ken Cooper-Stephenson & Elaine Gibson
eds., 1993) (criticizing Weinrib); Perry, supra note 7, at 478-88. Perry has offered a related set
of criticisms of Jules Coleman and Arthur Ripstein, in Stephen R. Perry, The Distributive Turn:
Mischief, Misfortune and Tort Law, in JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL THEORY: ESSAYS ON THE
WORK OF JULES COLEMAN (B. Bix ed., 1997) ("[A] fault standard tells us nothing about when, or
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Interestingly, the problem that Perry has identified in
Weinrib's analysis is the mirror image of the problem I identified in
reductive instrumentalism. Reductive instrumentalism understands
rights and duties merely to be shorthand for statements about who
was liable for which injuries, and takes the normative basis for state-
ments about liability to be founded upon purely instrumentalist con-
cerns. The problem we are focusing on in Weinrib is the converse:
Weinrib maintains that conclusions about who owes a duty of repair
to whom are entailed by statements about who breached a primary
duty to whom, and he provides a Kantian justification for claims
about primary rights and duties. 57 But there is no reason to think
that conclusions at the level of remedies are entailed by principles
about how people ought to conduct themselves toward one another,
just as there is no reason to believe that conclusions at the level of
remedies (liability rules) implicitly capture what our tort law says
about how people ought to treat others. 258
Both Perry and Coleman have offered elegant theories purport-
ing to bridge this gap, to explain why and under what conditions a
breach of a primary duty (or a rights invasion, or a wrong) will lead to
a duty to repair. Perry argues that a central doctrinal feature of tort
law is the defendant's duty to repair certain injuries he has caused.259
The legal duty of repair may be understood as an embodiment of a
moral duty of repair. A central question for Perry is the normative
foundation of this duty of repair, and of the notion of moral responsi-
bility which undergirds the duty of repair. His account has two parts:
even whether, misfortune should be shifted from one person to another. What it tells us, rather,
is how we should behave towards one another...
257. See WEMNMIB, supra note 7, at 84-113.
258. See supra Part IV.B. While the portion of Weinrib's work on which I have focused is
central to Weinrib's recent and most extensive discussion of correlativity, and is therefore an
appropriate representative of his position, Weinrib's writings are voluminous and multi-layered.
I therefore do not rule out the possibility that other explanations could be generated from his
work (and even from within The Idea of Private Law, supra note 7). One prominent Weinribian
argument not mentioned in the text of this Article is that tort law is about "doing" and
"suffering," and that the imposition of liability constitutes a reversal of the process of injury, in
that the tortfeasor undoes the wrong done to the plaintiff. It is essential, then, that only the one
to whom the wrong was done may be the plaintiff. See id. at 142-44, 168-70.
The problem with Weinrib's account is not its inability to handle the substantive standing
rule per se, but its cogency more generally. Jules Coleman has offered a sustained critique of
Weinrib's contention that tort law is about rectifying "wrongs" rather than "losses," see
COLEMAN, supra note 7, at 318-24, and Stephen Perry has provided a thorough attack both of
the "doing/suffering" aspect of Weinrib's theory, and the capacity of a "wrongs" theory to give
adequate place to the significance of harm in a theory based on rectification. See Perry, supra
note 7, at 479-88.
259. See Perry, supra note 7, at 450 ("ETlhe principles of reparation that I develop do
constitute the main moral foundations of tort law.").
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A defendant is morally responsible for the plaintiffs injury if (a) the
defendant's conduct was faulty,260 and (b) the plaintiffs injury is so
connected to the defendant's conduct that the injury is among those
outcomes for which defendant is "outcome-responsible."261 If these
conditions are met then there is moral responsibility for the injury,
and there is a moral duty of repair.
A pivotal notion of responsibility in the context of tort law,
according to Perry, is what he calls "outcome-responsibility."262 The
key to outcome responsibility is the foreseeability of the bad out-
come. 263 The foreseeability of the bad outcome connects the tortfeasor
to the bad outcome and puts the tortfeasor among the class of persons
who may be deemed responsible for the outcome, including the plain-
tiff.264 This creates a limited domain of potentially responsible
parties. Perry then looks at the first factor-fault-and suggests that
we deem the tortfeasor morally responsible for the injury because she
is the one who acted in a faulty manner among those who are
"outcome-responsible." The tortiousness of the conduct makes it
appropriate for the defendant, rather than an innocent plaintiff, to
bear the loss.265 Thus, a duty of repair emerges from a combination of
the fact that the defendant's conduct was tortious and the fact that
the injury to plaintiff was foreseeable, so that the outcome is among
those for which defendant is responsible.266
Before turning to the substantive standing rule, it is worth
noting a broader concern about Perry's account. Perry's theory is
problematic on a general level because it often requires positing an
extraordinarily high moral duty of repair. Tort law commonly
260. Particularly in his explanation of the possibility of so-called "strict" liability, Perry
emphasizes that the judgment of "fault" may, to a certain extent, be a relative judgment regard-
ing who, among those outcome-responsible for the injury, acted in a manner that was faulty
relative to the actions of other outcome-responsible parties.
261. Perry, supra note 7, at 499.
262. Id. at 497-99; Perry, supra note 243. See also Tony Honore, Responsibility and Luck,
104 LAW Q. REV. 530 (1988).
263. See Perry, supra note 7, at 505 ("I have suggested that there is more to proximity than
foreseeability, but it will not be necessary to explore that issue further here because'the law has
correctly sensed that it is proximity-as-foreseeability that is particularly relevant to repara-
tion."). See also Perry, supra note 243 (foreseeability central to outcome-responsibility).
264. See Perry, supra note 7, at 497-98.
265. See id. at 499.
266. See id. at 497. Specifically:
The localized distributive argument for fault and the agency-oriented understanding of
outcome-responsibility are complementary. Each completes a gap in the other that
prevents it from constituting an adequate justification, standing on its own, for
correlative rights and obligations of reparation. Taken together, though, they form a
single, coherent, justifying argument.
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imposes extraordinary legal duties of repair on defendants who have
behaved in a manner that is faulty, even if only in a rather minimal
quotidian sense-taking one's eyes off the road for a moment, for
example.267 Of course, such behavior is negligent and should not be
engaged in. Moreover, such behavior might foreseeably cause serious
injury. It seems peculiar, however, that on most of the occasions
when a person behaves somewhat negligently, no sanction whatsoever
is imposed, but if some slight negligence on the part of that person
causes a serious injury, he incurs a massive duty of repair.268 While
the foreseeability of the injury may warrant the conclusion that the
defendant was outcome-responsible, that the injury was the
defendant's fault, or that the defendant bears moral responsibility for
what happened, it seems far less clear that the defendant has a moral
duty of repair for the entire loss. Yet Perry's account requires this
stricter conclusion in a wide variety of cases 269 in order to explain the
tort law's imposition of liability as an embodiment of the moral duty
of repair. Indeed, this criticism applies widely to corrective justice
theories predicated on a moral duty of repair. My point is not that
our system is immoral or unfair in imposing this liability on the
negligent defendant, but simply that the defendant's minimally faulty
behavior does not necessarily warrant a moral duty of repair of this
magnitude. This observation, in turn, casts doubt on the idea that the
imposition of liability is an embodiment of the moral duty of repair.
For the moment, however, we will accept arguendo this aspect of
Perry's theory.
The problem with regard to the substantive standing rule is
more acute. Perry's theory can handle the outcome in cases like
Palsgraf, but only because the injuries are not foreseeable. As we
have seen, the substantive standing rule dictates denial of recovery
even where there is foreseeability27o and therefore "outcome-responsi-
267. See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, Moments of Carelessness and Massive Loss, in
PHIIOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW, supra note 121, at 387.
268. See id. at 389-93. Cf Christopher Schroeder, Causation, Compensation and Moral
Responsibility, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW, supra note 121, at 347, 351-52
(plausible moral theory of appropriate sanction for defendant incompatible with disparate
treatment of tortfeasors based on harm caused).
269. Perry himself is cautious on this and related points. He believes that our moral
conception of the duty of repair demands that responsibility be apportioned in proportion to
fault, among outcome-responsible parties, in roughly the way that comparative negligencejurisdictions do. See Perry, supra note 243. Thus, in some cases, a tortfeasor will not bear the
entire loss. In many others, however, a defendant such as the careless driver will bear the
entire loss because, although his or her negligence was not of an extraordinary level, no one else
was at fault in any way.
270. See supra text accompanying notes 184-85.
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bility." Moreover, even in Palsgraf itself, there are two issues: (1)
Why isn't the conduct negligent in relation to Mrs. Palsgraf herself;
and (2) why must the conduct be negligent in relation to a plaintiff
herself in order for the plaintiff to recover?271 Perry's theory may
illuminate the first issue, but does not speak to the second.272
Corrective justice theory, insofar as it purports to explain the
structure of our actual tort law, could simply adjust and concede that
the notion of responsibility for outcomes in the tort law is not
captured by foreseeability, but relates more closely to substantive
standing. Jules Coleman appears to make such an adjustment in his
own view in an effort to accommodate similar concerns.2 73 Coleman
asserts that a defendant who wrongfully causes a plaintiffs loss is
responsible for that loss only if the loss was the defendant's fault. For
a loss to be D's fault, "P's loss [must] fall(] within the scope of the
risks that make that aspect of D's conduct at fault."74
Even if Coleman's account accommodated substantive standing
doctrine, it would do so only by relying upon an implausible explica-
tion of the notion of fault. Substantive standing case law is so jarring
precisely because, in many of the cases, the concept of fault we gener-
ally use in torts and in everyday judgments of responsibility would
lead us to say that the plaintiffs injury is the defendant's fault.
Indeed, in bystander cases in which a negligent driver kills a child,275
the tremendous grief and sense of loss suffered by the parent quite
plausibly is the driver's fault; if a law firm can prove it went bankrupt
because everyone believed a defamatory article about its rainmaker, 2 76
then one is inclined to say the loss suffered by the law firm is the
defamer's fault; if a woman loses the proceeds of an insurance policy
of which she was the beneficiary because the defendant defrauded the
insurance company into removing her name as a beneficiary,277 her
loss is the defendant's fault.
271. See supra text accompanying notes 14-24.
272. But see Perry, supra note 256, at 82-87. Perry recognizes that, in light of Palsgraf and
risk-rule cases, the fault that justifies an obligation to compensate "must grow out of the
defendanfs outcome-responsibility." Id. However, though Perry may aspire to explain this
constraint, his account goes no further than to recognize it as part of the structure of tort law (at
least as regards negligence and the risk rule). See also Perry, supra note 125 (recognizing
peculiar contours of duty in economic harm cases), and Perry, supra note 171, at 407
(recognizing necessity of primary rights violation to trigger right to repair).
273. See COLEMAN, supra note 7, at 345-47.
274. Id. at 346.
275. See supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.
276. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
277. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
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The problem, as these examples and the entire body of law
presented in Part III suggest, is that whether a plaintiff has substan-
tive standing does not seem to track our ordinary moral judgments
about whether a plaintiffs loss was the defendant's fault. It also does
not seem to track our notion of when a defendant is morally responsi-
ble for the plaintiffs loss. On the contrary, Perry's synthesis of faulty
conduct and foreseeable outcome seems to capture more aptly our
intuitive moral judgments about when someone is responsible for
someone else's loss: when he has acted in a faulty manner, and the
plaintiff has suffered a foreseeable loss as a result of that action.
Hence, assuming that we are willing to say that "fault" or moral
responsibility for a given outcome does generate a full-fledged duty of
repair, from a moral point of view,278 Perry's theory seems to provide a
better explanation of the duty of repair, and therefore, of the concept
of corrective justice. Nonetheless, Perry's theory appears to be incon-
sistent with substantive standing doctrine. Thus, to the extent that
corrective justice theory can provide a plausible explanation of the
basis of a moral duty of repair, it will turn out that existing tort law
cannot be understood as an embodiment of the principles of corrective
justice theory.
B. The Concept of a Private Right of Action
Corrective justice theory has difficulty accommodating the
substantive standing rule because it mischaracterizes the way imposi-
tion of liability fits into the structure of tort law. Corrective justice
theorists see the imposition of liability on the defendant as a
reflection of a principle, embedded in the law, that people ought to
bear the costs of those injuries stemming from their wrongful acts.
The key issues in corrective justice theory are therefore: (1) Did
defendant act tortiously; and (2) was the injury in question
sufficiently connected to the defendant to make him or her
responsible for it? In all of the cases we have considered, the defen-
dant violated a norm of the tort law (acted tortiously) and attention
therefore focused on the second issue. From a moral point of view,
there is no reason to believe the criterion of substantive standing is
relevant to whether defendant is responsible. Morally and intuitively,
foreseeability seems much more relevant.
278. But see supra notes 264-67 and accompanying text.
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This account runs into trouble for a very basic reason. It
wrongly presupposes that the imposition of liability reflects a judg-
ment, embedded in the law, that defendants ought to bear the costs of
certain injuries. This assumption misconstrues what the state actu-
ally does in private causes of action under the tort law. In an impor-
tant sense, the state does not judge that certain defendants ought to
pay certain amounts to plaintiffs. Rather, the state accedes to, and
enforces, a plaintiffs demand that the state compel defendant to pay
her a certain amount. Such action by the state appears to embody the
judgment that an individual is entitled to have the state compel a de-
fendant to pay her under certain circumstances, if she chooses to
demand payment. Of course, in many cases it may be plausible, from
a normative point of view, that the defendant ought to pay the plain-
tiff, or that it would be a good thing if the defendant paid the plaintiff.
But, merely by affording a right of action, our system is not
committed to these stronger claims. It is at most committed to the
view that the state ought to act on certain individuals' demands that
others be forced to pay them.
Our law makes available private rights of action for certain
persons against tortfeasors. Individuals who wish to obtain various
forms of relief against a defendant may do so provided they follow
certain steps. The state provides remedies to those who successfully
go through these steps. The contention that it is legitimate, proper, or
desirable that the state afford such private causes of action is not
equivalent to the statement that defendants ought to be paying dam-
age awards in certain cases. That our legal system affords rights of
action reflects a collective judgment that the state ought to facilitate
the plaintiffs demand for a certain remedy by coercing the defendant
into giving the remedy.
The phrase "right of action" indicates that our system regards
plaintiffs as entitled to act against defendants in certain respects. As
Hart and Sacks explained in their classic work, The Legal Process, our
system of enforcing private rights of action essentially creates a power
in plaintiffs to act against defendants through the state.279 However,
279. HART & SACKS, supra note 171, at 137-38. My analysis of rights of action is similar
but not identical to that of Hart and Sacks: "A right of action is a species of power-remedial
power. It is a capacity to invoke the judgment of a tribunal or authoritative application upon a
disputed question about the application of preexisting arrangements and to secure, if the claim
proves to be well-founded, an appropriate official remedy." Id. at 137. I would maintain that a
right of action is a power to obtain redress by successfully meeting certain evidentiary and
procedural requirements. According to Hart and Sacks, however, it is a power to go before a
court and present one's case for securing redress, with the possible consequence of securing
redress if one's case is judged well-founded. See id.
[Vol. 51:1
RIGHTS, WRONGS, AND RECOURSE
the mere availability of a systemic remedy does not presuppose a
moral duty of repair corresponding in magnitude to the massive liabil-
ity judgments the tort system regularly produces in tort cases. To put
it differently, the system recognizes that plaintiffs ought to be able to
act against defendants by compelling such relief from defendants
through the state, not that defendants have a free-standing moral
obligation to provide such relief. In the absence of tortious or illegal
conduct (or consent), individuals are not normally permitted to act
against one another either directly or through the state. A private
right of action is consequently not only a power of individuals to act
against others, it is also a Hohfeldian "privilege" to act against oth-
ers.
28
Thus, the relevant question is not what is the normative basis
for the statement that defendants ought to provide relief to plaintiffs.
It is what is the normative basis for saying that plaintiffs are entitled
to act against defendants through the coercive machinery of the state.
The answer to this question will explain the normative basis of the
institution of private rights of action. The substantive standing rule
is a limitation on this institution. We may then ask why the
normative rationale that permits private rights of action does not
permit them where substantive standing is lacking.
Corrective justice theory does not provide the wrong answer to
these questions, it does not even ask the questions. It goes off track, I
believe, for reasons that parallel those of instrumentalism.
Instrumentalism was inadequate as a tort theory because it conflated
two levels of tort theory, the level of rights and the level of rights of
action. But there is at least one more level of tort theory: the level of
remedies. Even after we have decided that a particular plaintiff is
entitled to a right of action against a defendant, that leaves open the
question of what remedy the plaintiff ought to be able to obtain.
"Rectification" or "making whole" is surely a powerful normative idea
embedded in our tort law, but we must look carefully at the question
it is used to answer. I believe it explains why, assuming that a person
has a right of action against a defendant, that person is entitled to
compensatory damages as a remedy. In other words, it is a normative
idea that figures centrally at the level of remedies.
Corrective justice theorists have permitted a plausible princi-
ple at the level of remedies to spill over into the concept of private
rights of action. As a result, the principle that those who have a right
280. See HART & SACKS, supra note 171, at 137-38; Hohfeld, supra note 226, at 32-33.
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of action against a defendant are entitled to have the defendant pay
them compensatory damages, with the aim of making them "whole,"
is converted into a principle that the very justification for imposing
liability on a defendant is that the defendant has caused harm to a
plaintiff, and made her less than whole. The substantive standing
rule and, more generally, the concept of a right of action as a plain-
tiffs power and privilege, provide strong reasons to believe that cor-
rective justice theory is inadequate at the level of rights of action and
the conditions of liability. Recognition of the theory's limitations does
not undercut the importance of corrective justice theory as an account
of the permissibility and justice of compensatory damages as a form of
remedy. Just as the instrumentalist errs in conflating the level of
rights with the level of rights of action, the corrective justice theorist
errs in conflating the level of rights of action with the level of reme-
dies.
VI. CIVIL RECOURSE
One version of the substantive standing rule is this: A plaintiff
does not have a right of action against a defendant unless the defen-
dant violated her right. We have seen that the substantive standing
rule cannot be accounted for from the point of view of corrective
justice theory or law and economics, the former because it fails to
capture the notion of "right of action" in the tort law, and the latter
because it fails to capture the notion of "right." I have suggested a
firmer conceptual foundation for "right" and "right of action." It is
now time to construct a positive account of the substantive standing
rule.
A. The Principle of Civil Recourse
What I shall call the "principle of civil recourse" states that a
person ought to be permitted civil recourse against one who has vio-
lated her legal rights. Our tort law can be understood, in part, as an
embodiment of this principle. It explains why plaintiffs are empow-
ered and privileged to act against defendants: The law's recognition
of a privilege in a plaintiff reflects an acceptance of the idea that a
person ought to be able to proceed against others, through the state,
under certain circumstances. As discussed above, a recognition of this
privilege does not entail that a defendant ought to be required to pay
a plaintiff independently of the plaintiffs decision to proceed against
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that defendant. Rather, the plaintiff is privileged to have the state
coerce the defendant into paying him if he chooses to proceed. The
plaintiffs privilege exists because the defendant violated the
plaintiff's right.
Civil recourse is "civil" in at least three respects. First, it is
civil as opposed to "barbaric." Holmes famously discussed the "blood
feuds" of German origin that predated our tort system.28' The early
medieval common law of England permitted vicious and cruel pun-
ishments to be imposed as remedies by private parties whose rights
had been violated; these included hanging, blinding, castration, and
amputation of a hand or foot.22 Similarly, the ancients permitted tort
penalties that included "debt slavery, chattel slavery, killing, beating,
mutilation, public disgrace, outlawry, and the blood feud."28
Whatever complaints one might have about the potential onus of
money judgments and dealing with lawyers, a money judgment is not
this kind of barbarism, and in this respect, the recourse open to plain-
tiffs is civil.
Second, unlike the blood feuds Holmes discusses, the recourse
is provided through a civil legal system and is essentially mediated by
this system. A wronged plaintiff is privileged to use the civil law in a
certain way against the defendant. She is not personally entitled to
take land or money from the defendant; she is entitled only to use the
civil legal system to exact compensation from the defendant through a
civil procedure.
Third, the recourse is civil as opposed to criminal. The law
does not invest individuals with the privilege to bring the criminal
law down on the head of one who violated his right. A person can
complain to the state, but it is not his choice whether the criminal law
will be applied to the defendant, and it is not his choice whether to
impose a criminal punishment on the defendant.
The idea of recourse is arguably in the same conceptual family
as the retributive notion of an eye for an eye, and an idea of recourse
lies behind the conviction that I may hit someone who hits me, that I
may take back stolen property, that I may lash out with bitter words
at one who has acted cruelly towards me. The same principle
281. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 3 (Dover ed. 1991) (1881).
282. See David J. Seipp, The Distinction Between Crime and Tort in the Early Common
Law, 76 B.U. L. REv. 59, 61-62 (1996).
283. James Lindgren, Why the Ancients May Not Have Needed a System of Criminal Law,
76 B.U. L. REv. 29, 31 (1996).
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supports the notion that a person is entitled, as a matter of justice, to
redress a wrong done to her.
I believe that legal scholars have shied away from the idea of a
right to re'dress because it seems to reflect a sense of private retribu-
tion based on vengeance, which is antithetical to contemporary no-
tions of justice and the rule of law. The essence of a genuinely lawful
and just system, one might think, is that individuals are not permit-
ted to take an eye for an eye: The law reigns, not fits of private
vengeance.
One may sympathize with this reaction, as I do, but still recog-
nize the importance of recourse in our tort law; indeed, I shall argue
that these concerns are part of a justification of the principle of civil
recourse. It is essential to our ordered society and our legal system
that we do not permit private retribution for the violation of legal
rights. Having been wronged is neither an excuse nor a justification
for violence against or taking from another, except in rare cases. The
law prohibits and criminalizes violence as a reaction to legal wrongs.
That is, indeed, part of what is sometimes meant by "the rule of law."
Nevertheless, the often touted principle, "Ubi jus, ubi reme-
dium"--where there's a right there's a remedy-expresses the widely
shared conviction that if one has been wronged, one ought, in fairness,
to have some recourse through the state against the wrongdoer. In
other words, where the state forbids private vengeful retribution,
fairness demands that an opportunity for redress be provided by the
state.
An analogy to familial disputes illustrates the conception of
fairness at play. When a child has been wronged by her brother or
sister-when she has been hit or taunted or her toys have been forc-
ibly removed-her immediate instinct may be to retaliate, perhaps
violently. Parents who forbid their children to be violent, even in
retaliation for a recognized violation of the rules, are typically then
faced with a certain kind of appeal from the rule-abiding child. The
child appeals to the parent to respond to the fact that her sibling hit
her or took her toys by reprimanding the sibling, requiring an
apology, or some other act on her behalf. There are often sound
pragmatic reasons to respond to the victimized child's appeal; for
example, it probably helps to prevent disputes from escalating.
Beyond pragmatic reasons, however, there is a reason of fairness.
Having forbidden the child to respond directly to being wronged by
her sibling, the parent may have an obligation to provide the child
with some other way of dealing with having been wronged by her
sibling. It is unfair to ask the child to remain passive in the face of
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her sibling's wrongs against her, without at least permitting her to
use parental authority to force her sibling to make up for those
wrongs.
The principle of civil recourse reflects a similar conviction
about fairness in civil life among citizens. Life in civil society requires
obeying a series of rules and refraining from a wide range of conduct.
These rules are occasionally broken by others. Others sometimes fail
to respect one's rights. The rule of law forbids private retribution
when such invasions of rights occur. Individuals whose rights are
invaded are therefore left in a predicament; they are not permitted to
seek private redress or retribution, but to leave the rights invasion
unredressed would be intolerably unfair.
The law solves this problem by recognizing a privilege and
creating a power in the person whose rights were violated to act
against the rights-violator through the authority of the state. In do-
ing so, the law creates what is literally a right of action against the
rights-violator. Our society thus avoids the mayhem and crudeness of
vengeful private retribution, but without the unfairness of leaving
individuals powerless against invasions of their rights. The
statement that one has a "right" to bring an action against a
defendant is a way of saying that fairness demands that the state
recognize an individual's privilege to proceed against the defendant
for civil recourse.
If we wish, we can also frame this point in the language of
social contract theory.2M It is too thin a version of social contract
theory to imagine that we consent to obey certain rules of conduct on
condition that others do the same. Any sensible party to a social
contract will want to know what will happen if other parties violate
the contract, that is, violate one's rights. Providing only criminal
sanctions for rights violations is inadequate in at least two ways.
First, such sanctions do not ensure that a violation will never occur,
and if it does occur, the victim's need for redress will not necessarily
be satisfied by the imposition of punishment on the rights-violator.
284. Cf JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GovERNMENT §§ 7-10 (C.B. Macpherson ed.
Hackett 1980) (1690) (recognizing right of an individual to "retribute" wrongs to him, and
explaining it within a social contract framework); ROBERT NOzICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND
UTOPIA 10-25 (1974) (developing within libertarian framework Lockean social contract ideas
regarding right to aggress against wrongdoers in state of nature). Nozick's account develops
along the lines of a liability rule view, NOZIC, supra at 54-87, which, for the reasons stated in
Part IV, supra, I believe does not provide an adequate account of the actual structure of our tort
law. The framework I am developing here is not inconsistent with that of the preeminent
contemporary social contract theorist, John Rawls. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE (1971), elaborated and modified in JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993).
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Second, if there is a broad set of rights, then the proliferation of crimi-
nal sanctions for violations of such rights would be a serious and
frightening constraint on the liberty of the social contractor, ex ante,
especially since many rights invasions will be unintentional.
The idea of civil recourse is a desirable solution to the social
contractor. Consenting to comply with all the rules, even after one's
rights are violated, does not entail giving up all possibility of redress
should others invade one's own rights. Conversely, consenting to be
subject to a wide variety of duties to others does not entail being
vulnerable to a similarly wide range of possible criminal sanctions.
While the state takes away the liberty of private retribution, it offers
a right to civil redress in its place. While it creates in each a vulner-
ability to action under the law, it provides in return protection from
the threat of private retribution.2
B. Substantive Standing and the Principle of Civil Recourse
Let us return to substantive standing. To reiterate, the sub-
stantive standing rule says that a plaintiff does not have a right of
action against a defendant on the basis of harm suffered as a result of
the defendant's invasion of a third party's right; the defendant must
have invaded the plaintiffs own right. The principle of civil recourse
provides an explanation. It states that a person whose right has been
invaded by another is entitled to civil recourse against that other
person. This principle, so stated, does not imply an entitlement to
civil recourse for any but those whose rights have been violated.
Hence, if the civil recourse principle is indeed the basis for permitting
private rights of action, and if the importance of security against
others precludes permitting private rights of action absent
entitlement to civil recourse against another,28 it follows that
substantive standing should be required.
285. Cf David Gauthier, Self-Defense and the Requirement of Imminence: Comments on
George Fletcher's Domination in the Theory of Justification and Excuse, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 615,
619 (1996) (offering social contract explanation of features of criminal law, reasoning that
criminal law "offers public deterrence in place of private preemption, public punishment in place
of private retaliation"). I am suggesting that tort law offers private rights of action in place of
private retaliation.
286. The social contract frameworks I have invoked, be they Lockean, Nozickean, or
Rawlsian, would presume that individuals have a substantial security interest in not allowing
the state to compel them to relinquish money or property in response to another private
person's initiative. I am arguing that the principle of civil recourse provides a rationale for
permitting those who have been wronged to have a power and privilege against those who
wronged them that is sufficiently strong to permit invasion of this (presumed) interest. Given
this presumed security interest, however, the absence of a justification for a right of action
grounded in the principle of civil recourse entails at least a prima facie recourse argument that
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But the issue requires greater attention than we have given it.
The prior section explained the idea of civil recourse and the general
reason why fairness often requires that individuals be provided with
recourse against others. In fully evaluating the substantive standing
rule, we must explore why individuals might be entitled to civil re-
course under some conditions but not others. In particular, why is it
critical that a person's right have been invaded in order for her to be
entitled to civil recourse against another? Palsgraf suggests the
following question: Why is it not sufficient that she has been tor-
tiously harmed by the other? The law gathered in Part III suggests
an even more challenging question: Why is it not sufficient that the
plaintiff has been foreseeably tortiously harmed by the defendant?
We can get an intuitive grasp of the answer to this question by
returning to an earlier characterization of the substantive rule: A
plaintiff may not recover unless the defendant's conduct was wrong
relative to her. In short, she may not recover unless the defendant
breached a tort duty to her or wronged her (relative to the set of
wrongs designated under the tort law). If the defendant wronged a
third party, but not the plaintiff, then that plaintiff has no right to
recover. Why should this be so? The answer is that entitlement to
recourse does not spring from the need precipitated by injury. It
springs from the affront of being wronged by another. Because one
should not have to suffer that affront passively, without response,
fairness requires that one have recourse against the wrongdoer.
Substantive standing cases are ones in which the plaintiff is injured,
but she has not suffered the affront of being wronged by defendant.
Thus, while she may have the need for compensation, she does not
have a right to act against the defendant.
The point can also be stated in terms of rights. The law marks
out a set of interests that each of us has in remaining free from the
interferences of others, and a set of prohibitions against interfering
with these interests in others. It thereby recognizes a set of rights in
each person to be free from certain actions of others and a set of
duties in each to refrain from interfering with certain interests of
others. When one person invades another's right, she fails to respect
that special set of interests that the other person is entitled, by law,
to have her respect. The law therefore permits that person civil
there ought not be a right of action. That is, if the principle of civil recourse does not provide a
basis for a right of action-which is true where substantive standing is lacking-then there is at




recourse against her. But where the defendant has not invaded the
plaintiffs right, regardless of whether the defendant caused her harm
indirectly by interfering with some third party's right, the plaintiff is
not entitled to recourse against her. Harm per se does not entitle a
plaintiff to recourse.
Finally, it is critical to distinguish the question of whether a
plaintiff has a right of action from the question of what form of rem-
edy is available to her if she does have a right of action. Obviously,
once it is established that a plaintiff has a right of action because her
primary right was invaded, our system generally permits the plaintiff
to recover compensatory damages, including consequential damages,
for the harm she suffered as a result of that invasion. The availability
of compensatory damages to one who can establish a rights invasion
does not necessarily indicate that harm is the basis of a right to re-
course. Rather, it merely reflects acceptance of the view that compen-
sation for the harm caused is typically an appropriate form of
recourse for those whose rights have been invaded. A wide variety of
reasons supports this normative view of remedies, which is entirely
consistent with the principle of civil recourse. In Part VII, we shall
touch upon the issue of whether "compensatory damages" is the only
appropriate form of remedy under this model.28 7
C. Substantive Standing in Tort Law
The principles of civil recourse and substantive standing in-
form analysis of every kind of tort, but the application of these princi-
ples is most evident for torts like trespass that define legal rights
without reference to harm. It seems fairly obvious that, because a
right of action in trespass is predicated on invasion of a legal right in
the land, only the holder of that legal right has a right of action for
violations of that right.288 This way of understanding the law of tres-
pass is grounded in a broad conceptualization of rights of action: One
is entitled to a right of action because one is entitled to recourse
against persons who have invaded one's interests with which the law
directs others not to interfere.
At the opposite end of the spectrum is the tort of negligence.
The legal right identified by negligence law is defined; in part, by
reference to harm. In enjoining each person to take the care he or she
287. See infra text accompanying notes 313-17.
288. See, e.g., Sky Four Realty Co. v. New York, 512 N.Y.S.2d 987, 989 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1987)
("Restating what would appear to be most obvious, an action for trespass may be brought by a
person in exclusive legal possession at the time of trespass.").
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owes to others, negligence law protects each individual's interest in
being free from harm caused by others' failure to take the care they
owe to that individual. Harm is therefore a necessary component of
an invasion of a legal right in negligence law. It is consequently also
a necessary condition for the right to recourse. Finally, in negligence
law, the remedy afforded a plaintiff is neatly tailored to rectify the
harm by making the plaintiff whole.
But harm without a violation of a plaintiffs right does not give
rise to a cause of action in negligence law. Thus, a parent whose child
has been injured by negligence typically cannot recover for her own
emotional injury if it was only her child to whom the duty was
breached;- 9 a merchant who suffers financial ruin because of the de-
fendant's negligent destruction of a third party's property cannot
recover if it is only the duty to a third party that was breached;29° a
non-client cannot recover for harm caused by an accountant's negli-
gence if it was only the accountant's duty to the client that was
breached.291 To the extent that the law of negligence becomes more
receptive to plaintiffs in these areas, it is because the scope of duty is
expanded; the substantive standing rule is retained in any case. The
principle of civil recourse explains this rule.
In certain respects, defamation and fraud lie somewhere be-
tween property torts and negligence, and this is perhaps why the
substantive standing rule seems neither trivial nor formalistic in
these areas. Unlike negligence, these torts do not define rights in
terms that make reference to freedom from harm. Unlike trespass
and nuisance, which draw from property law, these torts do not draw
upon a scheme of rights used elsewhere in the law. Thus, defamation
protects individuals against the affront of a reputational attack; a
person has a right of action under defamation law only if his reputa-
tion is attacked. The of-and-concerning element ensures that only a
person whose right against attack has been invaded may bring an
action, regardless of whether others were actually harmed. The sub-
stantive standing rule in defamation cases-the of-and-concerning
requirement-embodies the principle of civil recourse in the case of
defamation.
A similar analysis applies to fraud. The right protected is a
right against being deceived. A fraud plaintiff arguably can be de-
ceived in any number of ways: by a representation made directly to
289. See supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
290. See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
291. See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
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her, by a representation made to her through other parties, by a rep-
resentation made to the public which she hears and relies upon, by a
concealment or omission, or by a representation translated into a
price. If a plaintiff has been deceived, her right has been invaded and
she is entitled to civil recourse. But where a plaintiff has not relied
upon the representation, omission, or translation in any way, she has
not been deceived, and the right protected by fraud law has not been
invaded. She thus has no right of recourse against the originator of
the misrepresentation. The principle of civil recourse appears in
fraud cases as the rule that only a plaintiff who has relied may
recover; only the right of one who relied has been invaded and only
she has been decieved by the defendant.
The substantive standing rule within each tort is explained
analogously. Thus, nuisance is an interference with another's use and
enjoy property; the right invaded is the right to use and enjoy
property. Only the party whose property right is invaded is entitled
to recourse against the person whose action is a nuisance. Malicious
prosecution is an invasion of the right to be free from abusive
litigation; only the one litigated against is entitled to recourse for
violation of this right. Privacy torts recognize a right against
interference with a person's freedom from certain kinds of intrusion,
appropriation, or publicity; only persons whose right against such
interferences has been invaded have recourse against these invaders.
Only someone who herself has been wronged has recourse against the
one who committed that wrong.
The core idea of civil recourse is that the affront of being
legally wronged by another entitles an individual to a right of action
against that other. The tort law defines the ways in which we wrong
one another: by deceiving, hitting, attacking reputation, abusively
suing, depriving another of use or enjoyment of land, invading
another's privacy, inflicting physical or property damage through
want of care owing to the other, or interfering with one's contract. A
person who has been wronged in these ways has a right to civil
recourse against the one who has wronged her. The institution of
private rights of action in tort law is an embodiment of the principle
of civil recourse.
D. Palsgraf, Public Law, and Private Law
Behind Cardozo's adherence to the substantive standing rule
in Palsgraf lies the idea of civil recourse. "One who seeks redress at
law does not make out a cause of action by showing without more that
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there has been damage to his person;"292 to be entitled to redress, rea-
soned Cardozo, one must show not just a harm to oneself, but an
"[a]ffront to personality."293 Such an affront is "the keynote of the
wrong."294 Noting that the medieval trespass action is the historical
basis of negligence, he wrote that, originally, "trespass did not lie in
the absence of aggression, and that direct and personal."29 5 Cardozo
clearly viewed a plaintiffs right of action as an opportunity to redress,
and thereby to vindicate, the violation of rights she has endured, and
not as an opportunity to gain compensation for the harm she has suf-
fered. And that is precisely what he says as he concludes his analysis
in Palsgraf" "The victim does not sue derivatively, or by right of sub-
rogation, to vindicate an interest invaded in the person of another.
Thus to view his cause of action is to ignore the fundamental differ-
ence between tort and crime. He sues for breach of a duty owing to
himself."29
Cardozo's mention of the distinction between tort and crime
provides another clue as to why his opinion often seems odd to
modern scholars. In his insistence that Mrs. Palsgraf lacks standing
to sue for a wrong to another, Cardozo appears to display a rejection
of torts as an arena of public law, and this apparent rejection seems
especially counterintuitive on the facts of Palsgraf: If the trainman
acted wrongly, why not sanction him? And if Mrs. Palsgraf needed
compensation, why not compensate her? When we picture tort law as
a form of social insurance funded by sanctions imposed upon
wrongdoers, or when we picture it as a form of regulation whose
proceeds are used to compensate the injured, the case seems wrongly
decided. As I have argued above, however, such an instrumental
perspective is incapable of taking into account huge areas of tort
doctrine, not just Palsgraf. What is so striking about Palsgraf,
however, is the explicit recognition, by this highly esteemed common
law judge, that tort law is not just about deterrence and
compensation. Cardozo seems to be rejecting one of the most widely
accepted of Holmes's insights; he seems to be denying that tort law is
really a form of public law.29 7





297. Weinrib can be interpreted as embracing this view of Cardozo's opinion in Palsgraf,
and making it the center of his theory. See WE-INR, supra note 7, at 7 (a target of Weinrib's
formalism is the view that "[a]ll law is public, in that the legal authorities of the state select the
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The model I have offered suggests that this conclusion misses
the mark. For Cardozo, tort law was both more public and more pri-
vate than Holmes recognized. Insofar as tort law is about enforce-
ment-rights of action-it is indeed more of a private matter than
instrumentalists maintain. In recognizing a private cause of action
against a defendant, the state is not necessarily endorsing the view
that justice or efficiency or avoidance of social harm will be better
served if the defendant is required to pay the plaintiff compensatory
damages under these circumstances. While these considerations
undoubtedly play important roles within our system, the root
justification for a private right of action is the idea that the plaintiff
whose legal rights were invaded by the defendant is entitled to act
against the defendant through the state, by having the state enforce a
judgment against the defendant on her behalf. The justice in the
enforcement of private law lies in recognizing in those who are ag-
grieved a right to recourse against those who wronged them. It does
not lie in the justice of bringing about a state of affairs that is optimal
from a social point of view, whether corrective, distributive, or
economic considerations provide the criteria of optimality.
Yet this is only half of the story-the remedial half. Tort law
consists not only in rights of action, but, I have argued, in primary
rights and duties, in wrongs, and in relational directives. In announc-
ing the kind of conduct that is tortious, courts are enjoining indi-
viduals from treating one another certain ways and enjoining them to
treat one another certain ways. This is the creation of schemes of
legal rights and duties. These schemes are founded, in our system, on
a wide range of moral, political, and economic considerations charac-
teristic of those underlying public law.298 They serve as norms that
guide the behavior of citizens toward one another.299 They create or
reinforce a sense of legal obligation to treat others certain ways, and a
sense of legal entitlement in the security of certain interests. These
directive norms in tort law regulate conduct ranging from how a phy-
sician treats her patients and how a driver treats other drivers, to
favored goals and inscribe them into a schedule of collectively approved aims"); id. at 159-70
(making Palsgraf central to account of tort law as private law).
298. Cf COLEMAN, supra note 7, at 354-60 (describing variety of "local" and conventional
norms that give content to duties within a broader corrective justice framework). Cf IzHAK
ENGLARD, THE PHILOSOPHY OF TORT LAW 64-70 (1993) (describing broader pluralism, both at the
level of liability imposition and at the level of rights and wrongs).
299. See John C.P. Goldberg, Note, Community and the Common Law Judge:
Reconstructing Cardozo's Theoretical Writings, 65 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1324, 1334-36 (1990) (noting
that Cardozo believed that common law judges served the function of articulating and enforcing
norms of social conduct).
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how a large industry monitors its emissions and how a manufacturer
designs its appliances. In this important sense, tort law is also a form
of public law.
While the "rights, wrongs, and recourse" model I have offered
is distinct from the dominant approaches in contemporary tort theory,
it is neither novel nor idiosyncratic. The historical roots of tort law
display a similar character. From the early medieval period until the
sixteenth century, what we would now call tort actions were private
rights of action for damages, predicated on the defendant's having
committed a legal wrong.300 The legal construct permitting a private
person to act against one who "trespassed" against him was formed by
grafting together two different ideas. On the one hand was the idea
that the law requires each of us to refrain from interfering with
others in various ways. Historically, these "legal wrongs" were those
actions that constituted "breaches of the King's peace"301 and, more
generally, violations of the duties express and implied in the law of
private property, social custom, and contract.30 2 On the other hand
was the idea that individuals who have been wronged by others are
entitled to some redress against them.303 Through time, of course, the
range of wrongs, rights, and duties articulated in the law has
expanded beyond the range of criminal law and property law; the
forms of recourse have been narrowed, principally to actions for
damages and injunctions-to civil recourse as we know it. Though
they have evolved, the two basic ideas at the core of tort law-a
scheme of wrongs and rights and a mode of civil recourse through the
state-have remained constant.
VII. IMPLICATIONS
The analysis above casts doubt upon two prominent forms of
argumentation in torts. Some advocates of law and economics analy-
sis-most notably Landes and Posner-claim that they have articu-
300. See Seipp, supra note 282, at 83-85 (observing that in early common law, both torts
and crimes were for the same actions-breaches of the King's peace).
301. See id. at 72-78.
302. See J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION To ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 478-90 (3d ed. 1990)
(observing that nuisance law developed out of recognition of proprietary rights and entitlement
to enjoy property appurtenant to such rights); id. at 462-64 (prior to eighteenth century, most
negligence cases were predicated on deviation from custom of realm).




lated the structure underlying tort law.3°4 For judges who believe that
the task of adjudication is to discern the normative logic of the law,
and then follow out the implications of that logic,305 Landes and
Posner's argument provides a strong basis for using economic analysis
in deciding the law. And, indeed, such thinking is apparent in many
cases.30 6 I have argued, however, that a reductive economic approach
does not explain the doctrine of substantive standing. More generally,
I have suggested that the structural relationship among rights, rights
of action, and remedies in our tort law does not support a global
economic account of the normative structure of tort law. If my
arguments are sound, significant consequences follow for adjudicative
methodology. For judges who wish to follow the logic of our actual
tort law, the economic model is probably not the place to begin. If
they wish to use an economic model in shaping tort law, they must do
so on the ground that this model is normatively superior on its own
right, not that it is the normative structure to which the law is
already committed. And they must be prepared to argue that it is
within their proper role as adjudicators to implement a shift in the
normative structure of tort law.
Likewise, to the extent that corrective justice theorists claim to
have captured the normative underpinnings of tort law, my account
casts doubt on those claims. Judges should not apply the normative
principles these theorists set forth if they are doing so under the
assumption that they are following the logic of the law. If they do
apply corrective justice principles, they must do so because they be-
lieve these are the normative principles the law ought to follow, and
they believe it is a sound exercise of their institutional role to correct
the normative orientation of the tort law.
In a more positive vein, the account I have set forth above also
appears to have implications for several concrete issues in tort law. I
will briefly mention a few of these issues in order to preview some of
the work that I believe needs to be done. If my analysis of Palsgraf is
correct, then, at least in light of the overall normative foundation of
tort law, the mainstream of tort scholarship on the duty and proxi-
mate cause elements in negligence law has laid too great an emphasis
on foreseeability and a potpourri of ad hoc liability-limiting considera-
304. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 6, at 312 ("[Tlhe structure of the common law is
economic in character.").
305. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, LAw's EMPIRE (1986).
306. See, e.g., Edwards v. Honeywell, 50 F.3d 484, 491 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, C.J.) (using
"cheapest-cost-avoider" analysis to decide duty issue).
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tions.307 My account suggests that a thick relational conception of
duty must be developed to offer a satisfying explanation of the contro-
versial three-party tort cases involving emotional injury,3 08 economic
injury,309 or liability to non-clients and non-patients.3 10 With respect
to proximate cause, the risk rule has a broad and legitimate role to
play.31' Both the relational conception of duty and the risk rule are
conceptual companions to the substantive standing rule, although
instrumentalists have rejected these notions as incoherent because
they cannot make sense of substantive standing. These notions, now
revitalized, must be developed as an alternative to the
instrumentalist free-for-all that now dominates both duty and
proximate cause analysis.312
My analysis of the normative basis of rights of action in terms
of civil recourse may also have implications for how we think about
damages in tort law, particularly how we think about punitive dam-
ages.3 13 Under leading versions of corrective justice theory, there is
simply no place for any form of damages that are non-compensatory.
31 4
While law-and-economics scholars can offer various rationales for
super-compensatory damages, particularly by noting underenforce-
ment and detection problems,315 it is highly unlikely that an underen-
forcement rationale will explain why punitive damages are unusual
and why they hinge on state-of-mind. In short, law and economics is
unlikely to be able to offer a persuasive positive account. More gener-
ally, both corrective justice theory and law and economics can be
expected to have difficulty with non-compensatory damages because
the idea that a defendant is liable for the cost of the plaintiffs injury
is built into the very determination of why there is a right, under
307. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 53, at 358 (defining duty as the "expression of the
sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that plaintiff is entitled to
protection").
308. See supra Part HI.C.1.
309. See supra Part HI.C.2.
310. See supra Part II.C.3.
311. See supra Part HI.C.4.
312. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 135 (criticizing instrumentalist conception of
duty element in negligence law and developing an alternative based on relational, moral
conception of duty).
313. See BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996) (holding $2 million puni-
tive damage award on $4,000 injury violated due process).
314. See, e.g., WEINRIB, supra note 7, at 135 n.25 ("[U]nder corrective justice damages are
compensatory, not punitive.").
315. See, e.g., SHAVELL, supra note 6, at 148 (noting one reason for damages above compen-
sation is problem of injurers who escape detection).
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their view.316 From the point of view of positive tort theory, these
limitations are striking, for our actual tort law contains not only
compensatory damages, but punitive and nominal damages, as well as
a variety of forms of injunctive and non-monetary relief, not to
mention monetary awards for pain and suffering, which fit uneasily
within the notion of "making whole."3 17
The principle of civil recourse, by contrast, leaves plenty of
conceptual space for non-compensatory damages. It states that a
person is entitled to civil recourse against one who has wronged her,
but leaves open the question of what form of recourse ought to be
afforded. In assessing whether a particular form of recourse is appro-
priate or at least permissible, society may reasonably consider
whether a plaintiffs having been wronged in a certain way by a de-
fendant serves as a sound basis for permitting the plaintiff to exact a
certain sort of remedy from the defendant. More generally, the prin-
ciple of civil recourse as a theory of private rights of action creates a
different context within which to think about the reasons underlying
the availability of a variety of forms of damages in tort law. In light
of mounting controversy concerning the appropriate extent of punitive
damages and non-pecuniary damages, a new and flexible analytical
perspective should be a welcome arrival."8
Proximate cause, duty, and damages are only a few of the
many aspects of tort law that the rights and recourse model may illu-
minate."19 I do not mean to suggest that application of the theory
should be undertaken lightly; many qualifications are necessary.
Thus, it may be said that law and economics and corrective justice
theory are comprehensive theoretical enterprises that cannot be
refuted by reference to one or two problems; that the normative struc-
ture of tort law-if there is such a thing at all-may be pluralistic and
not monolithic; and that, however tort law may once have been under-
316. Of course, Calabresi and Melamed, supra note 6, have generated an important frame-
work for addressing when injunctive relief, as opposed to damages, should be available, and a
large body of literature has developed this framework. See also supra note 181 and authorities
cited therein. But given the initial categorization of a right in terms of a liability rule (rather
than a property rule), and given Posner's account of why compensatory damages are
presumptively the appropriate level of damages, it is unclear why the common law's many
deviations from compensatory damages are coherent.
317. Cf Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, The Non-Pecuniary Costs of Accidents: Pain-
and-Suffering Damages in Tort Law, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1785 (1995) (setting forth economic
analysis of advisability of permitting pain-and-suffering awards).
318. See generally Robert L. Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Ideology of Enterprise Liability,
55 M. L. REV. 1190, 1208-09 (1996) (stating many current tort reform controversies focus on
remedies).
319. See, e.g., Ripstein & Zipursky, supra note 7 (utilizing notion of recourse to analyze
causation and theory of market-share liability in mass torts).
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stood, highly instrumentalist notions have now become part of the
fabric of tort law. All of these are fair complaints. They speak to the
need for caution in jettisoning established theories, for modesty in the
application of new ones, and for integration of the insights of
economic analysis, corrective justice theory, and deterrence-and-com-
pensation instrumentalism into the model of rights, wrongs, and re-
course.
The kind of analysis I have offered in this Article might give
rise to a different and deeper concern. I have argued that certain
aspects of tort law are best explained as embodiments of a normative
principle-the principle of civil recourse. I have also suggested that
there are certain appealing normative justifications for the principle
of civil recourse. It might be inferred from this argument that tort
law ought to be interpreted, in the future, to conform to the normative
principles that it has been argued to embody. This inference has been
vigorously defended by Ronald Dworkin in all areas of the law.3
20
Despite the controversy it has aroused in circles of jurisprudence and
constitutional theory,321 it is remarkably well liked in tort law.
Indeed, such an assumption appears to underlie some of the work of
Landes and Posner, Epstein, Coleman, and Weinrib, and I have argu-
ably presupposed it myself in previewing the implications of my
account for the analysis of duty, proximate cause, and damages.
The inference from existing normative structure to the proper
manner of articulating the law is by no means forced on judges, how-
ever. Common law judges obviously have the raw power to shape the
law as they see fit; whether, on unsettled questions of law, such exer-
cises of power are legitimate if aimed to implement a normative struc-
ture that conflicts with that embedded in tort law is a delicate ques-
tion. It is particularly delicate in light of the observation that, even
assuming some normative ideas to be central, a plurality of normative
ideas underlies the precedents of contemporary tort law.322 More
importantly, tort theorists must look beyond adjudication, because as
a practical matter, citizens and legislators want to know what laws
they should create, abolish, or modify, and why. For all of these rea-
sons, what I have presented-a descriptive theory of the normative
320. See DwORKIN, supra note 305, at 410-13.
321. See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Kenneth Kress, Against Legal Principles, in LAW AND
INTERPRETATION: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHIOSOPHY 279 (Andrei Marmor ed., 1995) (describing and
criticizing Dworkin's and other theories that place weight on "principles" allegedly underlying
legal decisions).
322. See, e.g., ENGLARD, supra note 298, at 64-70.
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structure of tort law-is not necessarily all one might want from a
tort theory.
On the other hand, a descriptive theory is worthwhile even for
those who are aiming, through tort law, to realize normative goals
they believe to be defensible and important in their own right. An
understanding of what tort law has in some sense been designed to do
may be useful in assessing the limits of what it can be made to do. If
we think certain social goals ought to be realized-for example,
corrective justice between private parties, efficient allocation of re-
sources, compensation of those seriously injured, deterrence of
socially costly corporate conduct-it may be that we will achieve only
partial success in realizing these goals through tort law and that we
ought to put our energy into other forms of law or other institutions in
order to realize such goals.3 23 Other goals--distributive economic
justice, for example-may in fact conflict with the fundamental
normative structure of tort law and provide reason to limit the reach
of the law. We will achieve greatest success in answering these
questions if we come prepared with an understanding of the norma-
tive principles our actual tort law embodies.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Tort theory is currently dominated by two competing frame-
works: law and economics and corrective justice theory. Law and
economics sees tort law as an instrument for the attainment of effi-
cient levels of activity and allocation of resources. Corrective justice
theory depicts the law as an embodiment of a set of principles accord-
ing to which wrongdoers who injure others have an obligation to rec-
tify the harm they have done. Each maintains that its own view of-
fers the best positive theory of tort law. I have argued that each is
flawed and have offered an alternative to both.
My argument proceeded at two levels, one doctrinal and the
other conceptual. At the doctrinal level, I argued that a fundamental
feature of tort law-the substantive standing rule-is anomalous
within both economic and corrective justice theory. This rule is a
323. See, e.g., STEPHEN D. SuGARMAN, DOING AWAY WrrtH PERSONAL INJURY LAW 127-200
(1989) (advocating insurance and regulatory alternative to tort system); Kenneth S. Abraham &
Lance Liebman, Private Insurance, Social Insurance, and Tort Reform: Toward a New Vision of
Compensation for Illness and Injury, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 75, 78 (1993) (arguing need for
expanded compensation system outside of tort law in light of the limitations intrinsic to tort
law).
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pervasive requirement in tort law; it underlies many of the most puz-
zling areas of tort doctrine, and it lies at the root of our most famous
case, Palsgraf. Yet neither theory adequately explains the logic of
Palsgraf. More generally, neither explains the existence of the sub-
stantive standing rule in other torts, and neither explains the idea of
substantive standing. As positive theories of tort law, therefore, both
frameworks are deficient.
The substantive standing rule also points to fundamental
conceptual problems with both major theories. Law and economics
cannot make sense of the substantive standing rule because it treats
the concept of a "right" under the tort law simply as a shorthand way
of referring to rights of action. This treatment, in turn, derives from
economists' more general view of tort law as a series of liability rules.
I argued that the norms of tort law are not mere liability rules, and I
set forth an alternative conception of legal wrongs, rights, and duties
in tort law. This alternative conception permits us to understand how
wrongs can be "relational" and how rights can be something more
than price tags for our activities.
While corrective justice theory may be able to handle the no-
tion of rights, it too fails at a structural level. It focuses on the defen-
dant's duty of repair, not seeing that a more fundamental set of prin-
ciples in tort law concerns a plaintiffs right of action. Tort theory
ought to focus upon questions about why the state empowers
plaintiffs to act against defendants through civil litigation, not about
why the state requires defendants to take responsibility for the harms
they cause. I have offered an analysis of the notion of a "right of
action" that enables us to address these questions.
Thus, law and economics and corrective justice theory both
appear to be unsatisfactory as positive theories of tort law. One
theory falls short because of its inability to make sense of the notion
of rights and wrongs, the other because of its inability to make sense
of the notion of a right of action. The substantive standing rule,
which relates rights and wrongs to rights of action, dramatically
illustrates the need for a theory that makes sense of both. But even
apart from the doctrinal importance of the rule, any framework that
misconceives rights, wrongs, or rights of action will be inadequate as
a positive theory of tort law.
A different picture of tort law emerges from my critique. One
aspect of tort law consists of legal rules-directives-which enjoin
every person from treating any other person in certain ways.
According to these rules, no one is to batter, defame, defraud, or negli-
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gently injure others, or trespass upon their land. Conversely, no one
is to be battered, defamed, defrauded or negligently injured, and no
one is to have her land trespassed upon. The rights created by the
tort law are simply ways of being treated that the tort law enjoins
through legal rules. As with our statutory law, a multiplicity of policy
and principle reasons underlie our existing set of legal rules
specifying how people may treat one another.
A second, and equally important, aspect of tort law concerns
rights of action. A private right of action is a private individual's
power and privilege to act against others through the state. The
substantive standing rule is a limitation on the institution of private
rights of action. It permits a plaintiff to act through the state against
a defendant only if the defendant has treated the plaintiff in a
manner proscribed by the legal rules of tort law. The normative basis
for this limitation is the idea of civil recourse, the idea that being
wronged by another is what gives rise to a right to act against the
other. To this extent, and in a manner that is artificial, indirect, and
civil, the tort law is about getting even. More accurately, it is about
not getting even, about what the state gives us in place of getting even.
Rights, wrongs, and recourse form the conceptual core of the
law of torts. On the side of rights and wrongs, a domain of legal
norms asserts that people are not to be treated in certain ways. On
the recourse side, a system of rules empowers those who have been
treated in the ways the law prohibits to seek redress, through the
state, against those who have mistreated them. Efficiency, corrective
justice, deterrence, and compensation may each have a role to play in
explaining why we classify some conduct as mistreatment and not
others, and why we permit recourse on certain occasions and in cer-
tain forms. But without adequate conceptions of rights, wrongs, and
recourse as our framework, we cannot make sense of the basic struc-
ture of tort law.
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